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INTRODUCTION 
The  Eighth Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  contains: 
1.  A synopsis  of  the activities of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and 
its Working  Parties  for  1970. 
2.  A recapitulation of the  accident statistics  for  the years  1958  to  1970  with 
comments  on  their trend. 
3.  A list of new  official regulations  brought  into  force  in  1969  and  1970. 
Since  Government  action in  implementing  the  recommendations  of  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  is  only  reported  on  every  two  years,  this  does  not  feature 
in  this  report. 
The  items  listed on  the  preceding  page  have  been  relegated  to  the  annex. 9 
SECTION  I 
ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
On  3  November  1970  the  Commission  of  the European  Communities  appointed 
Mr.  Coppe,  member  of  the Social Security Commission,  Chairman  of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission  in place of Mr.  Levi-Sandri,  Vice-Chairman  of  the  Commission,  who  left 
the  Communities  on  1  July  1970.  At  the meeting  on  26  June  1970  Mr.  Levi-Sandri  said 
farewell  to  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  of which  he  had  been  Chairman  since 
7  December  1967  replacing at  that  time  Mr.  Coppe,  who  had  been  Chairman  since June  1965. 
In  1970,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  held  two  meetings,  the Restrict-
ed  Committee  two,  the  Working  Parties  and  their Sub-Committees  40.  In addition,  the 
Secretariat of the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  organised or gave its support  to 
five  information meetings  for  interested persons  from  the  trade  unions  and  from  management. 
The  overall total therefore increased  to  49  (47  in 1969). 
The  breakdown  of  the meetings  of  the Working  Parties  and  their Sub-Committees 
is  as  follows: 
Rescue  arrangements,  Mine  Fires,  Underground  Combustion:  2 
Rescue  arrangements:  4 
Ventilation Sub-Committee:  6 
Shaft-Fires  Sub-Committee:  1 
Fire-resistant fluids  Sub-Committee:  9 
Winding  and  guide  ropes:  2 
Electricity:  6 
Flammable  dust:  1 
Joint accident statistics:  3 
Health:  3 
Psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety:  3 
In  the  course  of  this activity,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  was  able 
to  give final  approval  to  certain items,  notably: 
in the  field of health;  2  Recommendations  and  the  adoption of  a  position on  methods  of 
combatting dust  formation  in underground workings  (Annex  VI),  the special  departments 
responsible  for monitoring  the  dust  formation  (Annex  VII)  and  on  the  collaboration 
between machine  constructors,  operators  and  research  departments  to  reduce  the  dust  for-
mation  resulting  from  the  use  of winning  and  road-heading machines  (Annex  VIII), 
- in the  field  of electricity,  a  Recommendation  on  the  characteristics  and  electrical pro-
tection of  cables  supplying mobile  machines  (Annex  IX), 
- in  the  field  of  rescue  arrangements,  a  Report  on  the  results  of joint research  into 
improving  the  physiological  conditions  of  closed-circuit breathing apparatus  (Annex  IV) 
and  a  Report  on  the  instructions  for  a  new  method  of hydromechanical  construction of 
plaster stoppings  (Annex  V). 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  at its meeting  on  26  February  1970, 
took note  of  the Resolutions  adopted  by  the  European  Parliament  at its session on  27  No-
vember  1969  after it had  considered  the  Sixth Report  on  activities of  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  for  the year  1968  (1). 
(1)  The  Seventh Report  for activity in  1969~  adopted by  the  ~nes Safety and Health 
Commission  on  26  June  1970~  could not be  considered in full  session by  the  European 
Parliament until February  1971. 10 
In response  to  the wishes  of  the  European Parliament,  within  the  limits of  the 
powers  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  the Secretariat prepared  the draft  terms 
of  reference for  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in  1969:  study  of  environmental 
factors,  medical  aspects  of dust  suppression methods  and  the  problems  involved  in the 
safety-training of  foreign workers.  It also prepared  the  draft  terms  of reference  required 
by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in February  1970,  with  respect  to  the  activities 
of  the  three Working  Parties  to be  created,  both to  comply with  the wishes  of  the Parlia-
ment  and  to  take  into  account  the  following major  factors: 
- frequency  of  individual  accidents  including accidents  caused by  falls  of  ground  (40%  of 
deaths):  new  Working  Party  "Roof  control"; 
- increasing mechanisation of  the workings,  involving,  as  shown  by  the statistics,  an 
increasing number  of serious  injuries:  new  Working  Party  "Mechanisation"; 
concentration of work  in larger  and  larger units,  causing  increasing  formation  of dust 
and  liberation of  firedamp:  new  Working Party "Ventilation and  Firedamp". 
At  its meeting  on  23  November  1970,  the  Restricted  Committee  studied this  new 
orientation of work.  Knowing  the effective strength of  the Secretariat,  fully occupied 
with its present  activity,  the Restricted  Committee  reviewed  the  terms  of  reference  of 
the  existing Working Parties,  established  the priorities  and  decided  on  the  limitations 
which  would  enable  the  new  terms  of  reference  to be  put  into effect without  increasing 
the  total volume  of its activity. 
This  adoption of position by  the  Restricted  Committee  was  not  able  to  be  con-
sidered by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  during  1970  (1). 
Within  the  framework  of  the  exchange  of  information provided  by  the  Commission  of 
the European  Communities,  the  Secretariat of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  gave 
its support,  by  giving  the  latest results  of its work,  to  information  conferences:  for 
interested  trades  unions  officials at Merlebach  (France)  on  29  May  1970  and  at Heer-Agi-
mont  (Belgium)  on  13  June  1970  and  for British student mining  engineers  at Luxembourg  on 
9.April  1970.  It participated at  a  colloquium of  the Mine  Fires  Commission  of  Charbonnages 
de  France,  held at Albi  on  6,  7  and  8  October  1970,  where  recent work  of  the  Working 
Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Mine  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion  was  discussed  (2). 
Lastly,  on  14  and  15  September  1970,  it organised  in  the  Sulcis basin in Sardi-
nia,  international  information  conferences  on  safety and  health in  coalmines,  for  70 
representatives  of miners'  trades  unions  in the  Community  and  the  United Kingdom.  The 
subjects  discussed related,  in the medical  field,  to  research work  on  pneumoconiosis;  in 
the  technical  field,  to  a  review  of  the work  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  to 
the  results  of  technical dust  research  and  to  the  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  the  accident 
statistics. 
As  in previous  reports,  this first  section sets  out  to  survey,  as  concisely  as 
possible,  Working  Party by  Working  Party,  the  origin of  the work,  development  of  the work 
during  the meeting  in  1970  and  any  results obtained  in certain work,  together with  the 
outstanding problems. 
(1)  Position approved by  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  on  26  March  1971. 
(2)  Technical  Publications~  Charbonnages  de  France~  1971~  no.  2. 11 
I  - TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
A.  Rescue  arrangements,  Mine  Fires,  Underground  Combustion 
The  Working  Party held  one  Plenary Meeting  and  one Restricted Meeting.  At  the 
Plenary Meeting,  it visited the  Cerchar  laboratories  at Verneuil,  where it studied  the 
possibilities of  using  tracer gases  to  detect ventilation  leakages,  which  could be  the 
cause  of  spontaneous  coal beatings.  As  a  restricted group,  it met  in the  laboratories 
of  SMRE  at  Buxton  to  take note  of work  and  research relative  to  foamed  polyurethane, 
specially employed  for  reduction of  these  leaks. 
The  rescue  experts  who  were  members  of  this Working  Party held  four meetings, 
two  of which were  devoted  to  the determination of criteria for  fire-resistant  clothing 
to  be  used  by  rescue workers. 
Sixteen meetings  of experts were  held  on  the  stabilisation of ventilation,  fire-
resistant  fluids  and  shaft  fires. 
This  work  had  the object of  completing  the  terms  of  reference of  those  Sub-Parties 
which  later had  to be  put  into operation following  on  the decision of  the Restricted 
Committee  of  23  November  (1);  the  Sub-Committee  on Fire-Resistant Fluids  achieved  this 
objective after nine meetings. 
The  work  is reported  on  below  in the  order utilised previously. 
1.  Shaft fires 
In  1969,  a  Sub-Committee  of  experts  carried out water-1nJection  tests  in shafts 
about  to be  abandoned  at  Ressaix with  the  object of  correcting,  if necessary,  the  Recom-
mendation of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  of  8th April  1960  regarding  the  ex-
tinction of  shaft  fires  and,  particularly,  the  graph of  the value  of  the  aeromotor  effect 
of water  falling  down  shafts,  since  subsequent  tests had  shown  discrepancies  in  the 
results. 
The  evaluation of  the  results  of  the  latter tests was  completed  in  1970  and  led 
to  an expert  report,  which  had not been placed before  the Working  Party during  the year 
covered by  this  report  (2). 
It followed  from  these  expert  conclusions  that  the values  of  the  graph  should be 
reduced  by  10  to  30  % (10  % for  clear shafts  and  30  % for  obstructed shafts)  when  the 
quantity of  air injected has  reached its steady state, which  takes  5  to  10  minutes  for 
an  air intake  shaft,  during which  the  aeromotive  effect is  clearly  lower.  It has  been 
shown  that water  falling in the  shafts  reaches  a  depth  of  800  m after  1  to  1.5 minutes 
in  an  air intake shaft,  and  fifteen minutes  or more  in  a  return shaft,  depending  upon 
the  ascent velocity of  the  air.  The  experts  could not  give more  precise values  without 
a  supplementary  theoretical  and  experimental  study. 
2.  Fire-resistant fluids 
The  experts  of  the  Sub-Committee  have 'completed  the work  of  rev1s1ng  the  third 
report  on  the specifications  and  conditions  relative to  fire-resistant fluids  for  me-
chanical  transmission. 
(1)  And of the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  of 26  Marah  1971. 
(2)  Submitted to  the  Working  Party on  26  February  1971. 12 
The  fourth  report  prepared  in this way  will be  submitted  to  the Working  Party 
and  to  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  during  1971.(1) 
Numerous  comparative  tests have  been  carried out  in specialist test  and  research 
stations  to  find  joint criteria and  test procedures  (equipment  and working  parameters) 
in various  tests,  such  as: 
- that defining the  flammability  criterion by  determining  the  propagation of  the  flame 
in  a  mixture  of  coaldust  and  oil. 
This  criterion has  been defined more  precisely with  regard  to its working  parameters 
and  the  evaluation of  the  test has  been made  less  stringent,  the  length of  propagation 
accepted  under  the specified conditions  having been  increased  from  7  em  to  10  em, 
this  latter length being  the  arithmetical mean  of  two  series  of  10  measurements,  with 
a  tolerance  of  3  em; 
that  relating to  protection against wear:  the  four-ball  test has  been  supplemented by 
a  test with  a  Vickers  type  vane  pump,  which  takes better account  of  the  practical 
conditions  of  use.  However,  these  two  tests  are  not  of  themselves  sufficient  to  de-
fine  the  very  complex  phenomenon  of wear  and  are  to  be  considered  as  experimental 
methods. 
those  defining  the health criteria relative to  the determination  of  certain  forms 
of  acute  toxicity.  For  anhydrous  fluids,  type  D,  an  enquiry  in the  coalmines  of  the 
Community  is still in progress with  regard  to  the  toxicity of  aerosols.  Even  now,  it 
is being  found  that  the  irritating capacity of  aerosols  and  thermal  decomposition 
products  of  these  fluids  on  the mucous  membranes,  the  epidermis  and  the  eyes,  as  for 
the  other fire-resistant  fluids,  does  not  pose  grave  problems  if certain simple pre-
cautions,  reviewed  in the Fourth Report  of  the  experts,  are  taken. 
Lastly,  again with  respect  to  certain of  these  products  of  type  D,  research  is 
at present being carried out  in the  Hamburg  Pharmacological  Institute  as  to  their 
possible  chronic  tonic effect. 
3.  Foamed  polyurethane seals 
At  its meeting  of  26  February  1970  the  Mines  Safety  and  Research  Commission 
adopted  a  Note  on  the  use  of  foamed  polyurethane in underground workings. 
Because  of its great  interest,  and  to hasten its distribution,  this Note  has  al-
ready  been  published  in Annex  VI  of  the  Seventh  Report. 
Among  other matters,  it discussed  the precautions  which  must  be  taken when  using 
this  product  and  enumerated,  for  the benefit  of  the  chemical  industry,  the  improvements 
which  must  be  made  to  polyurethane  or  to  a  material with  similar properties  to permit 
its use without  reservations  underground. 
Following  on  the disaster at  the Michael  Colliery  in Great  Britain,  the  SMRE 
carried out  tests with  foamed  polyurethane  and  other substances  serving  the  same  pur-
pose. 
A representative  group  of  the  Working  Party met  in the  laboratories  of  the  SMRE 
at  Buxton  to be  informed  of this work.  Up  to  the  present,  no  foamed  polyurethane which 
satisfies  the  requirements  made  in the  tests has  been  found  and  the  SMRE  is  continuing 
research  into other materials which  do  not  contain more  than  3  to  4  % of organic  sub-
stances. 
(1)  Adopted by  the Mines  Safety  and HeaZth  Commission  on  26  March  19?1. 13 
4.  Rescue  by  means  of  large-diameter boreholes 
Following  on  the  proposal  of  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  (1968),  re-
search has  been  carried out by  Cerchar  and  the  Steinkohlenbergbauverein into  problems 
in  th.e  drilling of  large-diameter boreholes,  to be  driven  from  the  underground  roadways, 
for  the  rescue  of  trapped men. 
This  research work  has  developed  in accordance with  the  conditions  defined  and 
recommended  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  has  progressed very  favourably, 
particularly in the Lorraine  Coalmines.  Progress  has  been made  in  the  field  of detecting 
trapped men,  in perfecting  a  first  contact hole  and  a  rescue hole  50  m long,  driven 
at  a  rising angle,  both with  and  without  tubing. 
The  Secretariat has  completed  the list of specialists in drilling and  of drilling 
equipment  available within  the  Community  for  the  rescue  of  trapped men.  This  list was 
only  approved  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  26  March  1971,  but  figures 
in Annex  III of  this  report,  to  hasten its distribution in accordance with  the wishes 
of  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission. 
It will have  to be  reviewed  periodically and,  in  any  case,  as  soon  as  the  afore-
mentioned  research has  been  comp~eted. 
5.  Ventilation 
With  regard  to  the  application of  the practical  conclusions  relative  to  the 
stabilisation  of  the ventilation in the  case  of  fire  (1)  in  a  working with  ascensional 
ventilation  (Seventh Report,  page  11),  a  second  meeting  took  place at Essen between  the 
Sub-Committee  on  Ventilation and  the Ventilation Committee  of  the  Steinkohlenbergbau-
verein,  where  computer  experiments  had  been  carried out.  The  Ventilation Sub-Committee, 
itself convinced  of  the  usefulness  of  computers  and  ventilation simulation systems, 
considers  that  the  shemes  recommended  in the practical  conclusions  constitute  an  indis-
pensable  complement  to  these machines  and  that  the  two  methods  have  to  be  associated; 
where  the  collier does  not  possess  a  computer,  the  use  of  these  schemes  and  the appli-
cation of  the principles  following  from  the  study of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Com-
mission  are  the  only means  which  permit  the  problem of stabilisation of  the ventilation 
to  be  solved  rationally  and  rapidly.  A final  meeting  should  take  place  in 1971,  at  the 
Computer  Centre of Louvain University. 
In addition,  the Committee  of  experts  continued, without being able  to  complete, 
the  study  of  problems  still to be  solved:  stabilisation of  the ventilation in the  case 
of  a  fire occurringin a  working with  descensional  ventilation;  stability of  diagonal 
ventilation roadways. 
6.  Fire-resistant clothing 
Following  on  the  Mont-Cenis  disaster at Herne-Solingen  and  on  the  terms  of refer-
ence  given  to  the Working  Party,  (Seventh  Report,  page  12),  the Working  Party  and  a 
restricted group  of  experts  studied  the question  taking into account  tests  carried out 
at  the  Rescue  Centres  at  Essen-Kray,  Merlebach  and  Hasselt. 
These  tests  had  the object of perfecting clothing resistant,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
the  flame  of  a  comparatively slight explosion  (13000,  6  seconds  duration  and  0.5  kg/cm2 
pressure), whilst,  on  the other hand,  permitting the  rescuer  to work,  which  implies 
the conduction of heat  to  the exterior. 
(1)  See  the  Sixth Report of the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  (Annex  III). 14 
The  experts  considered  the results obtained  to be  inadequate  and  estimated that 
the work  could  only be  completed if further  financial  support  were  made  available.  They 
therefore  drew  up  a  programme  of joint research  to be  carried out  in the  institutes 
listed above  and  in the Liege  Institute of Social Medicine.  The  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission will  consider this position in  1971. 
Meantime,  requests  for  financial  aid have  been  sent  to  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities  and  the process  of  approval  is  in hand. (1) 
7.  Results  of  research into  the  physiological  conditions  of closed-circuit breathing 
apparatus 
Since  1960,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  been  aware  of  the neces-
sity of  improving  closed-circuit breathing apparatus,  so  as  to  lessen  the physiological 
burden  on  the wearer particularly in fairly prolonged  rescue  operations  at high  temper-
ature. 
The  Working  Party  considered it necessary  to  propose  to  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  a  research programme,  of which it defined  the  component  elements. 
It was  necessary  to  study  the relative  importance  of  the  parameters  of  the  appa-
ratus,  such  as  its resistance  to breathing,  the  temperature,  humidity  and  co2  content 
of  the  inspired air,  the  02  consumption  and  the weight  of  the  apparatus.  For  this pur-
pose,  subjects  carrying out,  in  a  reproducible manner,  the  activities of  rescue work 
had  to be  subjected  to  tests. 
It was  subsequently  found  expedient  to  study  the possibilities of eliminating 
the  tests  on  human  subjects  and  replacing  them by  simulated tests  on  an artificial lung, 
with  the  object  of  ascertaining whether  the new  breathing apparatus  units  satisfy the 
technological  requirements which  follow  from  the  research. 
This  research project,  approved  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on 
27  November  1962,  was  entrusted  to  three institutes: 
- Institute of Physiology of  the University of Liege, 
- Hauptstelle  fur  Grubenrettungswesen at Essen-Kray  (Main  Mines  Rescue  Centre) 
-Rescue Co-ordination Centre  of  the  Campine  Basin at Hasselt. 
The  work was  commenced  on  1  July  1964  and  was  completed  at  the  end  of  1968. 
Since  the  reports  of  the Institutes were  very  long  (about  600  pages),  the results  have 
been  summarised  by  the  reporter of this  research;  this  summary  is  reproduced  in Annex 
IV. 
From  these  reports  it- can  be  concluded  that: 
- the  closed-circuit breathing  apparatus  units  at  present  in use  in the  Community  and 
in  the  United Kingdom  have  given  good  results with  regard  to  those  characteristics 
which  affect  the physiological  behaviour of the  re~cue worker; 
- however,  an  improvement  would  be  desirable  for  a  number  of  designs with  regard  to  the 
C02  absorption cartridge,  which  should  give better absorption of  co2  and  liberate 
less heat; 
- cooling devices  should be  created  to facilitate work  in  a  hot  environment; 
- on  the other hand,  it has  been possible - in very broad  outline - to  express  the 
total physiological  effort of  the wearer of  a  breathing  apparatus  as  a  function  of  the 
stresses  to which  he  is  subjected; 
(1)  This  Pequest  foP  financial aid was  appPoved by  the  Commission  in 19?1. 15 
- a  method has  been perfected  for measuring  the mechanical ventilatory characteristics 
of breathing apparatus  units,  so  as  to  avoid  prolonged  and  arduous  tests  on  human 
subjects when  testing new  units. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  decided  to  communicate  the  results  of  this 
research  to  the manufacturers  of breathing apparatus,  to  central  rescue  services,  to 
mines  inspectorates,  and  to  industries  outside  the mines  which  are  also  interested in 
this  subject. 
It directed  the  rescue  experts  to  follow  up  progress  in practical achievements 
in this  field, particularlywith regard  to  the  improvements  listed above  as  desirable. 
8.  Hydromechanical  method  of constructing plaster stoppings 
On  26  June  1970,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  adopted  the opinion of 
the  Working  Party  on  this  question,  already raised in the  Seventh Report  (page  12)  and 
decided  to  give  suitable distribution to  the  instructions  for  the  construction of plaster 
stoppings  by  the hydromechanical  method,  developed  by  the  Rescue  Centre  of  the  Saar-
bergwerke  AG  (See  Annex  V). 
It should  be  remembered  that  as  a  result of  tests  financed  by  the High Authority 
and  subsequently  confirmed  in practice,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  had 
previously  approved  in  1964  the  directives  of  the  Essen-Kray  Centre  regarding  the  con-
struction of plaster stoppings. 
With  this method,  normal  dry plaster is  transported pneumatically  through  flexible 
tubes  from  blowing  tanks  and  is brought  into  contact with  the water  only  at  the site of 
the  stopping;  in  the hydromechanical  method  a  special plaster is  used,  which  is  convert-
ed  to  a  thin mortar by  addition of water  in a  continuous  mixer  and  is  pumped  to  the 
site of  the  stopping  through  flexible  tubes. 
This  method  has  the  following  advantages  over  the earlier method: 
- rapidity of erection of  the  stopping; 
safety of  the men  working  on  the  construction,  since most  of  the  equipment  is  located 
close  to  the mixer  at  an  increased distance  from  the  stopping; 
- impermeability  and  resistance  to  explosion are  obtained more  rapidly. 
The  performances  mentioned  in Annex  V  (pages  V,5  and  V,6  )  and  summarised  in 
the  Seventh Report  (page  13)  have  in the meantime  been  confirmed  and  even  improved;  at 
the  Charbonnages  de  Lorraine,  in particular,  the distance between  the  stopping  and  the 
mixer  has  been  increased  to  950  m with  a  difference in level  of  25  m and  a  throughput  of 
7  m3/hour. 
B.  Winding  ropes  and  shaft  guides 
A request  for  financial  aid  in respect  of  a  test programme  on  the  study  of  dyna-
mic  effects  on  shaft  guides  and  other winding installations was  sent  in 1967  by  the 
Versuchsgesellschaft mbH,  Dortmund,  to  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  The 
competent  authorities  of  the Commission  have  been  reminded  of  the  opinion of  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission.  (1) 
In  addition,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  approved  new  terms  of  refer-
ence  which  differ  from  the  old  terms  by  an  extension of  the work  of  the Working  Party 
to haulage  ropes  and  shaft  guides  in  roadways. 
(1)  Request  granted in  19?1. 16 
This  extension was  justified: 
- by  the  large number  of  accidents  caused,  particularly in the Ruhr,  by haulage  ropes 
in  roadways; 
- by  the  connection between tests  and  research relative to  these  latter ropes  and  wind-
ing  ropes  in shafts,  since  the  information  drawn  from  studying haulage  ropes  can be 
extrapolated to winding  ropes; 
lastly,  by  the  competency  of  the members  of  the Working  Party in this  field. 
The  Working  Party has  continued  to  study  the  regulations  at present  in force 
with  regard  to  cage  suspension gear  and  examined  a  report  from  the  Rope-Testing  Station 
at  Bochum  on  accidents occurring in suspension  gear  and  rope  fastenings  and  on  tests of 
rope  balancing  gear  in multi-cable winding  installations·.  (1) 
It also  studied  the  circumstances,  the probable  causes  and  the preventive 
measures  relative to  an  accident which  occurred  on  24  March  1969  at Escarpelle Pit No.lO 
of  the  Douai  Group,  where  a  cage  carrying 5  men  in  a  staple pit fell,  causing  the  death 
of  the  occupants.  The  Working  Party study  is  in hand. 
Lastly,  it took  note  of  the  recent results  obtained  in dynamic  stress  testing of 
ropes  at  the Rope-Testing Station (Instituteof Transport  Techniques  and  Material  Testing 
Techniques  of  the Westfalische Berggewerkschaftskasse)  Bochum. 
It met  in  the  Testing Station on  27  October  1970  to  examine,  among  other  things  , 
the  dynamic  stress  testing equipment  a  new  rope-inspection appliance  operating  on  the 
principle of magnetic  induction,  in  a  flame-proof  version,  and  equipment  for  inspecting 
shaft  guides. 
c.  Electricity 
On  26  June  1970,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  approved  the  "Comments 
and  recommendations  following  from  the  Report  which it adopted  on  20th  June  1969  (2) 
with  respect  to  the characteristics  and  electrical  protection of  cables  supplying 
mobile machines  (coal-cutters,  loading machines,  etc.)  used  underground  in  coalmines 
in  the various  Community  countries"  (see Annex  IX). 
This  is  a  Report  of  practical  conclusions  forming  a  supplement  to  the  afore-
mentioned  documentary  study  (Annex  V of  the  Seventh Report),  which was,  by  reason  of 
its technical nature,  destined primarily for  the experts.  It proved  possible for  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  to  identify  certain minimum  precautions  taking  into 
account  the  relative  importance  of  the many  faults  to which  cables  subject  to heavy 
mechanical  stresses  are  prone. 
These  precautions,  summarised  on  page  IX,S  of Annex  IX,  concern,  in particular, 
circuit-breaking on  the first phase-screen fault,  the  use  of screens  and  amperometric 
protection,  permanent monitoring of  the  insulation  and  the  use  of  a  safety block. 
These  Recommendations  have  been  sent  to  the Governments  for  action  and  also  to 
interested persons  and  bodies. 
The  Working Party met  on  17  and  18  June  1970  in the Yorkshire  coalfield,  where 
it visited,  in the National  Coal  Board workshops,  an  exhibition,  prepared  for  its 
benefit,  of modern  electrical material  employed  in the  faces  and  roadways;  it made  a 
very  instructive visit  to  a  modern  face  at  Silverwood Colliery where  the  same  equipment 
is used with numerous  forms  of electrical protection;  a  very high  output has  been 
achieved  there  for  a  number  of years without  any  accidents. 
(1}  This  Report wiZZ  be  given  as  an  Annex  to the Ninth Report of the Mines  Safety and 
Health  Commission. 
(2}  See  Seventh Report of the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  - Annex  V. 17 
The  Working  Party was  unable  to  commence  examination of  the  documentary material 
assembled  by  the Secretariat  (1]  for  the  study of  the  design  of high-voltage  cables  (up 
to  6000  volts)  used  underground  and  their protective devices. 
It has  worked  at fulfilling its  terms  of  reference  4,  6  and  7  (2)  already men-
tioned'in the  Seventh Report  (page  14)  on  saline pastes,  trolley  locomotives  and  surges 
due  to  lightning.  Notes  were  presented  to  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  on 
these  three  terms  of reference in 1971.(3) 
D.  Flammable  dust 
As  indicated in the  Seventh Report  (page  14)  the Working  Party met  to  examine 
the results  of research  at  the  Tremonia  experimental mine,  Dortmund  and  the  Cerchar 
Test Station,  Verneuil,  with  the  financial  support  of  the  Commission,  taking into  ac-
count  the joint programme  developed  by  the Working  Party  and  approved  by  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  in 1968  (Annex  VIII,  page  21,  Seventh Report). 
The  tests  carried out  in Germany  have  advanced  knowledge  on  water barriers,  par-
ticularly on  divided water barriers, and  on  the  use  of hygroscopic pastes  and  powders 
to  fix dust.  The  Cerchar  tests dealt especially with tripped water barriers, which  are 
also being studied in Germany. 
These  tests  are still being  continued,  but  the  results  obtained with  respect  to 
water barriers,  concentrated  and  divided,  and  the use  of saline pastes  and  powders  are 
sufficiently significant  for  them  to be  exploited by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Com-
mission. 
To  be  able  to prepare  a  note,  and  possibly  recommendations,  on  these processes, 
the Working  Party plans  to meet  in 1971  at  the  Tremonia  experimental mine  and  at neigh-
bouring mines  to see projects  actually put  into effect.(4) 
The  Working Party  studied  two  explosions,  one  at  the  Varenne  colliery,  already 
studied by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  and  the  other at  the  Sophia-Jacoba 
colliery  (without  casualties).  The  conclusions will be  communicated  to  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  in  1971. 
E.  Joint  accident statistics 
The  Working  Party again made  certain more  precise adjustments  to  the  synthesis 
document  recording  the  joint definitions  used  to  draw  up  the statistics, the  interpre-
tation relating to  each definition  and  observations  on  the discrepancies  found  between 
the national  and  joint definitions. 
It reviewed  two  tables  mentioned  in the  Seventh Report  (page  15);  one  relates 
to  the breakdown  of  accidents  according  to  causes,  as  in the earlier survey,  but has 
been  extended  to  show  to  short-term incapacity  (from 4  days)  and  to  the places  at which 
the  accidents  occurred;  the other,  which is new,  will give  the breakdown of victims 
according to the site of  the  injuries,  the nature of  the  injuries  and  the  gravity of 
the  accident.;  more  than  56  days  absence or fatality. 
(1)  Examination  commenced  in 1971. 
(2)  See  Annex II of this report. 
(3)  Reports  on  terms of reference  4  and  6~  adopted by  the  ~nes Safety and Health 
Commission  on  29  June  1971. 
(4)  Made  on  19  and  20  April 1971. 18 
However,  this new  survey  can  only  be  made  in 1971,  since  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission still has  to  approve  these  extensions  of  the  existing statistical 
survey.  (1) 
On  the  other hand,  the Working  Party has  made  certain mathematico-statistical 
studies  to  determine  to what  extent  the  differences verified in the  rates  of  frequency, 
when  they  are  compared  chronologically or  country by  country,  are  significant  from  the 
statistical point  of view. 
Assuming  a  Poisson distribution of  the  rates  of  frequency,  the Working  Party has 
reached  certain conclusions,  but  considers  that it must  ask  for more  precise  terms  of 
reference  from  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  to  continue  this  comparative 
study of  the  development  of  safety in  the  coalmines  of  the  Community. 
F.  Study  of  accidents 
In  1970,  a  single  collective accident,  that of Fouquiere-lez-Lens,  was  brought 
to  the  knowledge  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission.  They  also studied supple-
mentary  reports  on  three  other accidents  which  occurred  in 1967,  1968  and  1969. 
a)  Accident  at  the  site of Fouqiere-lez-Lens,  Nord  et Pas-de-Calais  coalfield, 
4  February  1970:  firedamp  and  coaldust  explosion  (16  killed). 
This  accident was  the  subject  of  a  provisional  report  to  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission. 
While waiting for  the  final  conclusions  of  the enquiry,  the main  circumstances 
can  be  summarised  as  follows: 
The  explosion  took  place  in a  development  roadway  which  had  reached  a  length 
of  285  m from  the  foot  of  a  dip  road  150  m long. 
After  a  final  round  of shots  at  3.15  a.m.  and  loading of  the debris,  the  men 
left  the  development  road  at  5.00  a.m.  and  the electric current was  switched off, 
shutting off  the  secondary ventilation,  to  carry  out  certain work,  including  the 
replacement,  by  a  more  powerful  ventilator,  of  the blower  situated in  an  air-intake 
cross-cut,  close  to  the  entry of  the  dip  road. 
At  6.45  a.m.,  the workers  of  the first shift waited  for  the  new  ventilator to 
be started up  to enter the  dip  road  and  go  to work. 
As  other workers  passed,  at  7.00  a.m.,  the  explosion occurred killing 16  and 
injuring  11  others  by mechanical  effect. 
This  was  a  firedamp  explosion,  with  some  slight  involvement  of dust,  the  analy-
sis of which  makes  it possible  to  assume  that  the  explosion originated  some  40  m 
from  the face.  The  presence  of  an  accumulation of  firedamp was:possible after  a 
shutdown  of ventilation for  two  hours.  The  causes  of ignition of  the  firedamp  are 
being  studied  and  tests  are  in progress  at  Cerchar.  It has  been definitely estab-
lished that  the personnel were  absent  from  the site and  that  the electrical equip-
ment  was  switched off.  One  promising hypothesis  is that  of  spark  formation  by  fric-
tion:  these  sparks  could  have  been produced when  the monorail  pulley block was 
wrenched  free,  since  the monorail,  driven  by  a  compressed-air engine,  located  at  the 
top  of  the  dip  road,  could have been set in motion  at  the  time  of  the  accident. 
(1)  These  extensions  and  the  more  precise  joint definitions were  adopted by  the  Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  29  June  1971. 19 
Apart  from  other measures,  which  are being studied, work  requiring  shut-down 
of  the  secondary ventilation should  be  carried out  over  the week-end,  wherever  pos-
sible. 
b)  Accident  at  the Varenne  Colliery in the Loire  coalfield  (3  May  1968)  firedamp  and 
dust  explosion:  6  killed  (Sixth Report,  page  12,  Seventh Report,  page  17). 
This  accident has  been  the  subject of  a  final  report  already  examined  by  the 
Restricted  Committee  in  1969. 
In addition  to  the  information  given  there,  one  can mention  that  the  explosives 
used  in  the various  countries  are difficult to  compare  from  the  point  of view of 
their safety,  but  that  this  question is  the  subject  of  subsidised  Community  research 
in the  Research Institutes  of  the  Community,  which,  in this  field,  are in close col-
laboration with Research  Institutes in the United Kingdom. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  instructed  the  Working  Party  on  Flam-
mable  Dust  to  continue  the  study of  this  accident. 
c)  Accident  at  the Minister Achenbach  Colliery  (Rurr)  (4  October  1968)  firedamp  and 
coaldust  explosion:  17  killed  (see Sixth Report,  page  13  and  Seventh Report,  page  16). 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  taken note  of  a  supplementary  report 
on  this  accident. 
It will be  recalled  that  this  accident  took place  ir  a  caved  face  i  a  level 
seam,  which  had  been  started up  4  days  previously  and  in which  shot-fir1Lg had  been 
carried out  in  the  roof  to initiate caving;  this  caused  a  violent  roof fall  in  the 
caving  zone  and  a  high pressure  on  the  face,  particularly in the  lower part  of  the 
face,  which had  advanced  15  m in relation to  the  original rise heading,  slewing 
around  the  upper part. 
The  accumulation of  large  amounts  of  firedamp  could be  explained  by  the presence, 
20  m inside the  roof  of  the  "Ida"  seam,  in which  the  accident  occurred,  of  a  worked 
seam,  and  by  the  presence  of gas-filled cavities  in the  roof  of  the  Ida  seam  and  in 
its floor,  where  another  seam  had  been worked. 
As  to  the  ignition,  its most  probable  cause  is  the  formation  of  sparks  produced 
by  the  impact  of  the  upper  section of  a  light-alloy prop  (aluminium-based  alloy with 
zinc  and  magnesium)  on  the  lower  section of  a  steel  support,  with  a  slight rust de-
posit. 
Examination of  the  preventive measures  envisaged  by  the Mines  Inspectorate is 
not yet  completed. 
However,  the  following  proposed measured  can  be  mentioned: 
- To  prevent  accumulations  of  firedamp,  when  starting a  caved  face  it is necessary 
to  control  lowering of  the  roof  by  means  of wooden  chocks  filled with stone  and 
left in place. 
- It will  also be necessary,  when  planning  to  open workings,  to  choose  the  support 
system appropriate  to  the  release  of  CH4  to be  expected.  If the  expected  content 
is  more  than 0.50  % CH4  in the ventilation  current  in  a  working,  the  use  of suit-
able  supports  other  than  those  light alloy must  be  considered. 
- It is proposed henceforward  to  tighten up  the official inspection of work  projects 
for workings,  to  ensure  adequate  and  continuous  ventilation.  Pressure measurements 
at  the  boundaries  of  the working will make  it possible  to verify that  there is no 
risk of  reversal  of  the ventilation current. 20 
It is  also  intended  to calculate the  gas  emission  in advance,  to ascertain whether 
the workings  pass  into  a  zone where  a  greater  amount  of  gas  is  released. 
- Moreover,  the  extent  co  which it would  be  useful,  to prevent  firedamp  accumulations, 
to install methane  drainage  lines  or  to  fix  a  maximum  daily production  figure  at 
the  outset  is being studied. 
Finally,  the similarity of  the  presumed  causes  (friction or  impact  sparks)  in the 
accidents at Minister Achenbach  and  Fouquiere-lez-Lens,  has  stimulated  the  Government 
representatives  of  the  two  countries  concerned  to  exchange  information  on  the test 
results  obtained  in their research  centres  on  the  subject of  these  accidents. 
d)  Accident  at  the  Michael  Colliery,  United Kingdom  (9  September  1967)  fire:  9  killed. 
This  accident was  the  subject  of  a  final  report  on  the part  of  the British Govern-
ment  Representative  on  the basis  of  the  report  of  the public enquiry  into this  acci-
dent.(]) 
This  was  a  violent fire,  initiated by  spontaneous  ignition of  coal  at  the  crown 
of  a  roadway  which  was  covered with  foamed  polyurethane,  the  combustion  of which, 
together with  that  of  a  conveyor,  caused  the  release of  a  considerable quantity of 
fumes  with  low  oxygen  content. 
The  Inspector of Mines  and  Quarries  has  made  certain  recommendations  which  are 
to  be  respected. 
They  relate  to  the alert of  the  general  rescue  services,  checking  on  the  pre-
sence  of personnel  underground,  the  "sign-posting"  and  periodic  inspection of  the 
escape  routes  and,  in particular,  to  the  use  of polyurethane  foam  underground;  the 
use  of polyurethane  foam  has  been  prohibited  as  a  consequence  of  tests  carried out 
in the  experimental  roadway  at  Buxton. 
Further tests  and  research  have  also been made  in  an  attempt  to  find  another 
product which  has  similar properties,  but  does  not  have  the danger  of  rapid  flame 
propagation,  particularly when  it is  sprayed  on  to  the walls  of  a  roadway  (tunnel 
effect). 
The  Working  Party on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Mine  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion 
has  made  considerable  use  of  the  lessons  learnt  from  these  tests  in  the  issue of  a 
note  on  the  use  of  polyurethane  (Annex  VI  to  the  Seventh Report). 
II - HUMAN  FACTORS 
A.  Health 
The  Working  Party met  three  times. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  adopted  two  Recommendations  and  an  opinion 
in  the  field of dust  prevention in underground workings: 
- a  Recommendation  dealing with methods  of dust  suppression  (Annex  VI) 
- a  Recommendation  on  the organisation of  special departments  for monitoring dust 
build-up  (Annex  VII) 
(1)  Doc.  2624/68  Report  on  the  causes  and detailed circumstances of the  fire at the 
Michael  Fife  Colliery~  on  9  September  196?  by  B.S.  Stephenson  (available  from  the 
Secretariat in French  and German). 21 
- an  op1n1on  recommending  collaboration between  constructors  and  operators  and  research 
departments  in the  construction of  coal-winning  and  toad-heading  machines  (Annex  VIII). 
These  documents,  already described  in the  Seventh  Report,  page  18, will not  be 
explained  in greater detail here.  They  have  been sent to  the  Governments  for  action  and 
distrfbuted  to  the organisations  concerned. 
The  third document  was  entitled "Opinion"  and  not  "Recommendation"  because it 
would  be difficult to  introduce it into  the official regulations,  but it will be  fol-
lowed  by  a  specification for  the  use of mine  managements,  to assist  them  in formulating, 
in collaboration with manufacturers,  requirements  in the field  on  dust  suppression. 
A restricted  group  of  experts  is  engaged  in drawing  up  this  specification. 
The  Restricted  Committee  (1)  has  decided  to  continue  the work  of  the Working 
Party on  Health  (Annex  II,6) by  the  terms  of  reference  B2  and  3  on  dust measurement 
and  categories  of dustiness  and  has  also decided  to  extend  these  terms  of reference  to 
medical  problems,  with priority for  environmental  factors;  mine  climate,  noise,  vibra-
tion,  lighting,  gas,  etc.  Headings  for other medical  problems  have  been proposed  by 
the Secretariat in collaboration with  the Occupational Medicine Division selected  from 
suggestions which were  supplied by  the various  delegations  in the  course of  an  enquiry 
made  in 1966.  The  choice was  dictated by  the state of  progress  of  research  in this 
field.  It was  approved  by  the Restricted  Committee  on  23  November  1970. (1) 
Progress  in the  subsequent  preparation of  this work will depend  on  the  assistance 
which  the Secretariat receive  from  the  Occupational Medicine  Division. 
B.  Psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety 
The  Working  Party held  two  plenary meetings  and  a  restricted meeting. 
With  respect  to  the preparation of  joint safety  campaigns,  the Working  Party 
took note  of  the work  of  the  experts,  of  the  documentary material  prepared,  of  the draft 
of  the detailed programme  of necessary operations.  The  Working  Party approved  the  choice 
of  the first  subject of  these  campaigns:  "Continuous  Transport Systems," but  did not 
agree  that  these  campaigns  should be  started simultaneously  in all the  Community  coun-
tries,  despite  the  psychological  impact  resulting  from  this, which  could  be  an  advantage. 
It preferred that  the  campaigns  be  carried out,  on  the  precise subject  chosen,  in ro-
tation in each of  the coalfields of  the  Community,  so  as  to  gain  the maximum  benefit 
from  actual  experience,  both  in organisation  and  in  the  choice of  the  documents  and 
material which will be  used  - to  some  extent  - in all  the  coalfields. 
The  first of  these  campaigns will start in  1971,  with  Community  aid.(2) 
In addition,  the national authorities  responsible  for  the  local organisation of 
these  campaigns  have  been designated. 
The  Working  Party has  started its study,  under its terms  of  reference  regarding· 
the  employment  of  foreign workers,  by  establishing  the  elements  of  an  enquiry  into  the 
conditions  of  employment  of foreign  labour which  could  affect safety,  the  conditions 
covering  the measures  taken  and  the practical application of  these measures  at pit 
level. 
It also decided  on  a  survey of  serious  and  fatal  accidents  underground,  occur-
ring in coal-winning workings,  distinguishing foreign  labour  from national  labour,  to 
ascertain the  ~elative frequency  of  accidents  happening  to  foreigners. 
(1)  And  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  on  26  February  1971. 
(2)  Decided on  in 1971 22 
The  Working  Party  took note  of  the  summaries  of brochures  on  the  result of  re-
search  financed  by  the High Authority  of  the  CECA  on  Human  Factors  in respect  of Safety 
in Mines  and  the Steel-making  Industry. 
With  the object  of obtaining rapid results,  the Working  Party decided  to  restrict 
itself to  the practical  incidence  of  the psychological  and  sociological  aspects  of 
safety and,  in the  light of this,  has  established  the  lines  of  an  enquiry  to  be  proposed 
to  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  psychological  factors  affecting the  use  of 
individual methods  of protection. 23 
SECTION  II 
JOINT  ACCIDENT  STATISTICS 
As  in previous  reports,  the statistical tables  reporting serious  and  fatal  ac-
cidents  which occurred in  the various  Community  coalfields  in  1970  have  been placed  in a 
separate Annex;  they  are,  as  usual,  classified by  cause  of  accident  for  the various  coal-
fields,  the member  countries  and  the  Community. 
The  presentation of  the  recapitulatory information  reproduced  below is  also 
identical with  that  used  in previous  years.  In Tables  A and  B,  the  information is  grouped 
by  cause  of  accident  for  the  Community  countries  from  1958  to  1970;  Table  C,  using  the 
same  sub-divisions,  shows  the  fatalities  and  seriously injured  (1)  from  1960  to  1970  for 
group  accidents,  i.e.  those which  cause  death  or  serious  injury to  more  than five victims. 
The  graphs  E  to K present  the data mentioned  above  for all accidents,  including 
group  accidents. 
It should  be  noted  that  these  Tables  are  drawn  up  in the  same  way  as  in previous 
years,  since  the  new  surveys,  extended by  the  accidents  mentioned  in Section I  to  E  can 
only be  put  into  effect in  1971  at  the earliest. 
On  the other hand,  the  same  reservations  always  arise if it is wished  to  compare 
the  rates  of  accident  from  one year to  another  or  from  country to  country.  Instead of  comp-
aring  the actual magnitudes  of  accident  frequency  rates  - which  is  an  unsuitable  procedure  -
one  should  assign  to  these  rates  a  certain range  or  confidence  interval.  The  increases or 
reductions  found  as  the  figures  stand are,  therefore,  not  necessarily significant  from  a 
statistical point of view. 
Let  us  first  examine,  as  in previous  reports,  the number  of  fatalities  and 
serious  injuries per number  of metric  tons  extracted  (Table  D),  this being  done  purely for 
indicative purposes,  as  has  been  stated previously,  the  level  of  safety being determined 
rather by  the rates  of  frequency  per million hours  worked,  as  will be  seen  below. 
As  this Table  and  graphs  I  and  K show,  production in the  Community  dropped  by 
3.6 % in  1970  (as  against  2  % in 1969)  and  the  number  of hours  worked  by  8  % (9  % in  1969) 
whilst  the  o.m.s.  rose  by  5.4  % (6.5  % in  1969). 
The  number  of fatalities  per million  tons  fell  from  1.18 in  1969  to  1.10  in  1970 
(more  than  3  in  1958);  the  rate  for  serious  casualties, after falling by one-third  from 
1958  to  1967  and  a  levelling-off in 1968  and  1969,  underwent  a  reduction of  5.4 % in 1970 
(38.63  as  against  40.82  in 1969). 
Let  us  now  examine  the number  of fatalities per million working  hours  (Tables  B, 
D and  graph E). 
The  rate of fatalities,  which has  dropped  constantly  since  1958,  reached  its 
lowest  level in 1970:  0.429  per million hours.  In  absolute figures,  the  number  of fatali-
ties dropped  from  209  in 1969  to  188  in  1970,  i.e.  a  reduction of  approximately  10  % 
(13  % in 1969)  whilst  the number  of hours  worked  also dropped  from  476  million to  438  mil-
lion,  i.e.  by  approximately  8.1  %.  In  1970,  the  accidents  classified under headings  I  to 
V  (Table  B  and  graphs  E  and  G)  caused  83  % of  the  total fatalities  (94  % in  1969)  and  are 
distributed  as  follows:  Cause  I  (roof  falls)  31%  (40%  in 1969);  causes  II and  III 
(haulage  and  transport  and  movement  of personnel)  40%  (42%  in 1969);  causes  IV  and  V 
(machinery,  handling of  tools  and  falling objects)  12%  (12%  in 1969). 
(1)  The  expression "seriously injured" means  "victims  incapacitated for more  than 
56  days"· 24 
The  number  of  serious  casualties per million hours  worked  appears  in Table A 
and  graph  F.  The  rate of  incidence,  after reaching,  in  1969,  its highest  level  since  1958, 
has  levelled off  (15.022  as  against  15.160).  As  before,  there will be  noted  the  same  pre-
dominance  of  the  accident  rates  for  categories  I  to V;  which  alone  total  approximately 
97  % of serious  casualties,  distributed  in three  roughly  equal  parts;  category  I  (roof 
falls)  27.6  %,  categories  II  and  III  (haulage  and  transport  and  movement  of  personnel) 
34  % and  categories  IV  and  V  (machinery,  handling  of  tools  and  falling objects)  35.2  %. 
As  shown  by  graph H,  roof  falls  are still the most  important  cause  of  accidents.  Their 
rate  of  4.144  for  1970  is  7.8%  lower  than  in  1969;  with  the  1967  rate,  it is  the  lowest 
achieved  since  1958. 
Apart  from  category II,  the rate for which  dropped  by  5.14%  as  compared  to  1969, 
categories III,  IV  and  V continued,  as  in previous  years,  to  show  rises of  the  order of 
2  to  6.8  %. Germany 
C  A  U  S  E 
(1958-1964) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960 
1)  Falls of  ground  4.843  4-779  4.886  4.797  4.682  4.663  4.894  5.911  4.294  4,32 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2.550 2.569 2.445  2.458  2.501  2.433  2,385  4.132  2.979 2, 709 
3)  Movement  of personnel  2,497 2,463  2.348  2. 512  2.608  2.646  2. 744  1.35  0,998 1,00 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and 
0.767  0.914  0,92<  0.867  1.046  1.213  1,242  2,804  2.085 2,386  supports 
5)  Falling objects  2.537 2.719 2.738  2.945 3.077 3.038  3.242  0.414  0,371  0.354 
6)  Explosives  0.015  0.011  0,01(  0.009  0.008  0.006  0,006  0.02  0,007  0.032 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
0.016  0.002  0.123  o.o!C  - dust  0,011  - - - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp,  - o. 011  suffocation  by  natural  gases  - - - - - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - 0,003  0.002  - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  0.004  - - - - 0.004  - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.010 0.014  0.012  0.014  0.006  0.012  0.009  0.011  - 0.016 
12)  Other  Causes  0.487  0.522  0,457  0.503  0.488  0.473  0.4  77  0.26<  0.255  0.26( 
TOTAL  13.721  4.007 13,819  4,109 14.539  4.499 14.999  14.924  10.989  11. 08! 
( 1965-1970)  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967 
1)  Falls of  ground  4. 732  4. 721  4. 524  4.618 4.  736 4,321  3. 574  3.568  3 .sse 
$ 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2.411  2.067  1 .913  1.994 2,195 2,007  2. 866  3,269  2,960 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  3.032  2.852  2.974  3.300 3.399 3,370  o. 771  0.936  0.903 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  1.234  1-244  1.124  1.396 1,291  1,382  2.126  2.146  2.265 
5)  Falling objects  3. 344  3.272  3.642  3. 773 4,036 4,166  0.292  0,349  0.459 
6)  Explosives  0.005  o.oos  0.017  0.011 0,007  0,008  - 0.013  0,056 
7)  Explosion of  firedamp  or  coal  o. 014  0.013  - 0.004 0,004  - 0.031  - -
dust 
I  8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp,  0.005  - 0.003  - - - - 0.013  -
suffocation  by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - 0.004  - - 0.021  - -
10)  Inrushes of  water  - - - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.002  0.010 0.006  0.011 0,026 0,012  O.O!C  0.013  -
12)  Other  Causes  0,354  0.414  0.396  0.429 0,402 0,532  0.333  0.362  0,278 
TOTAL  15' 133 14.598 14.599 15.540  16,09~  15,798  0.024 10.669 10.771 
(l)  Includ1ng  Provence  as  from  1970. 
Belgium 
1961  1962 
4.071  4.439 
2. 77(  3,331 
1.062  1,136 
2,097 2,461 
0.301  0.445 
0,018  -
- -
- -
- -
- 0,010 
0.018  0.010 
0,301  0,351 
10,638 12.161 
1968  1969 
3.676 5,075 
3.220 3,169 
1.122 1,186 
1.903 2,353 
0.358 1,244 
0.049  -
- 0,019 
- -
- -
- -
0.016 0,019 
0.228 0,175 
10.572  3 ,24C 
A,  Comparative  Table  of 
numbers  of persons  incapacitated  by  underground  accidents 
for  eight  week$  or  longer 
years  1958-1970 
per ·' 000, 000  man-hours 
France  (1) 
1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
4.432  4.41  5.027 4.665  4.774  4.411  4.222  4.177  4.308  1.355 1.378 
3,565 3.4H  1.980 1.695  1.92<  2,10!  2.196  2.364 2,278 1.335  0,984 
1.066  0,961  1.505 1,118 2.873  2.33  2,458  2,368  2.383  0.668  0.394 
2.414  2 .31(  0,914  1,022  1.621  2.523 2, 991  3.096  3.042  1.169  0.984 
0,547 0.39  1.890 2,187 1.893  2,292 2,073  2.278  2,074  1.169 1.698 
0,019 0.018  0.043  0,051  0.031  0,01  0.051  0,009  0.013  0.167  -
- 0,009  0.047 0.088  - - 0.004  - - - -
- - 0,004  - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - 0.018  - -
0.009  - 0,014  - 0.004  0.02!  0.004  0,014  0.009  - -
0,198  0.268  2.956  2. 768  0.793  0.362  0,240 0,354  0.227 0.334  0,591 
2.250 1. 799  4.38(  3.594 13,909  14.07! 14.239 IJ4.66(  4.347  6,197 6.299 
1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
4,673  3.941  3.927 3.634 4.16:  4,04413,7611  5.572  6.36< 
3,018  2.153  1.858  1.918 1.946 1,55611,6661  - 0,707 
1,144  2,087  2.239  2.174  2.s1e  3,226  3,372  - 0.707 
I 
i 
1,801  2.272  2.639  2.773  3.01€ 3,070 3,332]  7.164  7,067 
1,242  1.839 1.785 2.114  2.386 2,537  2, 515  0.796  -
- 0.037  0.010  0.011  - 0,050 0,016  - -
- - 0.029  - - - 0,087  - -
- - - - 0.005  - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - 0.005  - 0,00€  - 0,032  - -
- 0.014  - 0.005  0.00€  0,014 0,024  - -
0,195  0.174  0.200 0.185  0,233 0,291 0,294  1.592  3 ,36( 
12,09  12.517 12.692 12.819  14. 57(  ; . 788  5,099  ).5.124 18,201 
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
1,808  - 0.792  0.366  0,893  1,326 1.464  1.305 1.82  2.238  1.742  2,017 4,846  4.49  4.571  4.434  4.387  4.337  4.509 
1,205 0,676  1.847 1,465  1.787  1.511  1.562  1.898 1,92  2,590 1,826  1.952  2.602  2,347  2.310 2,371  2,521  2.520 2.346 
1.005 1.578 1,056  0.732  1,78  0,324  0.386  0.187 0.51  0,580 0.630 0.472  2,003  1.823  2.185 2,185  2.282  2.261  2.326 
0,603  0,902  1.584 1.465 3.127  0,617  0,402  0,780 0.91  1.015 1.050 1,094 1.098 1.064  1.264  1.423  1.712  1.818 1.848 
1.808 2.029  2.375  3,296  3.574  0,401  0,515  0,492  0.8H  0.642  0.630 0,923  1,962  2.161  2.105  2.353  2.375  2.406  2.442 
- 0.225  - 0,366  - - - - - - - 0.021  o.o2a  0.02(  0.017 0.012  0.018  0.010 0.011 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,017 0.03(  0.010 0.001  0,071  0.006  0.001 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.002  0,001  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - 0.001  0.002  0.003 
- - - - - - - - - 0.021  - 0.021  0,010 0.001  0,010 0.018  0.007  0.012  0.008 
0.603  0,451  - - - 0,262  0.161  0,390 0.21<  0.497 0.147 0,129  0.985  1.01  0.513  0.428  0,404 0,390 0.364 
7,032  5,861  7,654  7,690 ll,168  4.441  4.490 5,051  6.21  7.583  6.025  6.629  3.551  2.954 12.986  !I;l.227 13.781 13.781 l3. 861 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
5,580  0.812  3,656  - 1.923  1,688  2.466  2.45<  2. 737  2,964  4.215  4.186  4.060 4,261 4,492  4,144 
0,797  0.812  - - 2.808  2.621  1.866  2.40  2,562  2,388  2.416  2,17  2.037 2,139 2,118 2,009 
1.  594  0.812  1,462  - 0.774  0.605  0.766  1.16( 1,165  0,823  2.364  2 .32(  2,354  2,795 3,023 3,082 
3.552  7.304 8,043  6,896  1,282  2,066  0,833  1.03  1.689  1,1531  1.773  1.815  1.790 1,945 1,865 1,991 
6.377 6.493 3,656  - 0.862  0,958  0.866 l.  59(  1,106  0,5761  2.415  2,362  2.638  2.858 3,185 3,306 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.013  0.007  0.019  0,015 0,019 0,011 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.011  0.016  - 0.002 0,004 0,025 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.002  0.001  0.003  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - 0.002  - - 0.002  - -
- - - - - - - - - - - 0.001  - 0.002  - 0,009 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.006  0.007  0.005  0.01C 0,021 0,014 
3.189  0,812  - 5,172  o.oss  0,353  0,700 0.30  0,116 0,082  0.289  0.354  0.337  0.341 0,333 0,431 
1.089  7,043  6,817  2,068  7,737 8,291  7,497 8.93!  9,375  7,986  jl3.506 !I;3.242 13.246 14.37C  5,16915,02 Germany  Belgium 
C  A  U  S  E 
(1958-1964) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
1)  Falls of  ground  0.268  0.290  0,263  0.216  0,280 0.26(  0.20(  0.223  0,213  0,299  0,266  0.246 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.179  0.169  0,182  0.196  0.149  0.178  0,30C  0,101  0,124  0,157 0.168  0.142 
3)  Movement  of personnel  0,094  0.097  0,07C  0.086  0.059  0,089  0,071  0.011  0,027 0,008 0,035  0.010 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  and  O.OlC  0.027 0,012  0,027 0,037 0.019  0.028 0,005  0,014  0.016  0.027  0.047  supports 
5)  Falling objects  0.065  0,041  0,039  0,065  0.094  0.072  0,054  0,016  - 0,008  - 0.010 
6)  Explosives  ( .009  0,003  0.003  - 0,004  - 0.002  o-.o11  0,014  - - -
7)  Explosives of  firedamp  or  coal  o.on 0,012  - - 0.660 0.002  0.002  - - 0,016  - - dusts 
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp,  0.005 0.003  0,002  0.004  0,002  - - 0,016  0.014  - - 0.047  suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,003  - 0,002  - 0.006  0.009  - 0.007  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 0,003  0.002  - - 0.004  - O,Oll  - - 0,044 0.047 
11)  Electricity  0.022  0,008 0.002  0.005  0.010 0.002  0.004  0,021  - 0.024  - -
2)  Other  causes  0.025  0,025 0.036  0.049  0.049  0.025  0.01  0.005  - 0,008 0,009  0.019 
TOTAL  0.687 0.680 0,611  0.651  1.344  0,657 0,58  0.42(  0.413  0,536  0.549  0,568 
(1965-1970)  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
1)  Falls of  ground  0.184  0.197 0.206  0.148  0,192 0.113  0,23  0,324 0,264 0.179 0,214 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.191  0,175  0,150 0,126  0,143 0.128  0.166  0,187 0,180  0,114 0,017 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0.070 0,094  0.076  0,079  0,056 0.058  0.011  0,025  - 0.033  -
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools  and 
0.02(  0,034 0.031  supports  0.025  0.030  0.014  0.052  0.025 0,028 0,065  -
5)  Falling objects  0.058  0.048  0.063  0,051  0,049 0.035  - - - 0.016  -
6)  Explosives  - - - 0.004  - - - - - 0,016  -
7)  Explosives of  firedamp  or  coal  0.019  0.056  0.061  - 0,011  dust  - - - - - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp,  0,002  0,002  0,007  - 0,004  - 0.041  0.013  - - suffocation by  natural  gases  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  0.005  - - - - - 0.011  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - p.012  - - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.005  - 0,003  0.004 0.004 0.004  0.011  - 0.014  0.033 0,019 
12)  Other  causes  0.023  0.027 0.017 0,022  0,022 0.027  - 0.013  0.042  - -
TOTAL  0.582  0.629  0,542  0,509 0,504 0.408  0.542  0.587 0.528 0.456 0,330 
(1)  Includ~ng Provence  as  from  1970. 
B.  Underground  accidents resulting  in  death  within eight  weeks 
years  1958-1970 
per  '000,  000  man-hours 
France  (J) 
1963  1964  1958  1959  19~2'  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
0.264  0.222  0,235  0.192  0,186  0,219 0.167 0,120 0,127  0,167  -
0,245  0,166  0,115 0,085 0,082  0.122  J.077  0.121  0,141  - 0,197 
0,057  0.028  0,007 0,018 0.027 0,008 0,043  0.009  0,009  - -
- 0.018 0.018 0,040 0.016  0.008 0,030 0,009  0,036  - -
0.019 0,018  0.025  0.007 0,004  0.017 0.030 0.009  0.018  - 0.197 
- - - 0,026  - - - 0,005  0.005  0,501  -
- - 0.115  0.121  - - 0,004  - - - -
- - 0.043  0.026  0.019 0,004  - 0.019  0.009  0,167  -
- - - - - - - - - - -
0.019  - - - - 0,004  - - - - -
0.009 0.009  - 0.011  0.012  - 0,009  0.024  - - -
0-028  0.009  0,036  0.029  0,008  - 0.009  0.014 0.014  - -
0.641  0.471  0.594 0.555  0,354  0.382  0,369 0.330 0,359  0,835  0.394 
1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
0.268  0.164  0,214 0.159 0.17  0,149  0.143  - -
0.170  0.052  0,126  0,088  0,101 0,186  0.127  - -
- 0,042  0.024  0,016  0.025  0,014  0.016  - -
- 0.009 0.015 0.016  0,006  - 0.032  - -
- 0.019  0,015  0.011  0.031 0,014  0.016  - -
- 0.009  0,005  0,005  0.006  - 0,008  - -
- 0.155  0.127  - - 0,03  - - -
- - 0,005 0.027 0.01  0,007  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- 0.005  - 0.005  - - 0.016  - -
0.024  - 0.010  - - 0,007  - - -
- - 0.005  0,005  - 0,007  - - -
0.462  0.455 0.419 0.332  0,_403 0,384  0.484  - -
Italy 
1960  1961  1962 
0,201  0,225  -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
0.201  0,225  -
1967  1968  1969 
- - -
0,797  - -
- - -
0.797  - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1.594  0  -
Netherlands  Community 
1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
0.366  - 0,262  0.064  0,034 0.11  0,062  0.084  0,043  0.253  0.242  0.235  0,217  0.234 0.217  0.175 
- - 0,077 0.145 0.067 0.09  0.062  0.105 0.172  0.147  0.14  0,146 0.168 0,124 0,167 0.178 
- - - - - - - - - 0.057 0.063  0,047 0.056  0,045 0.060 0.045 
0.012  0.021 0,037 0,013  0.030  - - 0,015  0,016  - - 0.041  - - 0.011 0,028 
- - - 0,016  - - - - 0,043  0.045  0,027 0.024 0.041 0,062  0.046  0.037 
- - - - - - - - - 0,009  0,01C  0.002  - 0,002  0.001 0,002 
- - - - - - - - - 0.032  0,036  0.002  - 0.375 0,001 0,001 
- - - - - - - - - 0.016  0,01C  0,006  0.003  0,007 0,005  0,002 
- - - - - - - - - - 0,003  - 0.001  - 0,003  0,005 
- - - - - - - - - 0,002  0,002  0,001 0.006 0,005 0,005  -
- - - - - 0.01  - - - 0,016  0,00  0.007  0.004  0,008 0.008  0,003 
- - - - 0,017  - - - - 0.023  0,021 0,024  0,029 0,032  0,021 0.014 
0.366  - 0,355 0,241 0.119 0.22  0.166  0,189 0,258  0.610 0.59(  0.507 0.546 0,932  0.547  0.492 
1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
- 0,044  0.050 0.100 0.17  0,058  0.082  0.177 0.208  0.192  0,160 0,176  0.135 
- 0.177 0,126  - 0.08  - 0.165  0.149 0,160  0.128 0.115 0,145  0.132 
- - - - - 0,058  - 0.051 0.060  0.044 0.054 0,038 0.039 
- 0.022  0,067  0,117  - 0,024  0.023  0,024  0.017 0,023  0.027  - -
- - - - 0.04  - - 0.037 0,03(  0.036 0,040 0,031  0.025 
- - - - - - - 0,002  0.00  0.002  0.006  - 0.002 
- - 0.053  0.03C  0.044  -
0.037  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 0,006  0.004  0.012  0.006 0,004  -
- - - - - - - 0,005  - - - - -
- - - - - - - 0.001  - 0.002  - - 0.011 
- - - - - - - 0.004 0.003  0.004 0.006 0,006  0.004 
- - - - - - - 0.013  0.01  0.015  0.012 o-.015  0.016 
- 0.243  0.176 0.167 0.30  0.233 0.247  0,522  0.53E  0.457 0.46( 0,438 0.429 C  A  U  S  E 
(1960-1965) 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools and 
supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp 
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
TOTAL 
Germany 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
Nab Nab Na  bNab  Na  bNa 
2  2  lO- 1  1  6 
3 62pt 
2  2  1C  4  63iJ4' 
-,-
2  14 
I 
1-
2  5  14 1  4  8 
Belgium 
C.  Comparative Table of underground  group accidents  (see  (1)  below) 
years  1960-1970 
France  (1)  Italy 
1960 ! 1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963 
Netherlands  Conununity 
1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
Nab Nab  Na  bNab Nab Nab  Na"b[Nab  Nab  Nab  Nab  NabNa  NabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNa 
I_ 
7 
-I-'  I 
-I 
II 
-I-
!  2  - 33- - - - - - -!-
I 
-1-r 
2  6  2  - 33- -I- 7  6 
2  lO 
1-
1- , 
-I-
2  2  lO 1 
7  3  3  18 
3  62;3311 
_,_ 
I 
-, 
2  5  14 
41 
5  14 3  4  41 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
(1966-1970) 
Nab Nab  Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab  Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab  Nab  Nab Nab Nab  Nab Nab Nab  Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab  Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and 
supports 
-1-
-I-
-I-
1- -
1- -1-
-I-
5)  Falling objects 
-----------H-HHH~~~~~~~~~~~++++++++++++++++++++++++++~++++~++~~~~~~-H~-H-rH-rr~rrrrrrrr~rTTTTT~Ttl 
6)  Explosives 
7}  Explosions of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires 
10)  Inrushes of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other.causes 
TOTAL 
2  5  2  17 
2  52  17  -
(1)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualities of  type  (a). 
(N)  Number  of  group accidents. 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  te resume  work  below  ground  for at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(1)  Including Provence as  from  1970. 
6  1  lll6 - 3  1121  - - - 1  17 
-- - - -- 1-
1  6  3  112  17 31 
D.  RECAPITULATION:  COMMUNITY  OVERALL 
Serious in-
Serious  in- Fatal- Serious 
Under- Million  juries  (4)  Fatal-
Extrac-
(disable- ities  juries  (4)  ities  injuries 
ground  man- Fatal- Year  tion  per  per  m. 
( 1)  o.m.s.  hours  ities  ment  for  per  per  m. 
I 
(kg.)  worked  8  weeks  m. tons  tons  m.  man- man-
or over)  hours  hours 
1958  252.278  1,634  1.260  770  17, 074  3.052  67.68  0.610  13.551 
1959  240.602  1,788  1.122  622  14,539  2.585  60.43  0.590  12.950 
1960  239.967  1,958  1. 037  526  13,459  2.192  56.09  0,507  12,986  I 
1961  235.848  2,100  962  527  12,720  2.235  53.93  0.548  13.227 
. ---·-----------r-------··---
1962  233.233  2,229  901  840(2'  12,418  3.602(2)  53.24  0.932(2)  13,781 
541(3J  2.320(3)  0.600(3) 
--r---- --·----
1963  229.769  2,331  849  465  11,686  2.024  50,86  0.547  13.761 
1964  235.007 2,395  841  411  11,726  1. 749  49.89  0.493  13.860 
1965  224.249 2,461  784  410  10,595  1.828  47.25  0.522  13.506 
1966  210.189 2,611  698  374  9,247  1.779  43.99  0.536  13.242 
1967  189.484 2,824  587  269  i,781  1.420  41.06  0.457  13.246 
1968  181.170 3,065  522  240  7, 501  1,326  41.44  0~460  14,370 
1969  176,900 3,265  476  209  7,222  1.181  40,82  0,438  15.160 
1970  170.355  3,442  438  188  6,680  1.104  38.63  0.429  15.022 
1971 
(1)  Net  extraction,  slurry and  dust. 
(2)  Incl.  Luisenthal explosion. 
(3)  Excl.  Luisenthal  explosion. 
(4)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  for  at  least eight  weeks. GRAPHS 
OF FATAL AND SERIOUS CASUALTIES 
IN COMMUNITY COALMINES 1) 
KEY 
to Roman figures in Graphs 
I  Falls of ground 
II  Haulage and transport 
Ill  Movement of personnel 
IV  Machinery, handling of tools and supports 
V  Falling objects 
VI  Explosives 
VII  Explosions of firedamp or coal dust 
VIII  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, suffocation by natural gases 
IX  Fires and uderground combustion 
X  Inrushes of water 
XI  ElectricJty 
XII  Other causes 
( 1)  Casualties were unable to resume work tor at least eight weeks. Per '000.000 man-hours 
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1) CASUALTIES WERE UNABLE TO RESUME WORK 
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SECTION  III 
OFFICIAL  REGULATIONS  DRAWN  UP  IN  1969  AND  1970 
In 1969  and  1970,  the various  Community  countries  issued  the  following official 
regulations with  regard  to  safety  and  health  in  coalmines.  It should be noted  that,  in 
some  countries,  these regulations  also  apply  to surface mines  and  quarries. 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
I  - Rhineland-Westphalia 
1.  Provisions  relative  to  the  prevention of fatal  accidents  caused  by  falling  rocks 
and  coal  during  operations  in the  face;  OBA  Dortmund  18.22  I  5,  23.1.1969. 
2.  Provisions  relative  to  the danger  of poisoning by  shot-blasting fumes  in workings 
with  secondary ventilation;  OBA  Bonn  17.  7  I  4,  31.1.1969. 
3.  Provisions  relative  to  the  inspection of  abandoned  underground workings;  OBA  Dort-
mund  55.3  I  16,  4.2.1969. 
4.  Provisions  relative to dust  measurements  and  the utilisation of  their results; 
OBA  Dortmund  12.21.31.  I  5,  24.2.1969. 
5.  Provisions  relative  to  the material-testing conditions  for  brake-linings with 
regard  to  their fire-resistance;  OBA  Dortmund  18.43.21  I  5,  28.2.1969. 
6.  Regulations  on  the  subject of filling  and  covering shafts  opening  above  ground; 
OBA  Dortmund  18.13  I  3,  7.3.1969. 
7.  Provisions  relative  to  faces  with  suspended  stowing;  OBA  Dortmund  18.21  2  I  1, 
12.5.1969. 
8.  Regulations  on  setting up ·and  utilising explosives  stores  and  temporary  storage 
sites;  OBA  Bonn  17.15  I  3/5,  15.5.1969. 
9.  Provisions  relative  to  the  principles  relating to  the  purpose  and  organisation of 
safety services;  OBA  Bonn  11.4  I  11/8,  30.5.1969. 
10.  Provisions  relative  to  the  training of shot-firers;  OBA  Dortmund  17.4  I  6,  11.6.1969. 
11.  Provisions  relative  to  the prevention of  accidents  caused  by  falling rocks  and  coal -
results  of  an  enquiry;  OBA  Dortmund  18.22.1  I  10,  20.6.1969. 
12.  Regulations  on  the  agreement  of plans  relative to  the  conditions  linked with  the 
driving  of  roadways;  OBA  Dortmund  11.1  I  2,  28.7.1969. 
13.  Regulations  on  the  treatment  of rails when  converting  them  for  use  as  support 
elements  and  the properties  required of  these rails;  OBA  Dortmund  18.23.2  I  3, 
1.8.1969. 
14.  Regulations  on  the use  and  inspection of portable explosimeters;  LOBA  NW  18.34.7  I  2, 
20.3.1970. 
15.  Provisions  relative to  the  danger  of  explosion when  working  in  the  fume  condensers 
of steam boilers;  LODA  NW  X8f  6-5 II 21.5.1970. 
16.  Provisions  relative  to  the maintenance  of  the  steam  accumulators  of  armour-plated 
locomotives;  LOBA  NW  14.21  XV  41,  11.6.1970. 48 
17.  Provisions  relative to  the  main winding  and  man-riding installations; 
LOBA  NW  15.16.6  I  8,  29.6.1970. 
18.  Regulations  relative to  the  representation  on  the ventilation plan of  the  under-
ground workings  of  the mine  and  of  the  information required by  §167,  paragraph  1 
of  the Mining Regulations  (BVOSt);  LOBA  NW  18.32.2 II  12,  10.7.1970. 
19.  Provisions  relative  to  the ventilation of  coal-winning workings  during  starting-
up:,  LOBA  NW  18.3.  I  3,  20.7.1970. 
20.  Provisions  relative  to  the effect of  shot-firing detonators;  LOBA  NW  17.2.  I  13; 
27.8.1970. 
21.  Provisional  regulations  relative  to  the  certification of  laser  appliances  in ac-
cordance with  the working plans;  LOBA  NW  12.31  I  7,  15.9.1970. 
22.  Provisions  relative  to  the  regular  transport of personnel  by  man-riding  trains 
and  conveyor belts;  LOBA  NW  16.2  I  15,  21.9.1970. 
23.  Provisions  relative  to  the  certification and  conditions  of  use  of  synthetic resin 
Trihasan A,  E  and  B liquids  for strengthening the  solid rock  underground;  LOBA  NW 
18.43.22  I  17,  19.10.1970. 
24.  Provisions  relative  to  the  certification of  trough water barriers  - model  3  (sus-
pended  and  laid  channels);  LOBA  NW  18.42.5 III 3,  24.11.1970. 
25.  Provisions  relative  to  the  certification of  troughwater barriers  - model  4 
(barriers with divided  troughs);  LOBA  NW  18.42.5 III  17,  24.11.1970. 
26.  Provisions  relative to  the  inspection of  the mine  of  the work  of persons  exposed 
to dust  risk;  LOBA  NW  12.23.23  I  12,  1.12.1970. 
27.  Regulations  relative  to  the  approval  of working  plans  for  the driving of  roadways, 
development  workings  and  faces  in coal or rock  in sections  threatened by  rock 
bursts;  LOBA  NW  18.22  I  2,  30.12.1970. 
II - The  Saar 
Regulations  for  the  consultation of  the Works  Committees  in operations  subject  to 
safety inspection by  the  Mines  Inspectorate;  Saarbrucken,  30.12.1969. 
BELGIUM 
1.  Royal  decree  of  5.9.1969  relative to  regulations  on  the  use  of electricity in coal-
mines,  surface-mines  and  underground  quarries; 
2.  Royal  decree  and  ministerial decree  of  10.12.1970  relative  to  dust  suppression in the 
underground workings  in  coalmines. 
FRANCE 
1.  Circular relative  to  the  control  by  electrical transmission of  the position indicators 
of  skips,  cages  and  kibbles  in mine  shafts,  17.4.1969  (DMH  No.  118). 
2.  Decree modifying  Clauses  33,  37  and  38  of  the  decree  of  20.10.1961  relative to  elec-
trical  equipment,  safety  lamps  and  flameproof  liquid-fuelled  locomotives  (accumulator 
batteries  and  portable  individual electric lamps)  10.9.1969  (DMH-Z  No.  85). 49 
3.  Circular modifying  the  commentary  of  Clause  33  of  the  decree  of  30.10.1961  relative 
to  flameproof  housings  for  accumulator batteries  (application of  the  decree  of 
10.9.1969,  6.10.1969  (DMH  No.  327). 
4.  Supplementary  Order  to  the  general  regulations  of  4.5.1951  on  the  exploitation of 
solid mineral  fuel  mines  with  regard  to  the  use  of  cartridged explosives  and  shot-
firing with  deep vertical shot-holes,  29.9.1969  (No.  69-899). 
5.  Decree  regulating shot-firing with  deep vertical shot-holes  in open-cast  operations; 
7.10.1969  (DMH-Z  No.  86). 
6.  Decree  authorising bulk gravity  charging of  explosives  in vertical shot-holes  in open-
cast  operations;  7.10.1969  (DMH-Z  No.  87). 
7.  Decree modifying  Clauses  7  and  8  of  the  decree  of  30.10.1969  relative to electrical 
equipment,  safety  lamps  and  flameproof  liquid-fuelled  locomotives  (equipment with 
flameproof  housing);  6.11.1969  (DMH-Z  No.  89). 
8.  Circular relative  to  shot-firing in deep vertical shot-holes  and  gravity charging of 
certain non-cartridged  explosives  in vertical shot-holes  in open-cast  operations 
(applications  of  the  decrees  of  7.10.1969);  21.11.1969  (DMH  No.  362). 
9.  Circular modifying  the  commentary  of  Clause  7  of  the  decree  of  30.10.1961  (application 
of  the  decree  of  6.11.1969);  28.11.1969  (DMH  No.  368). 
10.  Circular  and  standard prefectoral decree  regulating  the  use  of welding  and  gas  cutting 
in  the  underground  workings  on  solid mineral  fuel  mines;  12.2.1970  (DMH  No.  50). 
11.  Circular relative to  the  control  by  electrical transmission of  the position indicator 
of  cages,  skips  and  kibbles  in mine  shafts  (modifies  circular  DMH  No.  118  of  17.4.1969); 
7.9.1970  (DMH  No.  316). 
12.  Circular  supplementing  the  list of  explosives,  free-fall  charging  of which  can  be 
authorised  in deep vertical  shot-holes  in open-cast  operations  (see circular  DMH  No. 
362  of  21.11.1969);  12.10.1970  (DMH  No.  350). 
13.  Decree  relative  to  the  testing of  the  insulation between  conductors  of  different 
polarity of phase;  10.11.1970  (DMH-Z  No.  92). 
NETHERLANDS 
On  25th May  1970,  10  ministerial decrees  supplemented  certain directives  of  the 
Mines  Regulations  of  1964,  in the  field of drilling installations  and  surface installa-
tions,  and,  in particular,  the  following  directives: 
- Clause  154,  paragraph  4,  relative to  the  recovery  of  rock piles  (No.  13171/351  of 
5.10.1970). 
- Clauses  114,  115,  116,  175  and  181  relative to electrical installations  and  electric 
drilling gear  (No.  1299/351.82  of  7.9.1970). 
- Clause  43,  paragraphs  1  and  44,  relative  to  narrow-gauge  transport  on  the  surface 
(No.  1269/351.82  of  11.8.1970). 
- Clause  176,  paragraph 4,  relative to  a  fire-fighting plan in drilling installations 
(No.  1272/351.82  of  11.8.1970). 
- Clause  43,  paragraph  1  and  44  relative  to  fixed  transport  installations  on  the  surface 
(No.  1275/351.82  of  11.8.1970). 
- Clause  250,  paragraphs  3  and  4  relative  to  any  overhauls  in the drilling installations 
(No  1227/351.82 of  11.2.1970). 50 
Clause 97,  paragraphs  1  and  5  relative to lighting in surface  installations 
(No.  1162/351.82 of  11~2.1970). 
- Clauses  257,  paragraphs  2  and  5;  260,  paragraph 3;  261,  paragraphs  1,  4  and  5,  267, 
paragraph  2  and  277,  paragraphs  5  and  6  on  protection against  ionising radiations 
(No.  1233/351.82  of  26.5.1970). 
- Clause  43,  paragraphs  1  and  44  relative to surface haulage winches  (No.  1226/351.82  of 
25.5.1970). 
-Clause 44,  relative to surface motor vehicle  transport  (No.  1226/351.82  of  25.5.1970). ANNEXES LIST  OF  ANNEXES 
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AT  MINES  IN  1970 
ANNEX  I Year:  1970 
Country:  Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Ruhr,  Aachen,  Ibbenburen 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per  million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  972  26  4,19 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  427  29  1,84 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  803  14  3,46 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  308  8  1,33 
5)  Falling objects  940  6  4,05 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - 0,01 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbur5ts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 3  -
11)  Electricity  2  1  0,01 
12)  Other  causes  137  7  0,59 
TOTAL  3  591  94  232  044  913  15,48 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,11  - - -
0,13  - - -
0,06  - - -
0,03  - - -
0,03  - - - H 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,01  - - -
- - - -
0,03  1  1  4 
0,40  1  1  4 Year:  1970 
Country:  Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Saar 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as  under  (b) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million  Number  Number  Number  ities  man-hours  man-hours  of  dis- ments  as  as under  worked  (to  third  (to third  of  ablements of  fatal-
under  (a)  (b)  decimal  decimal  acci- under  ities as 
below  dents  as  under  (b)  below  place)  place)  (a) 
1)  Falls of  ground  141  3  5,526  o, 118  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  90  4  3,528  0,156  - - -
3)  Movement  of  personnel  65  1  2,547  0,039  - - -
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
and  supports  48  - 1,881  - - - -
5)  Falling objects  133  3  5,212  0,118  - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - - - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0,039  - - - -
12)  Other  causes  - - - - - - -
TOTAL  478  11  25  513  559  18,733  0,431  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
H  ... Year:  1970 
Country:  Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Total 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as  under  (b) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per  million  Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal-
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as  under  below  below  place)  place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1  113  29  4,321  0,113  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  517  33  2,007  0,128  - - -
3)  Movement  of personnel  868  15  3,370  0,058  - - -
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
and  supports  356  8  1,382  0,031  - - -
5)  Falling objects  1  073  9  4,166  0,035  - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - 0,008  - - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - 3  - 0,012  - - -
11)  Electricity  3  1  0,012  0,004  - - -
12)  Other  causes  137  7  0,532  0,027  1  1  4 
TOTAL  4  069  105  257  558  472  15,798  0,408  1  1  4 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  ~or at  least eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
H Year:  1970 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Borinage-Centre 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per  million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to  third 
under  (a)  (b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  45  - 11,718 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  14  2  3,646 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  6  - 1,563 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  13  - 3,385 
5)  Falling objects  16  - 4,166 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  - - -
TOTAL  94  2  3  840  200  24,478 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least  eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per  million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  dis-
(to third  of  ablements of  fatal-
decimal  acci- under  ities as 
dents  as  under  (b) 
place)  (a) 
- - - -
0,521  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,521  - - -
H  .. Year:  1970 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Charleroi-Namur 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as  under  worked  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  64  5  6,977 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  38  1  4,142 
3)  Movement  of personnel  15  - 1,635 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  32  - 3,488 
5)  Falling objects  14  - 1,526 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  2  - 0,218 
TOTAL  165  6  9  173  440  17,986 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  dis-
(to third  of  ablements  of  fatal-
decimal  acci- under  ities as 
dents  as  under  (b)  place}  (a) 
0,545  - - -
0,109  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,654  - - -
H  ... Year: 
Country: 
1970 
Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Liege 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours 
ments  as  as  under  worked  (to  third 
under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  29  1  4,928 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  29  1  4,928 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  11  - 1,869 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  11  - 1,869 
5)  Falling objects  6  - 1,019 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0,170 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  2  - 0,340 
TOTAL  89  2  5  885  208  15,123 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per  million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  dis-
(to third  of  ablements of  fatal-
decimal  acci- as  under  ities as 
place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,170  - - -
0,170  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,340  - - -
H  .. 
00 Year:  1970 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Campine 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as  under  (b) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million  per million  Number  Number  Number 
ities  man-hours  man-hours  of  dis-
ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  (to third  of  ablements  of  fatal-
under  (a)  (b)  decimal  decimal  acci- under  ities as 
below  dents  as  under  (b) 
below  place)  place)  (a) 
1)  Falls of  ground  54  5  2,434  0,225  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  43  3  1 '939  0,135  - - -
3)  Movement  of personnel  15  - 0,676  - - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  18  - 0,812  - - - -
5)  Falling objects  15  - 0,676  - - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - - - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal  - - - - - - -
dust  - - - - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - - - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  - - - - -
12)  Other  causes  4  - 0,180  - - - -
TOTAL  149  9  22  182  517  6,717  0,405  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least  eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a), and/or  (b). 
H Year:  1970 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Coal-field:  Total 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  ities  worked  man-hours  as  as  under  (to  third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  192  11  4,673 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  124  7  3,018 
3)  Movement  of personnel  47  - 1,144 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  74  - 1,801 
5)  Falling objects  51  - 1,242 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12)  Other  causes  8  - 0,195 
TOTAL  497  19  41  081  365  12,097 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least  eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of fatal- (to third  ablements 
decimal  acci- under  ities as 
dents  as  under  (b)  place)  (a) 
0,268  - - -
0,170  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,024  - - -
- - - -
0,462  - - -
H  .. Year:  1970 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third 
(b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  272  6  3,725 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  83  9  1,136 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  157  2  2,150 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  198  2  2,712 
5)  Falling objects  169  1  2,314 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  11  16  0,150 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 2  -
11)  Electricity  2  - 0,273 
12)  Other  causes  19  - 0,260 
TOTAL  911  38  73  005  824  12,478 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per  million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal-
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities 
decimal  under  as 
dents  as  under  (b) 
place)  (a) 
0,082  - - -
0,123  - - -
0,027  - - -
0,027  - - -
0,013  - - -
- - - -
0,219  1  11  16 
- - - -
- - - -
0,027  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,520  - - -
H 
....... 
....... Year: 
Country: 
~970 
France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Lorraine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
ul}der  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  128  5  4,801 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  59  3  2,213 
3)  Movement  of personnel  161  - 6,038 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  36  - 1,350 
5)  Falling objects  90  1  3,375 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0,037 
7)  Explosions of fire  damp·  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  8  - 0,300 
TOTAL  483  9  26  663  128  18,115 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,188  - - -
0,113  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,037  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,338  - - -
H  .. Year:  1970 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Centre-Midi  (1) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to  third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  74  7  2,807 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  68  4  2,579 
3)  Movement  of personnel  107  - 4,059 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  186  2  7,055 
5)  Falling objects  58  - 2,200 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  1  0,038 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  4  - 0,151 
11)  Electricity  1  - 0,038 
12)  Other causes  10  1  0,379 
TOTAL  509  14  26  360  728  19,309 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at least eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
(1)  As  from  1970  including Provence. 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b)  place)  (a) 
0,266  - - -
0,152  - - -
- - - -
0,076  - - -
- - - -
0,038  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,531  - - -
H Year:  1970 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Total  (1) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  474  18  3,761 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  210  16  1,666 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  425  2  3,372 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  420  4  3,332 
5)  Falling objects  317  2  2,515 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  1  0,016 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  11  16  0,087 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  4  2  0,032 
11)  Electricity  3  - 0,024 
12)  Other  causes  37  - 0,294 
TOTAL  1  903  61  126  029  680  15,099 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
(1)  As  from  1970  including Provence. 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci-
ablements  ities as 
decimal  as  under 
place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,143  - - -
0,127  - - -
0,016  - - -
0,032  - - -
0,016  - - -
0,008  - - -
0,127  1  11  16 
- - - -
- - - -
0,016  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,484  - - -
H  .. Year:  1970 
Country:  Italy  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Sulcis 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  s  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per  million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as  under  worked  (to  third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  - - -
3)  Movement  of  personnel  - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  8  - 6,896 
5)  Falling objects  - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  6  - 5,172 
TOTAL  14  - 1  159  644  12,068 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per  million  Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  dis-
(to third  of  ablements  of  fatal-
decimal  acci- under  ities as 
dents  as  under  (b)  place)  (a) 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
H Year:  1970 
Country:  Netherlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Limburg 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  32  1  2.634 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  32  2  2.634 
3)  Movement  of personnel  11  - 0.905 
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
and  supports  23  - 1.894 
5)  Falling objects  8  - 0.659 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  2  3  0.165 
TOTAL  108  3  12  145  752  8.891 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as  under  as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.082  - - -
0.165  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.247  - - -
H  .. Comparative  table of  number  of  persons 
incapacitated by  underground accidents for  eight  weeks  or  longer 
(Year  1970;  per million man-hours) 
C  A  U  S  E  Germany  Belgium  France  (1)  Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1)  Falls of  ground  4,321  4,673  3,761  - 2,964  4,144 
2)  Haulage  and transport  2,007  3,018  1,666  - 2,388  2,009 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  3,370  1,144  3,372  - 0,823  3,082 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  1,382  1,801  3,332  6,896  1,153  1'  991  and  supports 
5)  Falling objects  4,166  1,242  2,515  - 0,576  3,306 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  0,008  - 0,016  - - 0,011 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp,  - 0,087  - 0,025 
or coal dust  - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp  - - - - - -
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  - - - - - -
fires 
10)  Inrushes  of  - - 0,032  - - 0,009 
water 
11)  Electricity  0,012  - 0,024  - - 0,014 
12)  Other  causes  0,532  0,195  0,294  5,172  0,082  0,431 
/ 
T<YI'AL  15,798  12,097  15,099  12,068  7,986  15,022 
(1)  As  from  1970  including Provence. 
H  .. C  A  U  S  E 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp, 
or coal dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and 
fires 
10)  Inrushes  of  water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
TOTAL 
(1)  As  from  1970  including Provence. 
Comparative table of  accidents 
resulting in death within eight  weeks 
Germany  Belgium  France  (1) 
0,113  0,268  0,143 
0 '128  0,170  0'  127 
0,058  - 0,016 
0,031  - 0,032 
0,035  - 0,016 
- - 0,008 
- - 0,127 
- - -
- - -
0,012  - 0,016 
0,004  0,024  -
0,027  - -
0,408  0,462  0,484 
(Year  1970;  per million man-hours) 
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
- 0,082  0,135 
- 0,165  0,132 
- - 0,039 
0,027  - -
- - 0,025  H 
- - 0,002 
- - 0,037 
- - -
- - -
- 0,011  -
- - 0,004 
- - 0,016 
- 0,247  0,429 TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  VARIOUS  WORKING  PARTIES 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
ANNEX  II II,  3 
I  - Working  Party on Electrification - Chairman Mr.  LOGELAIN 
A.  Terms  of reference 
1.  Comparing  adopted  safety and  accident  prevention provisions  relating  to 
a)  electric shock, 
b)  fire hazard, 
c)  explosion hazard. 
2.  Ascertaining  the present position in Community  countries with  regard  to  safety 
regulations  on underground  electrical networks  of  low  and  medium  voltage  (up  to 
1  100  V)  and  feeder  cables  for  movable  equipment,  with due  regard  to  the specifi-
cations  for  the  said  cables. 
3.  Reporting  on  steps  to  be  taken when  work  has  to  be  carried out  on electrical 
equipment  under voltage. 
4.  Studying  the deleterious  effects on electrical equipment used  underground  of 
moisture  in salt pastes  and  salt pastes  used  in dust  suppression. 
5.  Studying  the  construction of  high-tension cables  (of  op  to  6  000  V)  used  under-
ground,  and  protective equipment. 
6.  Comparison of  safety provisions  relating to  underground  ele~tric locomotives, 
with emphasis  on  the possibility of  reducing  the  frequency  of  trolley wire 
sparking. 
7.  Study  of  over-voltage caused  by  lightning and  the  problem of  stray currents. 
B.  Preliminary work undertaken by  the  Secretariat 
1.  Periodic reports  on oil-powered  contactors used  in gassy  environments. 
2.  Investigations  of  the  use  of  remote-control circuits in automated  mining  oper-
ations. 
II-Working Party on Rescue Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion- Chairman 
Mr.  HELLER 
A.  Rescue Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion 
General  Terms  of reference  (Section 7  of  the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission's 
Terms  of  Reference) 
Exchange  of  information on rescue work  and  fire-fighting  in connection with accidents 
of  interest to  the Working  Party. 
B.  Rescue  work 
I.  Standing  terms  of reference 
1.  Communication  of  the  annual  reports  issued  by  the rescue stations  and  regular 
discussion of  these  documents. 
2.  Conveningmeetingson special  occasions  (accidents  from which  new  information 
can be  gained,  technical  innovations  in materials,  equipment,  etc.). 
3.  The  publication· ev~ry two  yeats  of  a  reprirt outlining in particular the state 
of  rescue arrangements  in the Community  and  the United  Kingdom. II,  4 
II.  Terms  of  reference 
1.  Improvements  in CO-filter self-rescuers. 
2.  Drawing  up  a  list of  experts  on drillings  in connection with rescue work  and 
the  apparatus  to be used. 
3.  Examination of  the  technique for  rescuing  trapped miners  by means  of  large 
boreholes with  a  view  to  formulating  the  rules based  on  experience gained 
in different  countries  and  submitting practical regulations  to  the mining 
authorities. 
4.  Studying of  the  Community  criteria for  fireproof  clothing and  general re-
quirements. 
5.  Examination of  the need  to  draw up,  alongside  traditional alarm procedures, 
plans  for  sending help  in the  event  of disaster. 
6.  Drawing  up  a  synoptic  comparison of  the rules  and  regulations  relating  to 
rescue  and  medical  attention as drafted by  the mining authorities of  the 
Community  and  of  the United  Kingdom. 
C.  Underground  fires 
I  - Standing  terms  of  reference 
Exchanging  views  on  the reopening in the Community  and  the United  Kingdom  of 
fire  zone  stoppings  and  where  necessary  adapting  regulations already drafted. 
II - Terms  of reference 
1.  Continuing  the  study of  the  problem of  fire-fighting  in very deep pits,  if 
necessary with  the help  of  small-scale model  tests  and  full-scale  experiments, 
should  a  favourable  opportunity arise. 
2.  Continued  study of  specifications  and  test conditions  applicable  to fire 
resistant fluids  (3.a)-c)  by  the  experts  on hydraulic fluids): 
a)  comparing  test results  so  as  to  prevent  products being differently 
assessed; 
b)  where  necessary,  adapting test criteria  to~technological progress; 
c)  in addition,  examining  to  what  extent  if might  be possible  to  relax 
these criteria and  test methods  so  that  the  said products may  be  more 
easily assessed  and  approved. 
3.  Continued  study  of  the stabilisation of ventilation in the  event  of pit fires 
in accordance with Professor  Budryk's  theory  (4.a)-h)  by  the ventilation 
experts): 
(i)  Problems  outstanding within the  framework  of  the  former  terms  of  reference: 
a)  the  extent of  instability in diagonal ventilation roadways, 
b)  the  effects of  a  fire  on  descensional ventilation systems, 
c)  means  of  guarding against  the  danger  of  explosion during fire-fighting. 
(ii)  Extension of  this  term of  reference  to  general ventilation problems  in 
view of  their  importance,  especially  to fires: 
d)  assessment  of  the  danger  of  explosion in a  fire area during its isola-
tion by  means  of  stoppings, 
e)  effects of  auxiliary ventilators on pit ventilation in the  event  of 
fire, II,  5 
f)  ventilation tolerances  (where  the object is to  study problems  of sta-
bility: measurement  of wind  speeds,  air flow  and  pressures), 
g)  possibilities of  early detection and  technical measurement  of para-
sitic air currents, 
h)  use of fire regulators  and  fire doors. 
4.  Early detection of  underground fires,  especially  smouldering fires,  and 
assessment of ~gmbustible gases  (remote  control  installations for  the  early 
detection of CO). 
5.  Measuring  instruments  enabling ventilation to be  checked  (oxygen deficiency 
warning devices):  Exchange  of  information on  the practical use of  oxygen 
deficiency warning devices,  especially  those which were  singled out  for 
special mention  in the  competition organised by  the  High  Authority  (conclud-
ed  in December  1967). 
6.  Sealing off abandoned  underground workings  by  means  of  dams. 
7.  Generation of fire  in means  of  transport  and  other  long  installations  (con-
veyor belts, air ducts,  piping,  guides,  etc.)  and  propagation of fire by 
means  of  these  installations. 
8.  Synoptic  comparison of  rules  and  regulations  on fire prevention and  fire-
fighting  in mines,  worked  out  by  the mining authorities  of member  countries 
and  of  the United  Kingdom. 
III - Working  Party on  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft Guides:  Chairman Mr.  MARTENS 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Follow-up of progress  made  in the  testing of winding  ropes  by  means  of  appropriate 
instruments  in order  to  obtain information concerning its application in the mines 
of  the Community  and  the United  Kingdom. 
2.  Testing of  couplings  for circular and  flattened winding ropes. 
3.  Arrangements  for  the installation and  inspection of  capels. 
4.  Testing of  guides  for winding  cages  in drafts  and  guide mechanisms  for  cable haul-
age  in roadways. 
5.  Maintenance  required  to  ensure  safe operation of winding  ropes  and  balance ropes. 
6.  Use  of  studies  on  the  dynamic  behaviour  of  shaft  and  roadway  ropes. 
7.  Exchange  of views  on  the properties operating conditions  and  strength of winding 
ropes  of particular interest. 
8.  Discussion on accidents  involving winding  and  hauling ropes  and  their couplings, 
which  could  provide new  information. 
IV  - Working  Party on Mining Accident  Statistics:  Chairmand  Mr.  KOCH 
Terms  of  reference 
Examination of  the methods  used  in Community  countries for  establishing m1n1ng  acci-
dent  statistics.  Paricular  examination of  the criteria applied  in defining  the  term 
"Mining  accident"  and  the criteria used  in classifying  the  accidents  according  to 
cause,  duration of  stoppage  and,  possibly,  position of  the  injuries. II,  6 
With  the  exact definition of  these criteria as  a  basis,  establishing differences 
between  the  statistical elements  assembled  in each  country  and  ways  of  taking  the~e 
differences  into account  in comparisons  on  a  Community  level. 
V - Working  Party on  Combustible Dusts:  Chairman Mr.  CHERADAME 
Terms  of  reference 
Taking  into account  the mechanism of dust  combustion  and  of  flame  propagation and  the 
various factors  which  may  influence  this,  including  the fact  that methane  is frequent-
ly  involved  in this  phenomenon,  the working  partu is instructed  to  carry out  a  study 
of  precautions against dust  combustion,  in particular  :  · 
a)  dust neutralisation  (dust control  in situ,  stone dusting,  spraying,  dust fixation 
by means  of  spreading salts and  coagulating pastes,  etc.),  this  study  to  include 
the  comparative analysis  of  the  regulations  and  instructions  applied  in the Com-
munity  countries  and  the United  Kingdom,  along with  the methods  of  application of 
the different processes 
b)  dust barriers of various  types  to halt dust  explosions,  mixed  dust-methane  explo-
sions  and  pure methane  explosions. 
The  working party may  make  any  suggestions  for  research work  considered necessary to 
advance  the  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  studied  and  to  promote  safety in these fields. 
VI  - Working  Party on Health  in Coal  Mines:  Chairman Mr.  VANDENHEUVEL 
Studying,  from  the  standpoint  of  technical  prevention and  industrial medicine,  the 
p~evention of  environmental  risks  to  the  health of workers  in coal mines. 
A.  Terms  of  reference 
1.  Where  necessary,  making  recommendations  on  means  of dust  control,  and  general 
measures  to  reduce  dustiness  in underground workings,  recognised as  being  to 
some  extent effective  (wet drilling, water  infusion,  spraying,  special attach-
ments  to winning machines,  pulsed-infusion shotfiring. 
2.  Where  necessary,  making  recommendations  on  the organisation of  specialised 
dust-control  services. 
B.  Preliminary work  to  be undertaken by  the  Secretariat 
The  assembling  of  documentary material  and  comparison of  legislation in the various 
Community  countries with reference  to: 
1.  General  rules  covering  the prevention of  dust  in respect of  the design and  use 
of winning machines. 
Standards  to  be  observed  to  ensure minimum  dustiness  arising from  the use of 
these machines. 
2.  Dust measuremept  (methods,  frequency,  measuring points,  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
etc.)  and  where  necessary  establishing a  scale of  comparison of  the various 
methods  employed. 
3.  Establishment of dustiness  thresholds.  Definition of categories of  permissible 
dustiness.  Steps  to be  taken when  faced with various  categories of dustiness. II,  7 
VII - Working  Party on Effects of Working  Time  on  Safety at Work,  especially in Difficult 
or Unhealthy Conditions:  Chairman Mr.  VAN  DER  HOOFT 
Provisional  terms  of reference  (definitive text  to be  submitted  to  the Restricted 
Committee): 
Number  of hours worked  in wet working points.  Determining in what  cases  a  working 
points is to be  considered wet  and  the precautions  to be  taken. 
VIII - Working  Party on Psychological  and  Sociological Factors  affecting Safety:  Chairman 
Mr.  SCHNASE 
Terms  of reference 
1.  Safety campaigns. 
2.  A draft recommendation  on  the  employment  of foreign and  young  workers. LIST  OF  SPECIALISTS  FOR  BOREHOLE  RESCUE 
WORK  AND  EQUIPMENT  AVAILABLE  IN  COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES 
Position  on  1 January  1971:  to  be  brought  up 
to  date  every  2 years 
(Approved  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  at its meeting  of 26  March  1971) 
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A.  INTRODUCTION 
The  present list is  intended to  supply all  the  centres  concerned  in the  coal 
industry with  information  on  the  appliances  available  in the  countries  of  the  Community 
for  drilling rescue  holes  from  underground  and  from  the  surface  as  well  as  organisations 
and  specialists  in  this  field. 
The  drilling appliances with their accessories  shown  in  this  list can  in an 
emergency  be  placed  at  the disposal  of  any  coalfield in the  Community. 
Where  required,  the  centres  in each  country  should be  contacted.  The  directors 
are  also members  of  the Working  Party  on  "Rescue  and  mine  fires"  of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission. 
The  closed-circuit breathing  apparatus  is  also  regularly  included  according  the 
most  recent  development  of  technology  in  the biennial  reports  (1)  published by  the Working 
Party  and  the other  appliances  undergoing  research  and  development  and  particularly 
suitable for  rescue work  in mines  are not  included  in the  above  list of  apparatus.  It is 
therefore unnecessary  to  list them  in  the present publication. 
The  biennial reports  can be  obtained  from  the Secretariat of  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  (2). 
(1)  Latest  (Seventh)  Report  for  196?  and  1968~ 
(2)  29~  rue  AZdringer~  Lu:::embourg. III,  7 
B.  SPECIALISTS  AND  APPARATUS  FOR  RESCUE  DRILLING  FROM  UNDERGROUND III,  9 
I.  GERMANY  (FEDERAL  REPUBLIC) 
Ruhr 
1.  Note 
The  availability of  the  apparatus  below  together with  accessories  depends  on  the 
rescue  centre  at Essen.  The  apparatus  is  available in fairly  large numbers  in  the 
Ruhr  collieries or at  the  depot  of  the  rescue  centre at Essen  and  can be dispatched 
immediately when  required. 
2.  Addresses  of  organisations  and  specialists 
2.1.  Hauptstelle  fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen,  43  Essen-Krey,  Schonscheidtstr.  28, 
Telephone:  Essen  2-18-66  (The  switchboard  is  continuously manned) 
Director  of  the  rescue  centre:  Herr  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  (member  of  the  Rescue 
Working  Party) 
Private  address:  433  Mulheim/ruhr,  Am  grossen Berg  18,  Telephone:  Mulheim  (Ruhr) 
5-27-15 
Technical director of  the  rescue  centre:  Herr  A.  SCHEWE,  (member  of  the  Rescue 
Working  Party) 
Private  address:  464  Wattenscheid-Hontrop,  Langacker  11,  Telephone: 
Wattenscheid  7-12-13. 
The  following  experts  are  at the  disposal  of  the  rescue  centre: 
Mining  engineers,  W.  BOTH,  M.  FUNKENMEYER  and  F.J.  KOCK. 
2.2.  For drilling rescue  holes  from  underground,  the  assistance of  the  following 
specialists  from  the  drilling division  of  SKBV  can  be  obtained by  applying  to  the 
Essen  rescue  centre: 
Herr  K.  TROSKEN,  43  Essen,  am  Wunnesberg  37, 
Telephone:  Essen  71-33-21  and 
Mining  engineers,  H.J.  GROSSEKEMPER,  V.  MERTENS,  E.  MOSBLECH  and  G.  MOGWITZ. 
3.  Appliances  and  accessories  available  for drilling rescue holes  from  underground 
3.1.  Drilling machines 
3.2. 
1.  Turmag  P  30,  1220  mm  dia. 
2.  Turmag  P  VI/12-120,  610  mm  dia. 
3.  Wirth  HG  170,  1400  mm  dia. 
All  the drilling machines  for drilling large  diameter holes  are  compressed-air 
driven.  The  Wirth drill can  also operate electrically  and  is therefore  also  suitable 
for  use  at  the  surface. 
Drill rods 
1.  4~" dia.  regular 
- p  VI/12-120 
2.  5~" dia.  regular 
- p  30  -
3.  5~" dia.  regular 
special - HG  170  -
With  the  rods,  there is  a  sufficient number  of  guide  rods  for  oriented drill holes. III,  10 
3.3.  Roller bits 
1.  Non-removable  roller bits  98  to 216  mm  dia. 
2.  Enlarging  roller bits up  to  1400  mm  dia. 
3.4.  Valves  and  "preventors" 
4.  Auxiliary  apparatus  (communication) 
4.1.  Location  apparatus 
4.2.  Sound  location  apparatus  for  mines 
4.3.  Telephones  for drill holes 
4.4.  Intrinsic safety  telephones  with  loudspeaker 
4.5.  Radio  apparatus  for  use  underground 
4.6.  Television  apparatus 
5.  Auxiliary  apparatus  (supply  and  rescue) 
5.1.  Containers 
5.2.  Rescue  cages 
1.  Dahlbusch  apparatus  370  mm  dia. 
2.  Dahlbusch  apparatus  430  mm  dia. 
5.3.  Pressuried  chambers 
6.  Auxiliary  apparatus  (miscellaneous) 
Saar coalfield 
1.  Note 
Requests  for  the  apparatus  below  should be  addressed  to  the  following  departments 
of  Saarbergwerke  A. G.: 
Safety 
Underground  surveying  and  mine  damage 
Rescue  centre at Friedrichsthal  (Saar). 
2.  Addresses  of  services  and  experts 
2.1.  Safety 
Director,  A.  VAN  GEMBER  (member  of  the  Rescue  Working  Party), 
66  Saarbrucken,  Triererstr.  1, 
Telephone:  Saarbrucken  40-51 
2.2.  Underground  surveying  and  mine  damage 
Director:  Prof.  A.  JUNG,  66  Saarbrucken,  Triererstr.  1, 
Telephone:  Saarbrucken  40-51. 
2.2.1.  Drilling service:  Director:  drilling engineer  LUTZOW, 
Telephone:  Saarbrucken  40-51. 
2.3.  Rescue  centre,  Friedrichsthal  (Saar) 
Director:  Dipl.  Engineer R.  MULLER  (member  of  the  Rescue  Working  Party) 
6605  Friedrichsthal  (Saar) 
Telephone:  Sulzbach  (Saar)  81-00  and  8-81-82  (The  rescue  centre  is  . 
permanently manned  by  a  full-time  rescue  team). III,  11 
3.  Apparatus  and  accessories  available for drilling rescue holes  from  underground 
3.1.  Drills 
3.2. 
1.  Turmag  P  30  up  to  1220  mm  dia. 
2.  Turmag  P  VI/12-120  up  to  610  mm  dia. 
3.  Wirth  HG  170  up  to  1400  mm  dia. 
All  the  drilling machines  for  large diameter holes  are operated by  compressed 
air.  The  Wirth drill  can  also be  operated electrically and  can  therefore be 
used  at  the  surface.  The  time  required  for  transport is very variable.  In un-
favourable  local conditions, it may  be  two  or  three  days  before  the  apparatus 
is  ready  to  operate. 
Drill  rods 
1.  41"  '2  dia.  regular - p  VI/12-120  -
2.  5~" dia.  regular - p  30  -
3.  51"  '2  dia.  regular  special - HG  170  -
Each  drill rod  is  accompanied  by  a  sufficient number  of  guide  rods  for 
oriented drilling. 
3.3.  Roller bits 
1.  Non-detachable roller bits,  98  to  216  mm  dia. 
2.  Enlarging bits up  to  1400  mm  dia. 
3.4.  Valves  and  "preventors" 
100  mm  dia. 
II.  BELGIUM 
1.  Note 
The  Belgian  coal  industry has  no  equipment  specially designed  for drilling  large 
diameter  rescue holes.  Each  colliery has  the material  for  making  holes  for  first 
contact.  They  have  contracted out  to Messrs.  FORAKY,  specialising in  large  diameter 
drilling.  The  necessary operations  for detection  and  first contact,  and  arrange-
ments  on  the  spot  for drilling will be  carried out while  awaiting  the  arrival of 
the  equipment  and  the  specialists  from Messrs.  Foraky,  which will be  prompt,  in ac-
cordance with  the  agreements. 
2.  Addresses  of  the  firm  and  the  organisation  concerned 
2.1.  Address  of  the  firm: 
Foraky,  13,Place des  Barricades,  Bruxelles  1000 
Telephone:  Bruxelles  18-20-53  and  17-59-40. 
2.2.  In  order  to  obtain  the  equipment  when  required,  contact  the  rescue  centre:  Centre 
de  coordination et de  sauvetage,  Hasselt,  Kempische  Steenweg  555,  Telephone: 
Hasselt 2-28-87.  (The  telephone  exchange  is  continuously manned  by  full-time  rescue 
teams  ready  for  action at all  times.) 
- Director:  Monsieur  A.  HAUSMAN  (member  of  the  Rescue  Working  Party) 
Telephone:  Hasselt  2-28-87 
- Secretary of  the  centre:  Monsieur A.  SIKIVIE, 
Telephone:  Hasselt  2-28-87. III,  12 
3.  Apparatus  and  accessories  available for  drilling  rescue  holes  from  under-
ground  and  from  the  surface. 
Drills  for  rescue holes  from  400  to  600  mm  dia.  are  available. 
III.  FRANCE 
1.  Note 
The  availability of  the  apparatus  below  together with  accessories will be  authorised 
by  the  rescue  centre,  Belle  Roche,  Merlebach.  The  apparatus  is mainly  in  the  Lorraine 
and  Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais  coalfields  and  with  the  specialist firm  "LONGYEAR"  which 
will  supply  them  on  request. 
2.  Addresses  of organisations  and  specialists 
2.1.  Belle Roche  rescue  centre in the  Lorraine  coalfield,  at  F  57  Merlebach,  Telephone: 
Merlebach  04-19-95. 
(The  switchboard  at  the  rescue  centre  is manned  continuously.) 
Director: 
Monsieur J.  CRETIN,  divisional mining  engineer  (member  of  the  Rescue  Working 
Party). 
2.2.  Rescue  centre  of  Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais  coalfield,  Rue  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette, 
F  62  Lens  (Pas-de-Calais),  Telephone:  Lens  28-24-31. 
(The  switchboard at  the  rescue  centre  is  continuously manned). 
Director: 
Monsieur  G.  ROGEZ,  Mining  engineer  (member  of  the  Rescue  Working  Party). 
2.3.  Monsieur  R.  GRISARD,  mining  engineer,  head  of  the  Safety Service of CdF  (member 
of  the  Rescue  Working  Party) 
9,  Av.  Percier,  F  75  Paris  8e,  Telephone:  Paris  225-95-00. 
3.  Apparatus  and accessories available  for drilling rescue  holes  from  underground. 
3.1.  Drills 
3.2. 
3.3. 
1.  1  Turmag  P  30  up  to  610  mm  dia.~  complete with 
1  swivelling support,  flittable  and  telescopic 
1  Turmag  prop 
1  winch 
2.  Equipment  for  508  mm  tubing with  the  P  30  drill, with 
1  plate  for  screwing  and  unscrewing  486  x  508  rom  tubes, 
1  appliance  for  guiding  and  retaining  tubes 
1  hydraulic brake  for  tubes  of  508  mm  dia 
70  m tubes  of  486  x  508  mm  in lengths  of 0.50 m- 0.75 m- 1.00 m- 1.20 m and 
1  of  3  m with  the handling pulley. 
Drill  rods 
1.  100  drill rods  1. 50  m in  length 
2.  6  guide  rods  of  193  mm  dia.  and  1.50 m length 
3.  25  guides  of  600  mm  dia. 
Roller bits 
1.  4  tricone bits of  193  mm  dia. III,  13 
4.  Auxiliary  apparatus  (communication) 
4.1.  Detection  apparatus 
4.2.  Sound  location apparatus 
1.  8  genephones  consisting of HALL  SEARS  receivers,  type HS-J,  model  12 
2.  8  pre-amplifiers,  type VBI-Grundig,  built-in battery 
3.  8  amplifiers  type  E.  OMY  3  - Hartmann  and  Braun,  supplied  from mains  200  V - 5  VA. 
4.3.  1  lumiscript  type  151-8,  Hartmann  and  Braun  (8  tracks). 
5.  Auxiliary  equipment  (supply  and  rescue) 
5.1.  Containers 
1  container 0.30  m,  1  of  0.60 m,  1  of  0.90  m and  1  of  1.50 m for  rods  NQ  and  BQ. 
5.2.  Rescue  cages 
2  Dahlbusch  appliances  (370  and  430  mm  dia.) 
6.  Auxiliary  equipment  (miscellaneous) 
6.1.  1  friction winch  for  fitting  the  rope  to  the  rescue  device 
1  return end 
1  tension  and  control device with pull-lift  and  dynamometer 
1 Westphalia winch,,model  1033,  equipped with  Guldner  HW  10  hydrostatic transmission. III,  15 
C.  SPECIALISTS  AND  APPARATUS  FOR  DRILLING  RESCUE  HOLES  FROM  THE  SURFACE III,  17 
I •  GENERAL  REMARKS  ( 1) 
The  possibility of saving emtombed  men  by  drilling  from  the  surface depends  es-
sentially on  the  depth.  For  rescue  purposes,  the maximum  depth would  be  in  the  region 
of  500  m.  On  the other hand,  in certain conditions drill holes  for  searching  and  supply 
purposes  can be  successfully carried out  to  a  depth of  about  1000  m. 
A distinction should be  made  between drill holes  for  searching  and  supply  pur-
poses  on  the  one  hand  and  rescue drill holes  on  the  other. 
Drill holes  for  search  and  supply  purposes  should be  carried out  at  a  minimum 
diameter  of  6  inches,  remembering  that  the  smallest  turbine has  a  diameter  of  5  inches. 
In  the  looser overburdens,  a  sufficiently large  diameter  should  be  chosen  for  an  inter-
mediate  tubing of  7  inches. 
Rescue  drilling  can  be  carried out  using  normal  clay  flushing,  at  a  diameter of 
26  inches  down  to  a  safety  zone  above  the  objective.  The  extent  of  the safety  zone 
should be  determined  according  to  the  circumstances,  taking into  account  the  local 
conditions.  When  the  safety  zone  is  reached,  the  flushing  liquid should be  removed  and 
drilling continued with air flushing.  It is  also  possible  to  carry out  preliminary 
drilling with  a  coring bit  (8~ inches)  and  air flushing,  and  then  to  enlarge it with 
water flushing. 
Drilling for  search  and  rescue  purposes  requires  a  considerable  time  as  it is 
shown  by  the  following  table. 
1.  Drilling for  search  and  supply  purposes 
1.1.  Depth of  500  metres. 
Transport  (300  km)  and  setting up  equipment  (including  12  hours 
to mark  out,  level  and  strengthen  a  drilling base  of.50  x  50  metres) 
Drilling including direction  and  tubing work 
0  - 300  m (8  5/8") 
300  - 500  m (8
11
) 
1.2.  Depth of  1000  m 
Transport  and  assenbly 
Drilling 
0  - 300  m 
300  - 1000  m  (400  m carboniferous) 
Total  time 
Total  time 
24  hrs. 
48  hrs. 
48  hrs. 
5  days 
====== 
24  hrs. 
48  hrs. 
240  hrs. 
13  days 
========= 
(1)  This  note has  been  taken  from  the  list of specialists and equipment  for  driZZing  from 
the  surface  drawn  up  by  the  Essen  Rescue  centre~  January  1st  1970. III,  18 
2.  Drilling rescue holes 
Depth  up  to  500  m 
Drilling and  sealing off with  cement 
0  - 300  m (drilling first hole  of  17~" 
300  - 500  m  (17~") 
(23") 
Setting tubes 
Drilling in safety zone 
II.  GERMANY  (FEDERAL  REPUBLIC) 
Ruhr 
1.  Note 
and  enlarging to  26")  5  days 
5  days 
5  days 
1  day 
2  days 
Total  time  18  days 
+  search drilling 23  days 
======= 
Coordination  of specialists  and  use  of  equipment  for drilling rescue  holes  from  the 
surface  are the  responsibility of  the  rescue  centre  at Essen.  This  centre should 
be  informed  in  case  of  emergency. 
2.  Addresses  of organisations  and  specialists 
The  same  institutions  and  specialists quoted  for drilling holes  from  underground 
are also  available  for drilling from  the  surface.  These  are  given  on  page  4  of  this 
list. 
3.  Specialised drilling firms 
3.1.  C.  Deilmann  AG.  (Oil  and  natural. gas). 
4442  Bentheim,  Postfach  75. 
Telephone:  (05922)  7-21,  Telex:  96833,  Telegrams:  Deilmann  Bentheim 
3.2.  Deutsche  Erdol-AG  Hamburg,  Prospecting  and  winning. 
2  Hamburg,  Kreuzweg  7 
Telephone:  (0411)  44-19-21,  Telex:  0211477  (Aufschluss  und Gewinnung, 
Kreuzweg  7),  0211103  (Hauptverwaltung,  Mittelweg  180),  Telegrams: 
Leawerke  Hamburg. 
3. 3.  Deutsche  Schachtbau- und  Tiefbohrgesellschaft  mbH,  Drilling  and  oil winning. 
445  Lingen  (Ems),  Waldstrasse  39,  Postfach  142, 
Telephone:  (0591)  41-71,  Telex:  096840,  Telegrams:Tiefbohrol Lingenems. 
3.4.  Gewerkschaft  Brigitta,  Oil  and  natural gas. 
3  Hannover,  Kolbergstrasse  14,  Postfach  1049 
Telephone:  (0511)  8-11-71. 
Telex:  0922852,  Telegrams:  brigittaoel Hannover. 
3.5.  Gewerkschaft  Elwerath  (Oil  company),  Hannover,  Werk  Nienhagen 
31  Celle,  Postfach 
Telephone:  (051405)  2-11,  Telex:  092553,  Telegrams:  Elwerath  Celle. 
3.6.  ITAG  Hermann  von  Rautenkranz,  International drilling company 
31  Celle,  Itagstrasse 5-27,  Postfach  114 
Telephone:  (05141)  60-81,  Telex:  925174  Itagc d, 
Telegrams:  Itag Celle. III,  19 
3.7.  Mobil  Oil  AG  (Crude  oil division) 
31  Celle,  Burggrafenstrasse  1,  Postfach  110 
Telephone:  (05141)  1-51,  Telex:  92551  (925151-925152), 
Telegrams:  Mobiloil  Celle. 
3.8.  Preussag AG,  (Oil  and  drilling) 
3  Hannover  1,  Leibniz-Ufer  9,  Postfach 4829 
Telephone:  (0511)  1-93-21,  Telex:  0922828, 
Telegrams:  Preussag Bohrverwaltung Hannover. 
3.9.  Rheinische  Braunkohlenwerke  AG,  Gruppe  Nord 
(Drilling  and  drainage  division) 
5151  Niederaubem,  Postfach  40 
Telephone:  (02271)  8-11 
3.10.Wintershall  AG  (Oil  company) 
2847  Barnstorf Bez.  Bremen,  Postfach  220 
Telephone:  (05442) 6-11-14,  Telex:  941205, 
Telegrams: Winte rshall Barns tor£  Bez.  Bremen. 
4.  Drilling specialists 
The  assistance of  the  specialists  of  the  above  firms  can be  requested directly 
from  the  firms  or  through  the  Essen  rescue  centre. 
5.  Drilling equipment 
The  following  firms  have  the drilling equipment  specified above: 
D e  p  t  h  s 
Drilling  firms 
0-500  m  - 1000  m  - 1500  m 
Deilmann  2  Failing 2500  2  Ide  co  H 525 
Deutsche  Erdol  Ide  co  H  30 
Ide  co  H 525 
I 
Deutsche  Schachtbau  I 
SMG  FS  291 
Elwerath  I  Haniel  & Ineg 
I  SR  12 
I tag  I  SMG/Za  312  Cardwell  J-450 
Mobil  Oil  I SMG  61100/30 
Preussag  I  SMG  ZA  292 
Rheinbraun  I 
2  Wirth  L  10 
5.2.  Drilling  equipment  for  rescue work  (18  5/8") 
Drilling firms 
D e  p  t  h  s 
0-500  m  -1000  m 
Deilmann  2  Ideco H 525  NSCO  80  B 
EMSCO  800 
Deutsche  Erdol  Ideco  H  30  2  NSCO  80  B 
Ideco H 525 
! 
I Deutsche  Schachtbau  SMG  FB  291 
I Itag  Cardwell  J-450 
I Rheinbraun  I 2  Wirth  L  10 
I 
I 
I  ! III,  20 
6.  Note  on drilling equipment  and  accessories 
6.1.  Drilling for search  and  supply purposes 
Nearly all the  firms  listed have  the  required  tools  and  tubes  for drilling holes 
for  search  and  supply purposes  at  a  diameter  of  6  to  8  inches. 
6.2.  Drilling rescue holes 
6.3.  Bits 
Bits of all sizes  can  be  obtained  at Deutsche  Schachtbau- und  Tiefbohrgesellschaft. 
In all the  other firms,  the bits  shown  are  only available  at  certain times. 
6.4.  Tubes 
For  tubing  rescue  holes,  tubes  up  to  24"  diameter  are  required.  The  stocks  of 
tubes  of this size vary  according  to  the  firm.  However,  it can  be  assumed  that  the 
total length  required  can be obtained  from all the  firms  listed. 
6.5.  Air  compressors 
Saar 
To  carry  out  a  search drilling with  air flushing,  the  appropriate  compressors will 
be  found  at  the  following  firms: 
Rheinische  Braunkohlenwerke  AG,  Gruppe  Nord 
Abteilung Bohrbetrieb  und  Wasserwirtschaft 
5151  Niederaussem,  Postfach  40 
Telephone:  (02271)  8-11 
Atlas  Copco  Deutschland  GmbH 
43  Essen,  Kupferdreher  Strasse  86 
Telephone:  (02141)  44-91,  (02141)  44-92-00  (after office hours). 
1.  Preliminary note 
In order  to  request  the  following  equipment,  the  following  services of Saarbergwerke 
AG  should  be  contacted: 
Safety 
Underground  surveying  and  mine  damage 
Rescue  centre at Friedrichsthal  (Saar). 
2.  Addresses  of organisations  and  experts 
The  same  organisations  and  specialists  for drilling work  from  underground  are  also 
competent  for  carrying out drilling work  from  the  surface.  The  addresses  are  shown 
on  ~ages III,  10  and  III,  11. 
3.  Drilling organisations 
Saarbergwerke  AG  has  the  following  equipment  and  accessories: 
3.1.  Drills including carriages 
1.  Salzgitter SG  750,  directed drilling up  to  159  mm, 
enlargement possible up  to  270  mm  dia. 
2.  Wirth  BW  H 563,  directed drilling up  to  159  mm, 
enlargement  possible up  to  270  mm  dia. 
3.  Joy  275,  directed drilling up  to  159  mm, 
enlargement  possible  up  to  270  mm  dia. III,  21 
All  the drilling machines  are  operated by  a  diesel  engine  and  are mobile.  The 
machines  at  1  and  2  can be  transported in  a  few  hours.  The  machine  at  3  (which is 
more  powerful)  takes  several  days. 
3.2.  Drill rods 
2  3/8  i~ches Regular  N - Asme 
can be  used with  the  3  types  of drill listed under  3.1. 
3.3.  Bits 
The  roller bits up  to  216  rnrn  have  already been mentioned  in connection with machines 
for underground. 
3.4.  "Preventors" 
Type  Wirth  6  5/8 inches -for presssures  up  to  140  kg/cm2  suitable for drill rods 
of 2  3/8 inches. 
3.5.  Valves  (complete  locking) 
Type  Wirth  6  5/8 inches  for pressure up  to  140  kg/cm2• 
The  drilling machines  belonging  to  the service for drilling at great depths  are  in 
continuous  use,  except  when  being moved  from  one  place ot  another.  Allowance  should 
be made  for  the  transport  times  required,  as  given  above. 
III.  BELGIUM 
1.  Note 
The  remarks  on  page III, 11  of  this list, on  drilling from  underground,  also  apply 
for drilling from  the  surface. 
Requests  for experts  and  for  equipment,  as  well  as  for  coordination of drilling work, 
are made  by  the  Rescue  Centre, Hasselt. 
2.  Addresses  of organisations  and  experts 
These  addresses  and  those  of  the  firm are  given on  page III,  11. 
IV.  FRANCE 
1.  Note 
Requests  for drilling equipment  and  experts,  as  well  as  for coordination of drilling 
work,  are dealt with  by  the  services  in Section B of this list. 
2.  Addresses  of organisations  and  experts 
The  addresses  are on  page III, 12  of this list. 
3.  Drilling firms 
3.1.  Forex Forages  & Exploitations Petrolieres 
35,  rue St.  Dominique,  Paris  7e 
Telephone:  70595-00  (Lignes  groupees) 
4.  Drilling experts 
Requests  for experts  and  equipment  to be  addressed  to: 
M.  Maurice  Lepreux 
24,  rue Boissieres, Paris  16e 
Telephone:  704.59-06. III,  22 
5.  Drilling  equipment 
5.1.  Drilling equipment  available  at  the  rescue  centre,  Belle-Roche 
1  Joy  oleo-hydraulic drill - 22  HD  (400  metres  in NQ.U) 
5.2.  Drilling equipment  available at Forex 
5.2.1.  Drilling equipment  for  search  and  supply  (6  inch dia.) 
For  depths  up  to  1000  metres: 
Ideco  H 25 
For  depths  up  to  1500  metres: 
Ideco  H 40 
Ideco  H 525 
5.2.2.  Drilling equipment  for  rescue work  (18  5/8  inch dia.) 
For  depths  up  to  500  metres 
Ideco  H 40 
Ideco  525 
6.  Note  on  drilling equipment  and  accessories 
The  information given at II.6 is  also  applicable here. RESEARCH  AIMED  AT  IMPROVING  THE  PHYSIOLOGICAL 
CONDITIONS  OF  CLOSED-CIRCUIT  BREATHING  APPARATUS 
CARRIED  OUT  WITH  THE  FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  OF 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
FOLLOWING  A PROPOSAL  BY  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
Summary  of Results 
ANNEX  IV 
(Approved  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  26  June  1970) CONTENTS 
Summaries  of  results  obtained by: 
1)  the Ernest Malvoz  regional Institute  (Liege/Belgium) 
2)  the  "Hauptstelle  fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen  des  Steinkohlen-
bergbauvereins"  (Essen/Germany) 
3)  the  "Co6rdinatiecentrum Reddingswezen  van het Kempische  Steen-
kolenbekken  (Hasselt/Belgium) 
IV,  5 
IV,  19 
IV'  33 IV,  5 
1)  SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS  OBTAINED  BY  THE 
ERNEST  MALVOZ  REGIONAL  INSTITUTE 
'  AT  LIEGE  (BELGIUM) IV,  7 
Respiratory  resistance  and  its effect on  the mechanical ventilatory  force  has 
been  examined  on  wearers  for  thirteen types  of self-contained apparatus.  The  results  are 
given  in table  1  which  deals with  data which  can be  reproduced  for ventilations  of  10, 
30  and  50  1/min.  These  ventilation  v~lues were  chosen  for  the  comparison;  where  such 
values were  not  obtained exactly  from  the wearers,  the necessary  corrections  have  been 
calculated.  In this  table  the mechanical  force  represents  the  additional  respiratory 
effort which  the self-contained  apparatus  requires  over  a  given  unit of  time:  it defines 
this  in an  overall  sense.  Variations  in  flow  pressures  of  zero  correspond  to non-dynamic 
resistances,  which  occur  in the  absence  of  flow: they mainly  consist  of critical pressures 
due  to opening  of valves  and  the  elastic resistance  of the bag.  The  average  pressure 
characterises  the effect of possible  continuous  low  or  lowered pressures  during  the  ven-
tilation cycle.  Pressure variations at  the  averlage  volume  of  inhaling  and  exhaling 
characterises  the  component  dynamic  of variations  in buccal  pressure  and  enables  the  dyna-
mic  resistance,  which  is  the  sum  of  resistances  to  the air flow,  to be  calculated.  The 
maximum  pressure values  also  represent  the  characteristics  of  the different  types  of self-
contained  apparatus. 
Table  2  compares  the  results  of  the  ventilatory mechanics  most  frequently  met 
(column  3,  which  refers  to  values  called  'commercial')  with different physiological  data. 
1)  inherent mechanical  thorax values  in the  average normal  person; 
2)  values  beyond which  the  subject  undergoes  additional  resistances  and  below which it 
is not  advisable  to  go; 
3)  values  for which  the  tolerance may  be  considered  as  correct,  taking into account  the 
reserves  of mechanical  energy which  the  thorax possesses; 
4)  values  which  inevitably involve  a  negative  tolerance to  the wearing  of  the  apparatus. 
Table  2  compares  the  results  recorded in detail in table  1 with  certain physio-
logical values  and  shows  that  the mechanical  ventilatory values  of self-contained apparatus 
prove  to  be  satisfactory.  This  does  not mean  that  these  satisfactory values  should not be 
checked  for  consistency with  the  aid of  an artifical lung;·which has  been  done  at Essen. 
Temperature  and  humidity  of  the air breathed quickly  reach high  levels  - 40-SQO  C 
(in a  laboratory environment)  - and water  vapour  saturation with  apparatus whose  oxygen 
supply is  compressed;  on  the  other hand,  these  values  remain  low  with  apparatus with  liquid 
oxygen  supply;  the  addition of  a  cooling  unit  in the  respiratory circuit also  reduces 
these  values. 
The  co2  content  of air exhaled varies  to  a  lesser degree  than that  of  inhaled 
air.  For all apparatus  in use  there is  a  limiting  factor,  which  becomes  decisive  once 
muscular effort is prolonged  or becomes  more  intense,  due  to  a  failure  to  absorb  co2  by 
the  element.  COz  produces  excess  ventilation, which  leads  to overload in ventilation, 
through  stimulation of  the  respiratory centre;  the  latter effect ist even more  marked with 
thermal  stasis  of  the wearer.  An  example  is  that encountered  in  a  trial involving  the  use 
of 02  at  a  rate  of between  1  and  1.5  1/min,  where  an  increase  in  COz  of  from 0  to  1  % in 
inhaled  air led to  an  incraese  in  the  ventilation of  about  2  1/min  in  a  normal  environment, 
whil  the  incraesed  reached  10  1/min with  a  thermal  stasis which  incraesed the body  tempera-
ture by  1°  C. 
The  additional ventilatory mechanical  force  was  minimal,  the  consumption  of 02  by  the  subject  did not  rise  appreciably  due  to breathing  in the self-contained apparatus. 
On  the  other hand,  the weight  of  the  apparatus  did affect  the  consumption of  Oz  by  the 
subject within  the weight  limits encountered  (less  than  20  kg),  the  rise in o2  consumtpion 
being  equal  to  an  increase  caused by  an  in crease  in body weight  of  the  subject:  if the 
trial in question means  an  expenditure  of  energy  of  20  ml/kg  of body weight,  an  increase 
of  1  kg  in the weight  of  the  apparatus  involves  an  additional expenditure of energy  of 
20  ml  or 1/60 of  the weight  of  a  man  weighing  60  kg;  in other words,  a  wearer  of  60  kg 
consuming  1200  ml  Oz/min  under  control  conditions will  consume  1400  ml  Oz/min if he  has 
to  carry  10  kg.  Beyond  20  kg,  the  consumption  of  oxygen becomes  excessive,  the burden in-
hibiting normal  movement  by  the subject. IV,  8 
For  respiratory  resistances normally  found  in self-contained apparatus,  the 
mechanical  ventilatory  force  of  the wearer is  only slightly affected:  it increases  simply 
because  of the additional effort, which  would otherwise be  insignificant.  The  admissible 
limit values  have  been well established for  application to co2  filter self-rescuers.  The 
physiological origin of  these  limit values .of  dynamic  resistance is  the maximum  force 
which  the  inhaling muscles  can  develop  (60  em  H20  as  the minimum  for  an  average subject). 
The  maximum  tolerable  resistance  therefore  depends  on  the ventilation  flow  permitted for 
the wearer  according  to the  equation:  R = 60/V.  Taking  into  account  the  relationships 
between  the maximum  air intake,  the  ventilation rate permissible,  the  consumption  of  02 
(equal  to  ventilation of  20  1  air/1 02)  and  pressure measurements  in mm  taken  for H20 
for  controlling self-rescuers with  a  continuous  flow  of  95  1/min,  a  diagram  (Fig.  1)  is 
obtained which  fixes  the maximum  tolerable resistance  in relation to the effort  allowed 
to  the wearer.  The  effect of  additional  clearances  (mouthpieces  of self-contained apparatus) 
is negligable with  the  values  normally encountered  (less  than  100  ml):  necessary  adaptation 
is  always  possible  in view  of  the  size of  the  ventilatory  reserves  available:  during non-
exhausting trials the  experimental  clearances  of  0.5  and  1  1  only made  small  changes  in 
the ventilatory behaviour of  the  subjects.  As  with  C02  in the  inhaled air,  such  clearances 
become  significant when  the  trials  are more  intensive  and  close to  the maximum.  For 
clearances  below  100  ml  and  low  metabolisms  (1  to 1.5  1  02/min),  the  problem is  unimpor-
tant  since,  at worst, it means  an  increase  in ventilation of  2  1/min. 
Some  effect  can be  ascribed to  the  temperature  and  the humidity  of  the  inhaled 
air.  But,  while  obviously present,  this  effect is  subordinate  due  to  the quantitavely  low 
calorific exchanges  in the  inhaled air.  On  the  other hand,  the  features  of  the  "micro-
climate"  represented by  the wearer  and his  self-contained apparatus  (reheating by  the  C02 
absorber  unit or cooling by  the  liquid oxygen  source,  followed by  the  carbon  ice pack) 
play  a  decisive part.  The  key  differentiation in physiological efficiency of  the  different 
self-contained apparatus  therefore  stems  from  their heating  or  cooling  function.  In high-
temperature  environments,  the  thermal  limitation is  a  paramount  factor,  as  tests  at Hasselt 
have  shown. 
An  outline  diagram was  devised  in order toweightthe different possible  improve-
ments  in the  design  of  apparatus  and  to  provide  data on  the  comparative  values  of various 
existing  apparatus.  This  diagram is based  on  a  variety  of physiological  approximations 
which  enable all the stresses, to which  Q  wearer of  a  self-contained apparatus  is exposed, 
to be  related to  a  single unit  of measurement,  the mechanical ventilatory  force,  chosen  in 
an  arbitrary fashion,  being expressed  in Kgm/min. 
Although  only  an  outline  and  rather  complex,  this  diagram  did yield simple  and 
practical information.  This  included  the  intensity of energy expenditure,  possible  thermal 
stasis,  the weight  carried by  the  subject,  the  volume  of  the  additional  dead weight 
carried,  the  C02  content  in the  inhaled air and  the  additional  resistance  of  the self-
contained  apparatus.  As  an  example,  a  satisfactory self-contained apparatus  involves  an 
overall stress  of  6  kgm/min;  an  inferior one  a  stress of  22  kgm/min. Comparaison  m~canigue ventilatoire  des  difft'!rents  appareils  respiratoires  autonomes 
Appareil 
Ventilation  L/min 
Variation 
Draeger  160  Draeger  170  Draeger  17~  Draeger  174  Auer  0,6L  Auer  1,8L  Pirelli 
10  3q  50  10  30  50  10  30  50  lO  30  50  10  30  50  lO  30  50  10  30 
Proto 
50  10  30 
Fenzy  Fenzy  +  S  Normalair  Aerorlox  Air-Magic 
50  10  30  50  10  30  50  10  30  50  10  30  50  10  30  50 
~- Puissance mecanique 
L.  en  H20/  min 
10,7  103  309  8,2  226  13  118  320  10,7  96  287  7,4  96  287  81  247  14  118  3n  31  296  94o  6,2  81  2o6  u  118  32o  28  155  326  21  157  385  33  236  536 
2.  Variation  de  pression 
aux  debits  nu1s 
mm  H20 
Pression moyenne 
mm  HzO 
3.  Variation  de  pression 
au  vo  1  ume  moyen 
22 
+7 
mm  HzO  14 
Resistance  dynamique 
globale 
mm  HzO/(L/sec)  13 
4.  Depression  maximum 
mm  H20 
Pression  maximum 
nun  H20 
Variation maximum 
de  pression 
mm  HzO 
17 
24 
24 
+9 
46 
14 
20 
26 
46 
19  16  19  21  n  29  22  25  26  24  21  20  21  31  32 
+6  -2  -4  -6  +9  +9  +7  +14  +12  +10  +4  -2  +6  +4  +7 
87  11  35  61  16  52  89  15  41  73  11  41  75  13  33 
15  10  11  11  15  16  16  13  13  14  13  14  11  11 
39  19  33  25  44  19  36  22  37  16 
48  16  28  26  28  45  24  25  39  20  19  38  30  31 
87  16  35  61  32  53  89  30  44  75  26  41  75  36  47 
25  15  16  18  30  35  40  19  22  24  20  21  23  28  26  26  19  21  22  21  23  20 
+4  +1  +5  +8  +4  -20  -30  +13  +15  +16  +15  +13  +11  +21  +19  +16  +17  +16  +15  -8  -9  -4 
67  19  51  93  40  130  240  12  34  53  16  52  92  32  48  78  29  55  76  36  90  140 
12  17  16  19  38  40  45  10  11  10  14  16  16  27  16  14  26  18  15  40  32  26 
32  24  43  15  80  150  18  24  42  12  27  21  38  24  50  80 
35  10  27  50  25  50  90  19  25  35  19  29  so  31  36  51  28  38  45  16  40  60 
67  19 I 51  93  40  130  240  23  34  53  25  53  92  33  48  78  32  59  83  40  90  140 
H 
<! Tableau  2 
Norrnes  rnecaniques ventilatoires des  appareils respiratoires  autonornes 
Caracteristiques  I. Thorax  2.  Perception  3.  Conunerciales  4.  Tolerance 
Ventilation L/rnin  10  30  50  10  30  50  10  30  50  10  30  50 
1.  Puissance rnecanique 
L  ern  H20/rnin  16  220  1  030  5  45  120  12  1 1  0  350  25  250  1  000 
2.  Variation de  pression 
aux debits  nuls 
nun  H20  100  150  200  25  37  50  30  30  30  100  150  200 
Pression rnoyenne 
nun  H20  -10  -20  +10  - - - +1 0'  +10  +10  +10  +10  +10  - - - - - -
3.  Variation de  pression 
au  volume  moyen 
nun  H20  21  94  260  6  19  32  15  50  80  30  100  200 
Resistance  dynarnique 
globale 
nun  H20(L/sec)  20  30  50  6  6  6  15  15  15  30  30  30 
4.  Depression maximum 
nun  H20  60  100  11 0  15  20  25  10  25  50  50  100  100 
Pression maximum 
nnn  H20  40  50  150  15  20  25  30  35  50  50  50  100 
Variation maximum 
de  pression 
nnn  H20  1.00  150  260  25  37  50  40  60  100  100  150  200 
5.  Intolerance 
10  30  50 
125  1  250  5  000 
100  300  400 
+50  +50  +50  - - -
150  500  1  000 
200  200  200 
100  250  500 
100  250  500 
200  500  1  000 
H 
< IV,  13 
Figure 1 
VARIATION DE LA RESISTANCE EN FONCTION DE L'EFFORT 
Pression en mm H20 
300~-----------------------------------------------
110 
100  ~----------+---;-~---+----------~-------------
Travail exprime en litres 02/min 
2,0 IV,  15 
GOUT  PHYSIOLOGIQUE GLOBAL DE l'UTILISATION D'UN BON APPAREIL 
RESPIRATOIRE AUTONOME 
Exemple schematique (lire le diagram  me en tournant de 1 a  7) 
CONTRAINTE GLOBALE LIEE AU  PORT D'UN BON APPAREIL 
RESPIRATOIRE AUTONOME 
U!WfZQ  1 g'  ~ awwosuo::>  11  ® 
6>1  0  ~ ap a6Je4::> aun al,Jod lB 6>1  OL  as~d larns a1 @) 
..... 
0  g 
Puissance mecanique ventilatoire 
(1  em H20/min} 
:II 
(1).. 
C/) 
[ 
I)) 
::I 
0 
(,.)  (I) 
1\)  0 
3 
::I: 
~ 
~----~~----~~~0 g 
® La puissance mecanique ventilatoire du 
sujet est normale, Ia resistance additionnelle 
atteint 1 em H20(1Isec} 
(£)La contrainte globale est de 6 kg/min IV,  17 
COUT PHYSIOLOGIOUE GLOBAL DE  L'UTILISATION D'UN MAUVAIS APPAREIL 
RESPIRATOIRE AUTONOME 
Example schematique (lire le diagramme en tournant de 1 a  7) 
CONTRAINTE GLOBALE LIEE AU  PORT D'UN MAUVAIS 
APPAREIL RESPIRATOlRE  AUTONOME 
U!WfZO 1 rl  awwosuoo 11  ® 
6>t  Ol ap  Temperature 
a6Je4o aun a:J,Jod  ~a 6>t  OL  as~d  ~afns a1 ®  corporelle (
0 C) 
a. 
CD 
® La puissance mecB:ni_que  ventila~~ire du 
sujet est normale, Ia res1stance add1t1onnelle 
attaint 2 em  H20  (1 /sec) 
<i) La contrainte globale est de 22  kg/min IV,  19 
2)  SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS  OBTAINED  BY  THE 
"HAUPTSTELLE  FUR  DAS  GRUBENRETTUNGSWESEN" 
AT  ESSEN  (GERMANY) IV,  21 
RESULTS  OF  THE  RESEARCH  PROGRAMME  CARRIED  OUT 
BY  THE  CENTRAL  RESCUE  STATION  AT  ESSEN-KRAY 
Tests  on  respiratory physiology were  carried out  at  the physiological  institute 
at Liege University  on  a  number  of experimental  subjects  equipped with  closed-circuit 
oxygen breathing  apparatus  as  used by  rescue  teams  in the mines  of Western Europe.  In order 
to  obtain objective criteria which would enable  the value  of  the  apparatus  to be  assessed 
and  improved,  it was  deemed  necessary  for  these  to be  tried, not  only  longer  on  human 
subjects,  but  on  an  artificial breathing machine  (artificial lung),  so  as  to  then  compare 
the measurements  obtained with  the Liege  test results. 
With  this  in view,  a  theory was  first established dealing with  the physical 
processes  noted when  a  closed-circuit  oxygen breathing apparatus  was  used.  This  showed 
that  the  criterion of  'respiratory resistance'  as  used until  then  to monitor closed-circuit 
apparatus,  showed  only  the pressure at  the buccal mouthpiece  of  the  apparatus  but did not 
take into account  flow  quantity.  According  to this  theory,  a  formula was  devised to  cal-
culate  the  respiratory  resistance  in  an  overall sense,  consisting of  the  resistance  to 
flow  and elastic resistance,  a  formula which  even  then had  to be based  on  simplified 
hypotheses  and  did not  take  into  account  all relevant parameters.  Not  considered were,  for 
example,  flow  turbulence,  the non-constant elasticity of elastic components  and  the 
disparity in inhalting  and  exhaling  channels.  For this  reason  research was  focussed  on  a 
better criterion of  respiratory  physiology,  which would  involve  all the  important  factors. 
It was  shown  that  the  respiratory capacity,  consisting  of  a  combination  of  flow  and 
elasticity capacities, met  these  conditions. 
We  have  also developed  a  measuring  device which,  with  the help of an  artificial 
lung,  enabled  the most  significant information to be  obtained  (annex 1).  The  main  features 
of  the ~tificial lung  and  the measuring  device  and  the method  of  the  trials have  been 
fully  described.  Supervision of  the  trial procedure which was  carried out by  testing  an 
apparatus  first  on  a  human  subject,  then  on  an  artificial lung,  has  demonstrated  that  the 
procedure  used  is entirely suitable  to  the  aim  in view  (annex  2). 
Independently  of  the measurement  of physical  indices  (annex  3),  the  regenerative 
cartridges were  also  checked  for their chemical  performance  (annex  4). 
The  closed-circuit oxygen  apparatus  of  the  firm Fenzy,  1.956  model,  with values, 
was  used  as  a  specimen  to  show  in detail how  the measurement  results  obtained in trials 
were  utilised.  The  results  of physical indices measurements  of all types  of  apparatus 
investigated are  set out  in separate  tables.  Discussion of  these  results  centred on  the 
distinctive  features  noted  as  between different  types  of  apparatus.  This  showed  how  the 
various  types  could be  improved.  Overall,  however,  measurements  of all the  apparatus 
investigated were  found  to  lie within  the  'tolerance  limits'  worked  out  by  the  Physiology 
Institute at Liege. 
In  comparing  the measurements  obtained with  the  results  from  the Liege  investi-
gations  of  apparatus,  attention was  particularly  focussed  on  difficulties which  are  impos-
sible to  avoid when  thests  are made  on  human  subjects. 
The  values  obtained at Essen  and  at Liege have  been  grouped  together in  table 
form;  it has  been  found  that,  despite  the  difficulties referred to,  the  different values 
coincide  to  a  considerable  extent  (annex 5). 
It emerged  that  one  can be  confident  that  the new  method  of  testing  closed-
circuit oxygen  apparatus  makes  it possible  to simulate  in good  conditions  the  use  of  appar-
atus  by men  and  that  the  values  obtained during  these  investigations  provide exact  indi-
cations  forfuture  improvement  in  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus. IV,  23 
Annexe1 
SCHEMA DE L'INSTALLATION DE MESURE DE LA RESISTANCE RESPIRATOIRE 
Pou mon artificial 
Convertisseu r 
de pression 
differentielle 
Rheometre 
capillaire 
Vdt  p 
~-o/ 
p'V  pV 
Enregistreur x -y 
Appareil a  oxygene a  circuit ferme 
I  1  r::ouche 1 
! 
I 
Sac respiratoire 
. 
L_ __  - __  j 
Convertisseur de surpression 
et de depression 
Amplificateur de mesure 
et integrateur 
pt 
Enregistreur rapide I  I .  .1  _I  .  !  I  I  .  I 
Volume resp1rat01re:  21.1/mln; 2 Vo= 1,681; f= 12,51/mln 
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~  ~  A.  -- ..I  ~  - T-R~capitulation  des  resultats  des  essais 
(valeurs  physiques) 
Modele  d'aeeareil  Aerorlox  Auer  54/400  Auer  56/400  Dr!tger  160  A  Dra:ger  170/400  Dr!tger  172 
circulation d' air  1/min  10  25  50  10  25  50  10  25  50  10  25  50  10  25  50  10  25  50 
Pu  depression max.  mm  WS 
Pti  surpression max,  mm  WS 
Pg  pression  to tale  nun  WS 
Pm  pression moyenne  mm  WS 
t.Ps  (P1  - P2)  v=o  mm  WS 
t.Pe  (P1  - P2)  V=o  nun  WS 
As  r~sistance au  flux  mm  WS  s/1 
Ae  resistance  nun  WS  s/1 
e1astique 
A  resistance  mm  WS  s/1 
respiratoire 
~s 
capaci  te  de  flux  em  WS.l/min 
We  capacite elastique  em  WS.1/min 
~  capacite  em  WS.l/min 
respiratoire 
I  4,8  20,5  60,0  8,0  15,5  47 ,C  0,0  6,8  44,0  3,9  8, 7  30,2  8,1  11 '1  34,4  4,0  9,6 
II  - 24,0  69,0  - 14,8  44,8  - 7. 5  52,3  - 9,4  29.7  - 11,5  33,4  - 9,6 
I  30,2  43,0  56,2  32,5  22' 5  55,0  40,0  42,7  49,0  22,0  26,0  48,9  9,0  18,4  45,0  38,0  44,2 
II  - 44,5  54,3  - 29,2  77,0  - 49.7  75,0  - 29,1  59,0  - 28,5  79,7  - 43,4 
I  35,0  63,5  116,2  40,5  38,0 102,0  40,0  49,5  93,0  25' 9  34,7  79' 1  17,1  29,5  79,4  42,0  53,8 
II  - 68,5  123,3  - 44,0  121,8  - 57.2  127' 3  - 38.5  88,7  - 40,0 113,1  - 53,0 
I  +12,1  +8. 5  +1,8  +10,3  1,0  -2,1 +14,0 +13, 3  -0,8  +5,0  +6, 5  +3,0  +0,4  +1' 3  +2,3  +9,2 +10,9 
II  - +8,3  -0,7  - +4,2  +8, 3  - +16,0  +0,8  - +7 ,1  +5, 7  - +5, 7  +12,8  - +12,0 
I  33' 6  53,0  111 '5  21,1  36,0 101,0  12,5  28,7  91,0  10,0  25,6  72,0  14,2  28,6  7 3, 6  16,2  33,8 
II  - 55,9  117.5  - 45,0  125,5  - 33,3  127,0  - 29' 1  87' 2  - 39,7  102,0  - 40,6 
I  18.9  22' 9  22' 3  27 '7  21,0  47' 1  32' 1  38,0  21,6  16,6  22' 6  6,4  11,9  14,3  9, 2  29,0  38,6 
II  - 22' 9  22' 6  - 19.3  50,8  - 44,4  27' 7  - 21 '7  13,2  - 15,8  29,2.  - 40,0 
I  32,2  20,3  21' 3  20,2  13,8  19.3  12,0  11,0  17 '4  9,6  9,8  13,7  13,6  11,0  14,1  15,5  12.9 
II  - 21,4  22,5  - 17' 2  23,9  - 12'  7  24,2  - 11,1  16' 7  - 15' 2  19,5  - 15'  6 
I  18,1  8,8  4, 3  26,6  8,1  9,0  30,7  14,6  4,1  15,9  8, 7  1,2  11,4  5,5  1,8  27' 7  14,8 
II  - 8,8  4, 3  - 7,4  9, 7  - 17,0  5, 3  - 8. 3  2,5  - 6,0  5,6  - 15,3 
I  37,0  22,0  21 '3  34,3  16,0  21' 3  33,0  18,3  17' 9  18,6  13,0  13,7  17 '7  12.2  14,3  31,8  19,6 
II  - 23,2  22,9  - 18,6  25,8  - 21 '2  24,8  - 13,8  16,8  - 16,4  20,3  - 21,9 
I  25' 2  95,5  436,0  18,8  72,8  393,0  12' 3  57.2  351,0  10,45  59,2  272,0  12,8  57' 1  268 ,o  16,3  67,4 
II  - 110,0 455,0  - 89,6  447 ,o  - 68,5  478,0  - 61,2  308,0  - 76,9  412,0  - 83,6 
I  10,5  44,4  86,7  14,4  36,2  113,0  24,4  64,6  75,4  12,3  27,8  28,0  4,5  5,0  8,8  18,5  43,2 
II  - 44,6  73,5  - 57,1  123,8  - 75,2  88,1  - 26,8  41,0  - 13,0  73,5  - 51' 7 
I  27' 3  105,5 445,0  23,7  82,0 410,0  27,3  86,5  359,0  16,1  65,5  274,0  13,3  57,5  268,5  24,6  80,5 
II  - 119,0 461,0  - 106,0 464,5  - 102,0 486,0  - 67,0  310,5  - 78,0 419,0  - 98,0 
A la lre ligne figurent  1es mesures  des  essais  effectues  avec  une  nouvelle  car  touche  de  regen~ration, 
a la  2e  ligne  figurent  celles  effectu~es avec  une  cartouche  usagee. 
41,5 
41,0 
52,6 
80,2 
94,1 
121 '2 
-1,6 
+4,3 
86,0 
117,0 
32,8 
22,6 
16,4 
22,3 
6,3 
4,3 
17' 5 
22,7 
324,0 
424,0 
108,5 
95,4 
342,0 
435,0 
Annexe  3 
Dr!tger  174  Fenzy  56  Pire11i  205  Simbal 
10  25  50  10  25  50  10  25  50  10  25  50 
4,1  10,7  41,5  0,0  1,0  8,0  4,0  16,5  67,0  2,0  10,7  35,4 
- 10,3  39,2  - 1,1  8,4  - 15,0  70,5  - 14,1  47,1 
37,0  38,0  49,0  59,0  62,5  60,0  39,0  52,0  193,0  34,5  43,3  54,5 
- 40,0  74,5  - 63,5  67,9  - 60,5  208,0  - 42,4  50,7 
41,1  48.7  90,5  59,0  63,5  68,0  43,0  68,5  260,0  36,5  54,0  89,9 
- 50,3 113,7  - 64,6  76,3  - 75,5  278,5  - 56,5  97,8 
+11 ,2  8 '9  -3,2  +18,5 +16,0 +14,0 +10, 5  +14,8  +29,8  14,7  +8,5  +8' 5 
- +11 ,9  +3,0  - +18,0 +16, 2  - +14,8 +29,1  - 8, 7  +3, 2 
20,0  30,4  86,0  22,0  16,0  27 ,o  21' 2  60,6  251,0  33,2  39,3  72 '7 
- 40,3  112,0  - 20,3  29,7  - 70,3  268,0  - 30,1  89,0 
34,3  37,4  40,4  34,5  43,0  46,0  31' 5  41,0  11,2  25,8  27' 7  29,8 
- 36,2  33,3  - 45,1  51,6  - 29,2  16,,2  - 29,0  32,5 
19' 2  11,6  16,4  21,0  6, 2  5,2  20,3  23,2  47' 9  31,8  11,3  13,9 
- 15,4  21,4  - 7,8  5, 7  - 26,9  52,2  - 11' 5  17 ,o 
32,8  14,3  7 '7  33,0  16,1  8,8  30,1  15,7  2,1  24,7  10,6  5, 7 
- 13,9  6,4  - 17 '3  9,8  - 11,2  3,1  - 11' 1  6,2 
38,0  18,4  18,0  39,0  17.2  10,2  36,2  28,1  47 '9  40,4  15,5  15,0 
- 20,8  22,4  - 19,0  11,4  - 29,2  52,2  - 16,0  18,1 
18,3  63,2  338,0  22,4  52,5  129,0  18,8  114,0 862,0  23,0  78,0  295,0 
- 80,0 409,0  - 54,0  143,0  - 127,5  925,0  - 83,0 362,0 
14,3  47,5  103,5  32,0  84,5  132,0  23,4  58,6  75,6  18,5  56,6  119,1 
- 48,5  91,0  - 83,5  154,0  - 28,4  101,0  - 58,9  116,9 
23.2  79,0  355,0  39,0  99,5  184,0  29,5  128,5 866,0  29,4  96,5  318,5 
- 94,0 418,0  - 99,0  210,0  - 130,5  930,0  - 102,0 381,0 R e c  a  p  i  t  u  1  a  t  i  o  n 
Examen  du  rendement  chimique  des  cartouches  de  regeneration 
produit  duree  absorp- teneur  en coa  de  l'air inspire, vol.  % 
chimique  de  tion de  temperature  e  l'air inspire  en  C
0 
Appareil  l'essai  co,  volume  respiratoire  2S  1/min 
apres  le  temps  d'essai  (min) 
min  I  0  10  60  120  180  240 
Auer  - 0,10  0,08  0,06  0,04  0,06 
MR  S4/400  A  310  330 
18,S  18,S  23,S  30,S  34,S  37,0 
Drager  - 0,10  0,06  0,04  0,04  0,04 
BG  170/400  A  306  316 
21 ,0  19,S  26,0  32,0  36,0  38,0 
Drager  - 0,08  O,OS  0,02  0,03  0,03 
BG  172  A  284  294 
22,0  19,0  24,S  31,0  3S,O  38,0 
Drager  - 0,09  O,OS  0,03  0,04  0,09 
BG  174  A  267  277 
19,0  17,0  23,S  29,S  33,0  34,S 
Auer  - 0,09  0,07  O,OS  0,04  0,04 
MR  S6/400  A  2S4  264 
19,0  17,S  23,0  29,S  34,0  36,S 
Drager  - 0,18  0,12  0,06  0, IS 
BG  160  A  A  207  217 
21  ,0  23,0  28,S  3S,S  38,0 
Aerorlox  - 0,3S  0,40  0,38  0,42 
K  200  210 
2S,O  I ,0  4,S  7,0  10,0 
Fenzy  - 0,00  0,00  0,02  0,20  Modell  19S6  K  18S  192 
22,S  22,0  33,S  3S,S  36,S 
Simbal  K  167  177  - 0,06  0,30  0,48 
23,0  12,5  12,0  14,0 
Pirelli  20S  A  135  145  - 0, IS  0,14  0,62 
2S,O  20,5  29,5  37,2 
A  alcali;  K  chaux 
300  fin 
0,30  0,68 
38,S  39,0 
0,30  0,38 
39,S  39,S 
0,08 
38,0 
0,19 
3S,S 
0,04 
36,S 
0,30 
39,0 
0,42 
II ,S 
0,2S 
36,3 
o,so 
14,0 
0,90 
36,0 
(Ire  ligne) 
(2e  ligne) 
so  1/min 
(min) 
60  120 
0, I 0 
38,S 
0,04 
39,S 
0,03 
39,0 
0,03 
37,5 
0,09 
39,0 
0,29 
37,2S 
0,3S 
2,5 
0,4S 
38,2 
I ,20 
8,S 
O,SO 
39,5 
H 
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Comp~raison des  resultats significatifs des  essais  de  physiologie  respiratoire  pour  des  volumes 
respiratoires de-10 et 50  1/min 
capacite  de  flux w  pression moyenne  pm  resistance au  flux  A  depression pu  surpression  s  s 
Appareil  em  ws  1/min  mm  ws  mm  WS  s/1  mm  WS  rran  WS 
10  so  10  so  10  so  10  so  10 
Aerorlox  27,0  385,0  17,0  15,0  26,0  15,0  4,0  38,0  28,0 
25,2  436,0  12,1  I ,8  32,2  21  ,3  4,8  60,0  30,2 
Auer  7,4  287,0  4,0  6,0  9,0  14,0  6,0  37,0  20,0 
MR  54/400  18,8  393,0  10,3  -2, I  20,2  19,3  8,0  47,0  32,5 
Auer  9,0  247,0  4,0  4,0  II ,0  12,0  6,0  32,0  30,0 
MR  56/400  12,3  351 ,o  14,0  -0,8  12,0  17,4  0  44,0  40,0 
Drager  10,7  309,0  7,0  6,0  13,0  15,0  7,0  39,0  17,0 
BG  160  A  10,45  272,0  5,0  3,0  9,6  13,7  3,9  30,2  22,0 
Drager  8,2  226,0  -2,0  -6,0  10,0  11,0  9,0  33,0  7,0 
BG  170/400  12,8  268,0  0,4  2,3  13,6  14,1  8,1  34,4  9,0 
Drager  13,0  320,0  9,0  7,0  15,0  16,0  6,0  44,0  26,0 
BG  172  16,3  324,0  9,2  -1,6  15,5  16,4  4,0  41  ,5  38,0 
Drager  10,7  287,0  14,0  10,0  13,0  14,0  6,0  36,0  24,0 
EG  174  18,3  338,0  II' 2  -3,2  19,2  16,4  4,1  41  ,5  37,0 
Fenzy  13,0  320,0  15,0  11,0  14,0  16,0  6,0  42,0  19,0 
Modell  1956  22,4  129,0  18,5  14,0  21,0  5,2  0  8,0  59,0 
Pirelli  205  14,0  392,0  1,0  8,0  17,0  19,0  9,0  43,0  10,0 
18,8  862,0  10,5  29,8  20,3  47,9  4,0  67,0  39,0 
Simbal  28,0  326,0  21  ,0  16,0  27,0  14,0  2,0  27,0  31,0 
23,0  295,0  14,7  8,5  31 ,8  13,9  2,0  35,4  34,5 
A la  Ire  ligne figurent  les resultats des mesures  obtenus  a Liege,  et a la  2e  ligne ceux  obtenus  a Essen. 
pu 
so 
45,0 
56,2 
38,0 
55,0 
35,0 
49,0 
48,0 
48,9 
28,0 
45,0 
45,0 
52,6 
39,0 
49,0 
50,0 
60,0 
50,0 
193,0 
51 ,0 
54,5 IV,  33 
~·  3)  SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS  OBTAINED  BY  THE  "COORDINATIECENTRUM 
REDDINGSWEZEN  VAN  HET  KEMPISCHE  STEENKOLENBEKKEN" 
AT  HASSELT  (BELGIUM) IV,  35 
RESULTS  OF  RESEARCH  CARRIED  OUT  AT  THE  "COORDINATIECENTRUM  REDDINGSWEZEN" 
I  - Object  of  research 
It was  thought expedient  to  compare  breathing apparatus  from  the  viewpoint  of 
the physiological  condition of  rescuers  in operations  carried out in environments 
with high  temperatures,  and  this  for  two  reasons: 
1)  Work  is being  carried out  at progressively greater depths with  consequent 
increases  in  temperature  in the  surrounding strata. 
2)  The  cost of equipment  installed in workings  which may  have  to be  cut off by 
stoppings  in  the event  of fire is  so  high  that it will be necessary to retrieve 
it provided  conditions  and  facilities  permit  this.  At  this point  the problem of 
the  close  positioning of stoppings  to  the site of the  fire arises  and  it will be 
necessary to go  beyond  the  stoppings where  the  temperature  is  always  very high. 
II - Training of  rescuers  at high temperatures  in the  Campine  coalfield 
300  rescuers  are  trained 5  times  a  year in a  working  in which  the difficulties 
of  a  mine  are  reproduced  and  which has  been especially designed  from  the point of 
view  of  climate  and  medical  supervision.  A medical  specialist is present  at  all 
training  courses.  The  expenditure in energy  of each test is calculated in litres of 
oxygen  consumed  per minute. 
III - Research  following  on  this  training 
a)  comparison of different  closed-circuit breathing apparatus  as  part of tests 
carried out  in intensified climatic conditions. 
b)  establishment  of  the  permitted length of operations  in intensified climatic 
conditions. 
c)  study of  the effect of  the  onset  of  the  thermal  stasis  on  the  physical  and 
mental  capacity of  the  rescuer. 
1)  Comparision of  different closed-circuit breathing apparatus  (used  in the 
countries  of  the  European Community  and  the United Kingdom)  as  part of  tests 
carried out  in intensified climatic conditions 
During  each  test  the  300  rescuers  had  the  following breathing  apparatus  distri-
buted  among  them: 
a)  liquid-oxygen apparatus with  regenerative  cartridge with  lime  soda: 
Aerorlux 
Drager Normalair 
b)  compressed  oxygen  apparatus with caustic soda  regenerative  cartridge: 
Pirelli 205 
Drager  174  BG 
Drager  172  BG 
Drager BG  170/400 
c)  compressed  oxygen  apparatus with  lime  soda regenerative  cartridge: 
Fenzi  56 
Proto  MK  V ! 
T  a  b  1  e  a  u  Figure  I 
Tableau recapitulatif des  cycles d'exercice effectues  pour:  a)  la comparaison  des  appareils respiratoires; 
b)  la determination de  la duree d'intervention permise  en  fonction  de  la  tempera-
ture  humide  et de  l'effort; 
c)  la verification de  certaines donnees. 
P.  Phase  c.  Cycle 
Consommation  I  l  ts = 33  oc  ts = 34  oc  ts = 35  oc  ts = 37  oc  ts = 40  oc  ts = 41  oc  ts  = 42  oc 
39  oc I  I 
Th  34  oc  Ts  =  =  moyenne  th = 28  oc  th = 29  oc  th = 30  oc  th = 32  oc  th = 35  oc  th = 36  oc  th = 37 
d'oxygene 
0,9  1/min  P.3-C.7  P.3-C.9  P.4-C.3  P.4-C.I  P.4-C.4 
I ,0  1/min  P.4-C,8  P.3-C.4  P.4-C.S  P.3-C.6  P.4-C.7  P.4-C.9  P.5-C.2  P.S-C.3  P.S-C.7 
P.S-C.6 
I, I  1/min  P.4-C.IObis 
I ,2  1/min  P.4-C.6  P.4-C.IO  P.4-C.2  P.3-C.8 
A remarquer  que  la recherche  ne  prevoyait  pas  de  depasser  la temperature  humide  de  34°C. 
Nous  nous  sommes  limites a cette  temperature  pour  la comparaison  des  appareils respiratoires,  mais  pour  toutes,  les courbes  de  duree d'uti-
lisation nous  avons  effectue  : 
- des  exercices  de  controle  :  P.4  - C.8  et P.S  - C.6 
- des  exercices a temperature  humide  plus  elevee,  mais  uniquement  avec  des  appareils  respiratoires  du  type  "Drager"  et pour  un  effort de 
I  litre o
2
/min:  P.5- C.2,  P.5- C.3  et P.S- C.7 
oc 
I 
H 
<! IV,  39 
The  table  in Figure  1  recapitulates  the  programme  of tests  carried out. 
To  enable  a  comparison  among  the  apparatus  to be  made,  a  common  measurement was 
needed  and  this had  to be  the  physical  condition of  the wearer  of  the  apparatus  after 
a  specified test. 
With  this  in view,  each  rescuer at  the  end  of  the  test is given  a  'fatigue 
coefficient', which  takes  into account: 
a)  rectal  temperature  at  the  end  of  the test; 
b)  heart-beat at  the  end  of  the test; 
c)  weight-loss  as  a  percentage of  the body weight  of  the person  concerned; 
d)  heart-rate  recovery  after 10  minutes  of  rest when  seated,  the  recovery being 
calculated  as  a  percentage  of  the heart-beat increase  due  to  the test; 
e)  the  opinion of  the  person  concerned. 
Each  of  the  above  values  is  allotted an  index  figure  to be  found  in the  diagram 
in Figure  2.  5  index  figures  are  added  together and  divided by  5.  The  result 
provided  the  fatigue  coefficient.  The  formula  of  the  index  curve  is  as  follows: 
y  =  100 __  _:;;l ___  _ 
log  (B  ~ X +  1) 
x  being  the  value measured. 
A and  B are  the physiological  limits which we  accept  in the  specific case  of 
a  test in high  temperatures with  closed-circuit breathing  apparatus.  The  values  for 
each  facture  are  shown  on  the y  axis  of  the  diagram  in Figure  2. 
c  = 
B  - A 
G 
This  fatigue  index or overall  index,  has  been  calculated for  each  rescuer for 
each test;  for  each  type  of  test we  have  calculated the  average  fatigue  index  for 
all wearers  of  the  same  type  of  apparatus.  This  has  enabled  us  to classify them  and, 
after statistical analysis  of  the  results,  the  following  conclusions  could be 
drawn: 
a)  Comparison  of breathing  apparatus 
The  results  are  shown  in  the  table below  in which  the apparatus  are  classified 
in ascending  order according  to  the  average  fatigue  index  obtained,  the statistic-
ally derived difference being  indicated by  a  solid line where  the  difference is 
not significant,  by  a  broken  line whose  significant at 95  %,  and  by  no  line where 
the  difference  is  very  considerable. 
The  table  should be  read  from  top  to bottom. 
Drager-Norrnalair 
Aero lox 
Drager  174  BG 
Drager  172  BG 
Pirelli  205 
Drager  BC  170/400 
Fenzi  56 
Proto  MK  V 
123.5 
124.645 
128.865 
134.988 
135.392 
137.440 
140.020 
151.094 
These  results  are  calculated for  5  cycles because,  after  a  certain point in time, 
the  Fenzy  56  and  the  Proto MK  V were not  used. IV,  41 
Figure 2 - Diagram me permettant I' evaluation du coefficient de fatigue 
500--r-------------------r-------------------.---------------,---, 
400-4------------------~------------------~-------------+--~ 
300~--------------------1-
292 
200~--------------------~--------------------+----~------------~ 
100 
Fn§quence cardiaque fin exercice 
I  '  I  I  I  I 
I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  sa  96  104  112  120  128  136  144  152  160  168  176 
%recuperation frequence cardiaque apres 10 minutes 
I  !  I  I  I 
100  90  80  70  60  50  40  30  20 
Temperature rectale fin exercice 
37.5  38.0 
% perte de poids 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  i  I  I  I  I 
05  1D  15  2D 
Appreciation 
facile 
385 
I  I  I 
2.5 
difficile 
I 
39.0 
I  !  t  I  I  t  I 
3.0  3.5 
tres difficile 
I  I  I 
184 
10 
I  !  I 
4.0 
I  I 
192 
I  I  I  I 
200  208 
0 
39.5  39.64 
I  I'  I  I 
4.5  4.78 
insupportable 
Abandon IV,  43 
If we  calculate all the  cycles,  leaving out  the  Fenzy  56  and  the  Proto  MK  V,  we 
obtain the  following  results which have  a  sounder statistical value: 
Drager-Normalair 
Aero lox 
Drager  174  BG 
Drager  172  BG 
Pirelli  205 
Drager  BG  170/400 
122.37 
124.38 
127.76 
133.65 
135.49 
136.30 
b)  Difference between  cooled  and non-cooled breathing  apparatus 
Following  previous  results we  have  sought  to  find  the  determinant  feature  of 
this  classification. 
The  best-supported apparatus  are  the Drager-Normalair  and  the Aerolox,  fed by 
liquid oxygen.  The  inhaled air is not  only  cooler but  the entire apparatus 
stays  cool. 
Next  in order  came  the  compressed  oxygen  apparatus with  soda  regenerative cart-
ridges.  These were  topped by  the Drager  174  BG,  much  lighter than the others. 
Lastly  came  the  compressed  oxygen  apparatus with  lime  soda regenerative cart-
ridges. 
After very  detailed examination of possible  reasons  for  these  differences  -
weight,  temperature of  inhaled air,  respiratory effort,  etc.  - the  conclusion 
was  reached  that  the  key  factor was  likely to be  the  cooling of the  apparatus 
and  wearer  due  to  liquid oxygen. 
Using  liquid oxygen  does,  however,  present  practical difficulties  (preservation 
and  transport)  and  we  have  tried to  achieve  the  same  result with solid C02. 
C02  in solid  form  was  placed between  the back of  the  rescuer and  the  compressed 
oxygen breathing apparatus.  A thickness  of perforated plastic foam  2  em  thick 
and  latex straps  4  em  thick at  10  em  intervals protect the back  of  the  rescuer 
against  too  intense  cooling  and  allow  an  adequate  degree  of ventilation to  the 
back. 
Certain apparatus  had  cooling  systems  and  others  not. 
We  have  compared  the  results  obtained in the  same  tests with  three  groups  of 
apparatus: 
- liquid oxygen  apparatus: 
Drager Normalair 
Aero lox 
- compressed  oxygen  apparatus,  non-cooled: 
Drager  BG  170/400 
Drager  172  BG 
Drager  174  BG 
Pirelli  205 
- compressed  oxygen  apparatus,  cooled by  solid co2,  placed between  the  rescuers' 
back  and his  breathing  apparatus: 
Drager BG  170/400 
Drager  172  BG 
Drager  174  BG 
Pirelli 205 
Without  a  doubt  the  cooling of  compressed  oxygen  apparatus  by  inserting C02  in 
solid form between  the back of  the  rescuer  and  the breathing  apparatus markedly 
improves  the  latter in all conditions.  Virtually the  same  result was  obtained 
with  the Drager  174  BG  cooled by  a  cushion  of solid C02  with  liquid oxygen  apparatus. IV,  44 
During  a  test 26  Fenzy  56  apparatus were  cooled with  C02  in solid form  and  19 
were  not  cooled.  The  average  overall  index  for the  cooled  apparatus  was  137.8  and 
for the  non-cooled  150.4.  Not  enough  measurements  exist to establish valid 
statistics, but  the  difference  is  of  an  order that it can  already be  stated that 
cooling is  also  very  advantageous. 
It is  important  to note that  the  cooling  cushion  can  only be  used  in instances 
of high  temperatures  and where  the  rescuers  work with  naked  torsos. 
2)  Permissable operating periods  for  rescuers  wearing  closed-circuit,  non-cooled 
breathing  apparatus  in adverse  climatic  conditions 
These  periods  are  a  function  of: 
- the  dry  and  humid  temperatures  of  the site of operations; 
- the  intensity of effort; 
- the breathing  apparatus  used; 
- the  rescuer himself. 
We  have  established  curves  of  the periods  of operation shown  in Fig.  3. 
These  curves  are valid: 
1)  for  a  pit or  any  site where  humidity is  75  % or over; 
2)  for  rescuers  not  specifically trained  for work  in high  temperatures  and 
for wearers  of  compressed  oxygen,  non-cooled breathing  apparatus  with 
absorbent  soda  cartridges,  weighing  approximately  17  kg. 
3)  Study of  the effects  of  the  onset  of  thermal  stasis  on  the physical  and 
mental  performance  of  rescuers 
a)  purpose  of  research 
The  staff of  the "Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen  van  bet Kempische  Steen-
kolenbekken"  had  the  impression  that  some  of the  rescuers  at  the  end  of  a 
test or immediately after it were  in  condition of diminished psychic  competence 
for several minutes.  For example,  their attention  seemed  reduced  and  they 
appeared to have  difficulty in noticing  and  avoiding  any  obstacles  in their 
path. 
b)  Tests  applied 
1)  the Coetsier obstacle  test given  to everyone before  and  after the trial; 
2)  The  Thurstone  equivalent  shape test; 
3)  The  Coetsier obstacle test,  given  to half  the  group  before  and  to half 
the  group  after the  test; 
4)  The  Gruenbaum  test; 
5)  Length measurement  of different sections  of straight  lines; 
6)  Interview to ascertain subjective  impressions; 
7)  The  "Amsterdamse Biografische Vragenlijst"  (ABV); 
8)  Determination  of CFF; 
9)  Reaction  time; 
10)  The  RT  attention test. (/) 
.& 
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Figure 3 - Temps d'intervention admissibles avec appareil Draeger en fonction de Ia 
temperature et de l'effort 
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c)  Conclusion 
In general  terms it can  be  said that  the  rescue  tests  as  carried out  do  not 
enable  the  psychic deterioration to  be  established except by tests  of short 
duration" 
Yet  it would  appear  that~ 
~  for  the  of  rE.:scue.xs  the normal  acclimatisation process  did not 
exist  in relation ot  the.  obstacle  test~ It only  appeared in a  small  group 
of  persons,  as  shown  by  C}  minimal  loss  of weight; 
- the  degree  of activation  (value  CFF)  rises markedly  during  a  short test.  It 
is not  knmvn  what  this  is  for  a  test of  long  duration; 
- persons  having  a  high  cardiac  rate  at  the  end  of  a  test have  a  longer 
reaction  time. 
These  points  should be  confirmed by  new  experiments.  Attempts  should  also be 
made  to  apply  more  searching tests before  drawing  definitive  conclusions. 
In  addition  to  these  above-mentioned  studies  complementary  research has  been 
carried out  in  connection with  the  tests: 
1)  Should  the  above-mentioned  five  physiological  factors  be  taken into  account 
when  calculating the  fatigue  index? 
We  have  examined how  many  tests per subject  provided very significant, 
significant  and non-significant differences  for each  factor  and  its  related 
index. 
After statistical analysis  we  found  that: 
a)  The  overall index  gave  a  high  degree  of  accuracy.  But  the  values  we 
gave  to  the  subjective  assessment will have  to be  revised since it affec-
ted  the  overall  index  too greatly.  This  has  been  done  and  certain limits 
have  been  amended  on  the basis  of  the experience  gained.  Below will be 
found  the  amended  diagram in Fig.  4  for  calculating the  indices. 
b)  If the  test makes  it impossible,  or if all measurements  cannot  be 
carried out,  the  average  value  of  any  one  of  these  factors  or  indices  does 
provide  a  good  comparison  of  the physical  condition of  a  group  of persons. 
But  to assess  the  condition of  an  individual we  always  measure  the  cardiac 
rate,  the  internal  temperature  and  the  recovery  rate in % of  the  cardiac 
rate  after  10  minutes. 
2)  Determining  some  selection criteria for  rescuers  called upon  to work  in 
high-temperature  environments 
The  rescuers  most  suitable  for work  in high  temperatures  are: 
a)  those who  normally  engage  in heavy muscular work; 
b)  those who  generally work  in  a  hot  environment  (  27  oc  humidity  or  above); 
c)  those not  exceeding  their standard weight by more  than  5  kg,  which  is 
derived  from  the  formula:  (weight  in kg  +  100)  - height  in  em. 
d)  those whose  oxygen  consumption  is  over  35  cm3/min  per kg  of body weight 
with  a  cardiac rate of  170/min. IV,  48 
This  applies,  and  the  proviso is  very  important,  given  that,  in their first 
test at high  temperature,  their fatigue  coefficient  remains within accep-
table  limits.  For  example:  150  with  a  Drager  apparatus  for  a  test of 
1.0 litres 02/min  for  a  period of  100  minutes  and  in  an  environment  of 
28  oc  (humid)  and  38  oc  (dry). 
3)  Maximum  permissable  resistance  for self-rescuer filters  (in collaboration 
with  the Ernest Malvoz  regional  institute at Liege). 
The  acceptable  resistance  limit  for  a  self-rescuer filter depends  on: 
a)  the  depression  a  wearer  can  expert by breathing  on  an  infinite resistance. 
This  depression has  been physiologically  fixed at  600  mm  H20  (this  value 
can  be  considered  as  a  minimum.  It is  very much  higher  for most  persons); 
b)  the  ventilation of  the wearer,  hence  of  the  effort exerted. 
As  an  experiment  we  have  drawn  curves  (Fig.  5)  showing  us  the  requisite 
pressure  for  the  continuous  throughput  for self-rescuer filters  of different 
resistances. 
It seems  reasonable  to  allow  for  a  maximum  effort of  approximately  2.8  1 
02/min.  This  involves  a  loss  in speed which  is  lower  as  the  difficulty 
increases.  For this, however,  frequent  training is  required so  that  the 
worker  realises  he  must  on  no  account  get  out  of breath but must  spread 
out his effort. 
This  means  going  up  to  a  maximum  resistance  of  180  mm  H20  for  a  continuous 
throughput  of  g4.5  1/min  and  utilising the test filters  possessing this 
resistance. IV,  49 
Figure 4 - Diagram  me modifie permettant I'  evaluation du coefficient de fatigue 
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0 INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  THE  HYDRO-MECHANICAL 
METHOD  OF  CONSTRUCTING  PLASTER  STOPPINGS 
(approved  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
at its meeting  on  26  June  1970) 
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1.  General 
For  some  years  attention has  been  focussed  on  evolving  rapidly  constructable 
stoppings with resistance  to explosion.  In  the  testing of various  stopping designs  by 
exposing  them  to explosion,  plaster stoppings  have  shown  the best results  from  the  view-
point of  speed of erection  and  resistance  to  explosion. 
Two  separate ways  of  injecting plaster into  a  stopping casing were  pursued  in 
the  Saar  and  the  Ruhr.  In  the method  developed  at  the  Central Mine  Rescue  Station at 
Essen  and widely  applied  throughout  the  Ruhr,  a  standard plaster in its dry  state is 
fed  pneumatically  through  hose  systems  by  means  of pressure vessels  and  only moistened 
with water at  the  stopping point.  The  Central  Rescue Station of  the  Saarbergwerke  AG 
developed  the hydro-mechanical  method  of  constructing plaster stoppings  which  is  des-
cribed below.  In  this method  a  special plaster - SAARALIT  - mining plaster  'D'  - is 
rendered  pumpable  by  a  specially designed  continuous  mixer  of  the  Central Rescue  Station -
Sapromine mixer,  Saarberg  system  - by  the  addition  of water  and  then  pumped  to  the site 
by  a  suitable  pump  via hose  systems. 
The  advantages  of  this  stopping  construction method  are: 
1.  Reduction of  time  and  labour  in  the  erection of  a  roadway  stopping.  Experience  gained 
to  date  in  large-scale tests have  shown  that  a  well~trained team of  8,  including 
supervisory staff,  take  about  one  shift for  erecting one  plaster stopping of  1.5 m 
thickness  and  13  m2  roadway  cross-section. 
2.  Increased safety for  the  team engaged.  The  use  of hose  systems  for  the  hydro-mechani-
cal  transport of plaster enable  large distances  to  be  covered.  The  injection of 
plaster at  the  stopping point  requires  only  2-3  men.  The  remainder  of  the  team works 
at  the  pump  and  continuous  mixer  installation point,  which  may  often be  located  away 
from  the direct  danger  zone. 
3.  Reduction  of bulk  transport  and  its easement.  The  installation point  of  pump  and  mixer 
should  be  so  chosen  as  to  facilitate  the  supply  of special plaster.  Since  the material 
requirement  is  considerably  less  than  for  a  sandbag  stopping or  a  pneumatically-injec-
ted plaster stopping,  the  problem of  feed  is  also more  rapidly managable. 
4.  Improvement  of  impermeability  of  stoppings.  The  liquid plaster is still fluid when 
introduced  into  the stopping  casing.  Consequently,  cavities  cannot  form  in  the  space 
to  be  filled.  In  addition,  the  liquid plaster penetrates  into cracks  and  crevisses  of 
the  adjoining  rock  so  that  a  tight seal  to  the  rock is achieved,  even  in  the  roadway 
crown. 
5.  Improvement  of  the  resistance  of  stoppings.  In  a  series  of  tests  carried out  in  col-
laboration between  the mining  company  of  the  test pit and  the  Central  Rescue  Station 
of  the  SAARBERGWERKE  AG  underground  at the  test pit Tremonia  at Dortmund,  a  hydro-
mechanically  injected plaster stopping  of  1.5 m thickness with  an  excavated  cross-
section of  10  m2  was  exposed  to  an  explosive  pressure  of  1  kp/cm2  barely 2  hours  after 
completion.  The  results  showed  that no  gas  got  through  the  stopping;  nor was  there 
any  damage  to  the  stopping itself.  Even  when  the  explosive pressure was  increased  to 
15  kp/cm2  the  stopping  held without  evidencing noteworthy  traces of  damage.  And  when 
the maximum  explosive pressure  experienced  since  the  inauguration of  the  test pit, 
well  over  18  kp/cm2,  was  imposed  on  the plaster stopping,  the  stopping was  only mini-
mally  displaced  in·the  roadway  axis without  losing its coherence. 
6.  Applications  in mine  workings with existing stoppings.  The  hydro-mechanical  plaster 
stopping  method  is  eminently suitable for  advancing  stoppings  in mine workings  already 
equipped with  stoppings  and  filled with  firedamp.  The  use  of hose  systems  for  tran-
sporting  the plaster limits  the work  to  erecting casings  and  supervision in  the  danger 
zone.  All  the other Work,  including heavy work,  can  thus  be  carried  out  in fresh-air 
zones. v'  6 
Moreover,  this method,  in contrast  to  the  pneumatic  one,  prevents  a  transitional 
zone  with potentially explosive gas/air mixtures  being  formed  at  the  stopping  con-
struction point.  Thus  new  opportunities  are offered  in  advancing  stoppings,  when 
containing fire  zones,  by  the  introduction of  hydro-mechanical  plaster  stopping 
methods,  which  are  advantageous  to  the  safety of  mine  fire  teams,  the  operational 
time  and  therefore  also  to  the  costs. 
7.  Other  applications.  With  the  hydro-mechanical  method  of  plaster stopping  construc-
tion,  which  has  been  evolved  especially for  the  erection of  explosion-resistant rapid 
stoppings,  the  stopping operations  in fire  fighting  are  considerably facilitated. 
Above  all,  stopping  is effected quicker  than before. 
Beyond  the  applications  already noted,  this plaster stopping will be  used  as  a 
temporary  roadway  seal  or  as  an  abutment  for  permanent  roadway  seals.  This will make 
extensive mechanisation  of  stopping operations  possible.  In addition,  the hydro-
mechanically  transported plaster is suitable for  sealing roadway walls,  which  is 
frequently necessary in  combatting  concealed mine  fires.  Further,  the  shot-firing 
stoppings widely  used  at  Saarberg  can  be  constructed  of  plaster "in  one  casting". 
The  above-listed  advantages  of  SAARALIT  plaster stoppings  are  so  obvious  that 
all previously used  methods  of  stopping  construction in Saar mining will be  replaced 
by  the  hydro-mechanical  method. 
2.  Materials  required  to  construct  a  stopping 
2. 1.  Plaster 
For  the  hydro-mechanical  method  a  special plaster is  used  called  SAARALIT  mining 
plaster  'D'.  This  plaster was  developed,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Central  Rescue 
Station of  Saarbergwerke  AG,  by  the  firm Gebr.  Knauf,  Saargipswerke  GmbH,  Siers-
burg-Saar.  It consists  of  standard plaster with  inorganic  and  organic  powder 
additives which  slow  down  the  setting process.  The  liquid plaster is  adjusted 
in  such  a  way  that  the setting process  is  completed  12-17  minutes  after it leaves 
the  pump. 
SAARALIT  mining plaster  'D' is  supplied in PVC-coated  paper bags  holding  40  kg. 
The  plastic coating is  to  give it the best  insulation.  Nevertheless,  when  loading, 
transporting  and  stocking plaster,  care  must  always  be  taken  that it does  not 
become  damp.  Only  dry  mine  cars  may  be  used  for  underground  transport.  In wet 
workings  the plaster  should be protected  from  dripping water. 
In ordering plaster,  note  that:  SAARALIT  mining plaster  'D'  can  be  obtained  from 
the Knauf,  Saargipswerke  GmbH  Siersburg which  is  in  a  position  to  supply  special 
plaster in large quantities  at  short notice.  This  means  that special  stocking of 
plaster at pits is not necessary.  Unused  residues  can,  however,  be  stocked  for 
at least  9  months  without materially altering their physical  and  chemical  proper-
ties.  Ordering of plaster  should  be  done  via the  Central  Rescue  Station.  The 
required quantity  is  1.0  tonne  per m3  of  the  space  to be  filled.  To  allow for 
losses which might  arise in transport or  due  to poorly  sealed  stoppings,  this 
guide  figure  should  be  increased  by  20%. 
2.2.  Scaffolding 
Normally,  injecting plaster is  carried out between  two  plank  scaffoldings  (see 
annex  1).  Supplies  for  2  such  scaffoldings,  given  a  roadway  cross-section of 
10  m2,  are  listed in  annex  2.  It should  also be  said  that: 
The  special wooden  stopping props  (cf.  annex  3)  consist of  2  squared  timbers  of 
70  x  90  mm  (fir  or pine).  Both  timbers  are  connected  by  guide  forks  in  such  a 
way  that  they  can  be slid one  against  the  other.  In doing  this,  an  arrestor device 
can be  introduced  at  10  em  intervals.  Fine  adjustment  is  then effected by means 
of  a  tensioning  screw which  also  ensures  proper holding  against  the  rock. v'  7 
Special stopping props  are manufactured  in 2  lengths  and  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Central Rescue  Station.  Effective  lengths  of  these  props  are  from  2.00  -
3.10 metres,  in the  case of  the  short prop,  and  2.50- 4.10 metres,  with  the 
large. 
Sliding props  are primarily introduced when  time  is of the  essence,  i.e.  in 
firefighting  and  other rescue  team operations.  Each  main depot  should  therefore 
have  20  such  props  (10  long  and  10  short)  in stock.  A larger stock of these props 
should be kept at the  Central Rescue  Station.  When  constructing stoppings, 
squared  timber,  slabbed  timber  or  logs  may,  of  course,  be  used  instead of stop-
ping props. 
In tests  to date,  boards with  the  following  dimensions  have  proved  the most 
useful: 
Length 
Width 
2.00  m and  1.50 m 
15  em 
Thickness:  2.5  em 
The  calking for  sealing roadway walls,  through-pipes,  etc., is made  of oilcloth 
or stowing brattice.  A section 2  x  3  m of  the material is  rolled up  and  tied at 
4-5  points with shot-firing cable. 
It should be  pointed  out  that all the material  required to  construct scaffolding, 
as  described  in Annex  2,  as  calculated on  the ratio of  2  stoppings  =  4  scaffol-
dings,  must  be  kept  in stock  at  the main  fire depot. 
2.3.  Machines  and  installations 
A suitable pump  is required  for  injecting plaster into  the stopping casing.  Wide 
use  of this method  in Saar mining has  proved  the MOHNO-pump  (positive-displacement 
pump),  type  2  NE  50,  of  the NETZSCH  firm,  Waldkraiburg Obb.,  to be very  reliable 
(cf.  Annex  4).  Reciprocating  pumps,  such  as  the  Simplex-pump  of KLEIN, 
SCHANZLIN  & BECKER  AG,  Frankenthal,  and  the PLEIGER-pump  type  PD3W5,  have  also 
proved workable with this method.  These  pumps  have  not  only  a  25-50%  smaller 
throughput  than  the  MOHNO-pump,  but  require more  frequent  cleaning.  Finally,  the 
dimensions  and  weight  of  the MOHNO-pump,  type  2  NE  50,  are  smaller  and  more  ef-
fective  than  those  of  reciprocating pumps.  For more  difficult pumping  work  (long 
pipelines  and/or  greater level differences)  the MOHNO-pump,  type  4  NE  40,  is 
suitable, which  can  overcome  a  counter-pressure of  up  to  20  kp/cm with  a  through-
put  comparable  to  type  NE  50. 
Plaster and  water are mixed  in the  Sapromine  continuous mixer,  Saarberg system 
(Annex 3).  The  plaster sacks  are  cut  open by  a  knife fitted in the  filling funnel 
of  the  continuous  mixer.  Gravity ensures  that  the plaster flows  into  the verti-
cally arranged blending  chamber,  which has  a  circular cross-section,  whose  over-
all volume  is only  8  litres.  Inset  into  the blending  chamber  is  a  central pipe 
attachable at its upper  end  to  the water mains,  which  has  a  large number  of holes. 
Water  is  forced  out  of these  radially at high velocity,  so  that the  downward 
flowing plaster is  rapidly  and  thoroughly moistened.  A spiral agitator,  driven 
by  a  motor  under  the  chamber,  further ensures  that  a  consistent  liquid plaster 
medium  is  produced.  This  agitator also prevents  plaster setting on  the walls  of 
the  chamber.  The  prepared plaster medium,  which  has  a  water/plaster ratio (litre 
water/kg plaster)  of  approximately 0.6  controlled by  appropriate water dosage, 
is extracted by  the MOHNO-pump  (cf.  Annex  5)  through  a  screen-like aperture 
placed  on  one  side of  the blending  chamber  floor via a  suction hose  NW  50  atta-
ched  at  that point. 
The  plaster throughput  of this blender  and  pump  installation,  of  course,  depends 
on  the distance between  the  pump  and  the  stopping site and  amounts  to  about 
10  m3  per hour with hose  systems  of  up  to  400  m in  length.  The  liquid plaster is v'  8 
pumped  to  the  stopping site through  a  hose  system of  "C"  fire service hoses.  The 
"C"  hoses  of the  firm PARSCH,  Ibbenburen,  Westphalis,  have  so  far proved  the 
best.  The  outlet in  the  stopping is  the  compressed  air hose,  diameter  50  mrn  and 
1.50 m long.  It is  advisable  to  provide  a  reserve  hose  capacity in  addition  to 
the hose  lengths  strictly required for  the distance  so  as  to be  able  to  change 
any  hoses  damaged  during  pumping.  The  reserve  capacity  should  correspond  to  the 
distance  pump-stopping,  i.e.  there  should be  a  reserve hose  for  each  hose  in 
operation. 
The  required machines  and  installations,  including air and water  hoses  and 
cleaning equipment  discussed  in  the  following  section,  are  listed in Annex  2. 
Between  the  pump  installation point  and  mixer,  and  the  stopping site, there 
should be  a  telephonic  link using  light-weight  mine  rescue  telephones. 
2.4.  Air  and  Water  Connections 
The  following  connections  are required  for  the operation of  the  pump  and  con-
tinuous  mixer: 
MOHNO-pump: 
MIXER 
1  compressed  air  co~nection 50  mm 
1  compressed  air connection  19  mm 
1  water  connection  19  mm 
At  least  one  other  19  mm  water  connection  should  be  provided  for  cleaning opera-
tions  and  breakdowns.  Depending  on  the number  of  connections,  there should be 
made  available  1  section  compressed  air hose  of  50  mm  and  19  mm  diameter  and 
2  19  mm  water hoses.  In order  to keep  pressure falls  and  frictional  losses  in 
the hoses  to  a  minimum,  each hose  length  should not  be  longer  than  5  metres. 
The  compressed  air system should be  under  a  pressure of at least  4  kp/cm2.  The 
requisite  amount  of water is  assured if the  minimum  requirements  laid  down  in 
the  fire protection regulations  for water  systems  of  the  Saarbrucken  Chief 
Mining  Inspectorate of 6.5.64.(400  litres/minute at  a  hydraulic pressure  of 
1.5 kp/cm2)  are  complied with.  If the water  is  contaminated,  a  cleaning filter 
should  be  interposed before  the agitator,  to  avoid blockage  of  the  nozzle. 
3.  Construction of  a  stopping 
3.1.  Choice  of stopping site 
The  choiche of fire stoppings  should  always  be  made  according  to  the  "Regulations 
and  Guide  Lines  of  the  Saarbrucken  Chief Mining  Inspectorate for  combating  fires 
underground  in pits, of 4.11.1965",  paras.  2.3.1  and  2.3.2. 
To  achieve  a  tight seal with  the  rock,  no  undercutting is  required.  Only  the 
lagging  and  louse  lumps  need  be  removed.  The  removal  of  iron  lagging mats  re-
quires  an  adequately  strong wire  cutter or  a  compressed  air puller. 
3.2.  Determining  thickness  of  stopping 
The  stopping  thickness  in the direction of  the  roadway  axis  must  be  at least 
1.5 m with  roadway cross-sections of  up  to  16m2.  With  cross-sections  above  this 
the  stopping  thickness  must  be  at least  2  m. 
3.3.  Erection of  scaffolding 
For  the  construction of  a  plaster stopping  2  scaffoldings  are usually required, 
the  distance between  these  giving  the desired  stopping  thickness.  Since  the 
plaster injected between  the  scaffoldings  has  a  relatively short setting time, 
the  casing of  the  stopping is only  exposed  to  a  small hydro-static pressure. v,  9 
For  this  reason  a  light scaffolding may  be  chosen,  which  is  of  advantage  for 
the  time needed  for  erection.  A photograph  of  such  rapidly-erectable scaffolding 
is  shown  in Annex  2.  It consists  of  the special wooden  stopping  prop  described 
under 2.2.,  on  to which  planks  are  nailed~  The  roadway  wall  is  sealed with  a 
prefabricated  calking  of  stowing brattice  (see Annex  6).  Oilcloth is  affixed  to 
the  inner  side  of  the  casing.  Both  scaffoldings  should be  as  near perpendicular 
to  the  roadway  axis  as  possible. 
The  number  of special wooden  stopping props  required  for  one  scaffolding depends 
o~ the  roadway  cross-section.  With  a  cross-section of  10  - 13  m2,  4  props  are 
needed.  They  should be  set at  an  adequate  distance  (at least 15  em)  from  the 
roadway  supports,  so  that  any  further  sealing  can  be  effected at  the  outside 
edges  of  the  stopping.  The  prop  should  on  no  account  lean  up  against  the  road-
way  supports. 
To  avoid  seepage of  the  liquid plaster into  the  roadway which  is  to  be  stopped, 
the  stopping  casing must  be  sealed  thoroughly.  To  do  this  the  inner  sides of  the 
scaffoldings  should be  lagged with oilcloth,  stowing brattice, etc.  In doing 
this  care  should be  taken  that  the strips  of  the  sealing material  overlap by 
at  least  40  em,  to  ensure proper sealing  even when  bulging.  Above  all,  at  the 
connections  to  the  rock  and  at  any  points where  a  stopping pipe,  pipelines, 
cables,  etc.  are being  inserted,  seepage  of plaster must  be prevented  by  the 
use  of  oilcloth,  rock wool  or even  empty  plaster bags. 
In  the  upper  third of  the  scaffolding on  the protection side  an  adequate  obser-
vation opening  should  be  left  (See  Annex  7).  This  opening makes  the  stopping 
negotiable  for  as  long  as  possible,  and  work  can  continue  in  the  stopping  area 
while  the plaster is  injected.  Since  the  plaster sets relatively quickly,  it is 
possible  to move  about  on  the  surface of  the  plaster without  sinking in more 
than  15  em,  given  that  the  thickness  of  the  stopping  is  1.5 m.  It is therefore 
possible  to  work  on  the  scaffolding  from  the  inside even when  injection of pla-
ster is going  on.  Closing this  opening with single,  prepared  planks  is  done  when 
the  liquid plaster rises.  In order  to seal  the  stopping well  to  the  rock up  to 
its  crown,  an  artifical dome  cavity,  if no  natural  one  exists,  should be hollowed 
out  in  the  roof  on  the protection side of  the  scaffolding.  The  highest point of 
the  stopping  should be  at  this  point  of  the  scaffolding.  Here  the  outlet point 
for  the  sealing of  the  stopping  should be  located  (Annex  7).  In  any  event,  one 
NW  50  pipe  for ventilation  sampling  and  one  de-gassing pipe  NW  150  should be laid 
through  the  scaffolding.  Should  the  stopping be  constructed  in conditions  of 
explosive  danger,  or if there  is  a  future need  to  go  through  or ventilate  the 
sealed-off  zone,  a  stopping pipe  should  also  be  introduced.  If water  seepage  is 
anticipated,  a  water outlet pipe with  a  siphon  should be  provided. 
The  hydro-mechanical  injection of  SAARALIT  mining plaster  'D'  has  also proved 
itself in  the  re-surfacing  of  roadways  and  in the  sealing of  roadway  walls,  as 
is frequently necessary when  combating  mine  fires.  In  such  cases  also,  no  more 
than  a  light plank  casing is required,  suitably sealed with oil cloth. 
3.4.  Setting up  pump  and  continuous  mixer 
In selecting  the site for  pump  and  continuous  mixer  the  following  points  should 
be  considered: 
1.  Hydro-mechanical  transport  of  SAARALIT  m~n~ng plaster  'D'  has  so far  been 
effectively tested in hosepipe  systems  of  up  to  400  m in length.  Even  though 
the maximum  distance has  probably not yet been  achieved,  the hosepipe  length 
between  pump  and  stopping site should be kept  as  short  as  possible  for  the 
sake  of  effective operation. 
2.  In  stopping work with danger of  explosion,  the  site should  be  chosen  in  such 
a  way  that  the work  team is protected  as  far  as  possible  from  the  effects of 
an  explosion. v,  10 
3.  At  the site the air should be respirable,  so  that  the work  may  be  carried 
on without using respirators  as  far  as  possible. 
4.  The  compressed  air and water  connections,  required  as  per para.  2.4.,  can if 
necessary also  be made  over  longer distances with  the  aid of fire service 
"C"  hoses. 
5.  The  required  area for setting up  the MOHNO-pump  2  NE  50  is  2.40  x  0.45 m2, 
and  0.9 x  0.6  m2  for  the  continuous  mixer.  The  distance between  the  two 
machines  is  determined  by  the length of  the  suction hose  and  should  be  no 
more  than 1.0 m.  In addition,  sufficient  space  should  be  available at  the 
site for  the  smooth  feeding of.plaster to  the  continuous mixer. 
6.  A rapid  sup~ly of plaster in sufficient quantity  should be  ensured. 
7.  The  fire service  "C"  hoses  should be  laid on  the  roadway  floor  in such  a  way 
that no  sharp kinks  occur. 
3.5.  Pumping 
To  avoid blockages,  and  to maintain  the  required  liquid plaster consistency, 
the  following  instructions  should be  noted: 
1.  Fully open  the  conical  cock  for  the water  supply on  the  continuous  mixer. 
Regulate water  feed  and  pump  action  in  such  a  way  that  the  amount  of water 
in  the blending  chamberremains constant during normal  pump  working. 
Pump  only water until  ic is  clear that  the mechanical  equipment  is working 
properly  and  the hoses  are correctly laid  and water-tight. 
2~  Switch on  compressed air motor  on  the  continuous  mixer.  The  compressed  air 
feed  can be  regulated by means  of  control  levers. 
3.  Start filling plaster into  the filling  funnel,  slowly  to  begin with,  and 
then  so  that the  funnel  is  always  full of dry plaster.  Care must  be  taken 
that no  scraps  of packages  or other  impurities  get  into  the mixer. 
4.  Always  start with  some  excess water.  The  consistency of  the  liquid is visually 
judged at the  end  of  the  hose  system.  The  optimum mix  ratio  can  only be 
achieved  by  reducing  the water supply.  The  correct  liquid  consistency is 
achieved when  it resembles  thin  cream.  Pump  action  and  plaster feed  are not 
altered.  It must  be noted  that  any  change  in the mix  ratio only  becomes 
noticeable at  the  output  end  after  some  time,  which  depends  on  the  length 
of  the pipeline  and  the  action of  the  pump.  Cutting back  the water  supply 
should  therefore be  carried out  slowly  and  cautiously. 
5.  Once  the  stopping is  completed,  the plaster supply  should be halted first. 
The  mechanical  equipment  and  the  hoses  should be  flushed  through with water 
until clear w~ter emerges  at  the  end  of  the pipeline.  Adhering plaster in  the 
pipeline  can be  removed  by making  a  sharp bend  at  the outlet end  of  the  hose. 
The  resulting increased pressure  causes  the hose material  to  expand  so  that 
the deposited plaster is  detached  from  the walls  and  can  then be  flushed  out. 
The  suction  chamber  of  the  MOHNO-pump  sh.ould  be  inspected  for  any  plaster 
residues.  Any  solids  should be  removed  from  the mixer's  agitator  and  the 
screen in  the  pump  nozzie  checked. 
6.  After 12-15  t  of plaster have  been processed,  the  pump  should be  stopped  and 
the  installation cleaned  as  described  under point 5.  This  takes  about  10 
minutes. 
According  to  the  above  instructions it is necessary,  at the  beginning  and  end 
of  pumping  operations,  to work  only with water or with  excess water.  Care 
should be  taken that no  liquid with an  incorrect mix  ratio reaches  the  stopping v,  11 
cavity,  as  this would delay the setting of  the plaster, or even prevent it 
altogether.  The  output  end  of  the  injection hose  should  therefore be  readily 
movable,  so  that it can be  laid in fromt  of  or  into  the  stopping area as 
required. 
A hydro-mechanically  injected plaster stopping  can  be  injected  in one  opera-
tion,  apart  from brief interruptions  for  cleaning.  Additional  sealing is not 
necessary,  since  the plaster increases  in volume  by 0.04  % when  setting. 
For  actual pumping  operations  an  average  throughput  of  4  bags  per minute  can 
be  expected,  which  corresponds  to  an hourly rate of  9-10  t  plaster. 
For  a  stopping  of  1.5 m in  a  13  m2  cross-section  roadway,  a  pumping  time  of 
2.5 - 3  hours  should be  allowed.  Smooth  supply of plaster feed  involves  the 
cleaning of all mechanical parts. 
3.6.  Closing  the  stopping pipe 
In  the  case  of  isolating pit fires  in  the  presence  of  explosion danger,  the  stop-
ping  pipes  on  the  completion  of  all stoppings  ou  the  aire intake  and  air  return 
sides  are  closed on  instruction of  those  in  charge  of  the  rescue  operation 
(para.  2.3.2.  of  the  Regulations  and  Guide  Lines  of  the  Saarbrucken  Chief Mining 
Inspectorate  for  combatting  underground pit fires  of  4.11.1965).  It is sufficient 
if the  stopping pipes  are  sealed with blank  flanges. 
3.7.  Elimination of  breakdowns 
With  faults  in  the  pump,  hose bursts,  etc.  there is a  danger  that plaster will 
set in  the  hose  system.  Therefore,  at  least one  separate water ·connection with 
C-coupling  should be provided,  so  that in  such  cases  the  hose  systems  filled 
with plaster can be  immediately disconnected  and  flushed with water. 
4.  Staff requirements 
Pumping  plaster requires: 
1  supervisor, 
3-4 men  to  operate  the machines  and  feed  plaster to  the  continuous mixer, 
3  men  for  sealing operations  on  the  stopping,  preparation of  the  casing, 
checking  the hose  system,  necessary repair work,  etc. v,  13 
Annex 1 
Scaffolding for a hydro-mechanically injected plaster stopping v'  15 
Annex  2 
Required material,  tools,  machines  and  equipment  to  construct  a  plaster stopping 
for  a  roadway  cross-section of  10  m2 
1.  ~aterial for  2  scaffoldings: 
special stopping or other wooden  props,  minimum  thickness  10  em, 
4  m long 
planks  2  to  2.5 m long 
planks  1  to  1.5 m long 
oil cloth 
stowing brattice for  calking 
3" wire pins 
roof  felting pins 
fire barrier pads 
For  insertion in the  stopping: 
sampling pipe,  NW  SO,  5 m long with blank flange 
de-gassing pipe,  NW  150,  2  m long with blank flange 
If required: 
stopping pipe  700  mm  0 
blank flange  700  mm  0 
sealer  700  mm  0 
screws 
For  stoppings where water  seepage is expected water outlet pipes with 
siphon should be provided. 
2.  Machines  and  equipment 
injector pump  (for example  Mohno  pump  2  NE  50  continuous  mixer  for plaster 
(Sapromine  mixer,  Saarberg  system) 
fire service C hoses 
compressed  air hose 0 50  mm,  5  m long 
compressed air hoses  0  19  mm,  5  m long 
water hoses 0  19  mm,  5  m long 
suction hose 0.6 - 10  m long  (compressed  air hose  50  mm  0) 
outlet hose  1.5 m long  (compressed air hose  50  mm  0 with fire service 
C  coupling) 
8 
40 
40 
40m2 
60  m2 
1  pack 
1  pack 
3-5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
as  required 
1 
1 
as  required 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
19  mm  connector with roll thread  on  fire service C coupling 
(for cleaning)  at least  1 
hose brackets  for  fire  service  C hoses 
mine  rescue  telephone 
water filter 
as  required 
1  set 
1 3.  Tools 
miners  axes 
hack  saws 
shovels 
pickaxes 
spikes  for wooden  stopping props 
hand  hammers 
v'  16 
coupling wrenches  for fire  service hoses 
tape measure 
fitters  tool  bag,  with  tools  for  pump  and  mixer,  also pipes  and  flanges 
cleansing tools  for  pump  and  mixer  (long chisel,  scraper,  etc.) 
wire  cutter ¢  12  mm 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
as  required 
2 v'  17 
ADJUSTABLE SPECIAL WOODEN PROP FOR STOPPING 
terminal metal cap 
with 4 holdingtacks 
flat metal guide fork 
holder with 
metal bracket 
terminal metal cap 
with 4 holding tacks 
/ 
... 
I 
I 
I  I 
q, 
I  • 
'  d 
fir squared timber, 
7x9cm 
Annex3 
terminal cap and nut 
M24 
Reddingscentrale 
SAAR  BERG v'  19 
Annex4 
Mohno pump 2 NE 50 (Netzsch) v'  21 
Sapromine-mixer, Saarberg system ; side view & view from above 
Annex5 v'  23 
Annex& 
General view of mixer and pump installation v'  25 
Sealing the roadway walls  Annex7 v'  27 
SEALING THE ROADWAY CROWN 
domed cavity 
=-==== 
domed cavity in the roof 
de-gassing pipe 
When filling the domed 
cavity with plaster 
the roof at the rear 
scaffolding is 
automatically sealed. 
---- stopping pipe 
inspection window 
is gradually sealed 
by using liquid plaster 
Annex 8 RECOMMENDATION  EMBODYING  DIPECTIVES  ON  MEANS  OF  SUPPRESSING 
DUST  CONCENTRATIONS  IN  UNDERGROUND  WORKINGS 
(Approved  by  the  Mines  Safety Commission 
at its Plenary  Session  of  26  June  1970) 
ANNEX  VI VI,  3 
I  - Basic principles 
Before  examining dust control methods,  and  with a  view  to  their selection,  the Mines 
Safety and  Health Commission  considers it necessary to  lay down  the following basic 
principles: 
1)  The  efficiency of  the dust  suppression practice,  to be  examined  as  soon as  an  opera-
ting schedule has  been drawn  up,  does  not  depend  on  the use  of  a  single method,  but 
on  the  simultaneous  or  successive use of  a.number  of methods. 
2)  Control methods  which  counter actual dust production are preferable to  those which 
suppress dust  already made. 
3)  The  control methods  recommended  should  take  into account  their possibility of appli-
cation,  which  itself depends  on  the coal measure  conditions  and  the  techniques used. 
Having  stated  these principles,  the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  considers  that, 
despite  the diversity of  geological  conditions  and  the dust measuring methods  used  in 
the various  coalfields, it would  be  advisable  to classify to  some  extent  the control 
methods  in relation to  the operating conditions,  conditions  in the workings,  and  the  type 
of  operations  carried out. 
This  classification, which presupposes  the simultaneous  or  successive use of  a  number 
of methods,  depending  on  their possible use,  is above all based on  the principle  that 
it is better  to  prevent  dust  formation  than to  suppress  dust  already made. 
Dust  suppression proper  consists  in wetting  the  rock in situ;  in a  working  face  this 
means  injecting water  into  the workings,  and  wet drilling in drivages. 
The  suppression of dust produced but  not discharged  to  the  atmosphere  includes  such 
methods  as  spraying  in situ during  coal production and  drilling,  and  the aspiration 
and  precipitation of dust both during drilling and  the mechanical  development  of drivages 
and  as  a  supplementary measure  in the mechanical  working  of  the face. 
Lastly,  the  following  factors  have  a  more  or less  important bearing on  the  suppression 
of dust  emitted,  in suspension,  or  already deposited: 
- Ventilation.  An  inadequate air flow results  in an insufficient dilution of  suspend-
ed  dust,  and  on  the other hand  a  too  rapid air flow  resuspends  dust  emitted and 
already deposited  on  the  ground.  Experience has  shown  that  a  suitable air velocity 
is about  2  metres  per  sec. 
- The  use  of salt pastes  and  powders  for  settling dust. 
- Equipment  for  purifying dusty  atmospheres. 
- Individual protective means,  e.g.  masks.  These  may  be useful where  other methods 
are either inefficient or non-existent,  but  their drawbacks  (skin irritation and 
respiratory difficulties)  should not be  lost sight of.  It should be noted  that  these 
drawbacks  can be  considerably reduced by using  small ventilators provided with  a 
small  turbine for  air circulation. 
II - Evaluation of methods  according  to  place and  operation 
The  operations  have  been classified according  to place,  as  follows: 
1.  Faces 
a.  Coal  winning 
b.  Stowing 
c.  Caving VI,  4 
2.  Roadways 
a.  Drilling blast-holes 
b.  Shotfiring 
c.  Loading  excavated material 
d.  Machine  heading 
e.  Miscellaneous  stonedrift operations 
3.  Various  product-handling operations 
1.  Faces 
a.  Coal  winning 
Seam  injection 
Among  the various  possible techniques, the most  suitable would  appear  to  be  seam 
injection since it suppresses  dust  formation  in situ and  proper  injection has  a 
beneficial effect on all subsequent  causes  of dust production,  e.g.  dissociation 
of  coal,  falls  of  rock,  handling operations,  transferring material,  etc. 
Seam  injection,  where  feasible,  is  the most  effective method,  whatever  others  are 
used  later,  since  from  the point  of view of  dust  suppression it is always  advan-
tageous  to  treat  a  pre-injected coal,  notwithstanding  any  improvements  made  or  to 
be  made  to  the  coal-winning machinery. 
Seam  injection may  be  carried 'out  in  the following ways: 
Injection from  the working  place  by  means  of  perpendicular holes  in the coalface 
Shallow injection,  corresponding  to  the daily advance  in the working,  gives  fairly 
poor  results  since  the  cracks  enable  the water  to  run back  again quickly,  with 
increased  consumption of water,  without  the  internal  texture of  the  coal  being 
necessarily wettened;  moreover  this  injection method  may  have  harmful  effects  on 
the roof  and wall. 
Medium-deep  or deep  injection gives  considerably better results  for  the  same  or 
even  a  smaller  amount  of water,  the  coal  being more  uniformly wettened.  The  coal 
should  be  injected  in the microcrack  zone  preceding  the coalface;  this  zone,  which 
should  be  determined  empirically is usually situated 8  to  30  metres  from  the  face. 
Injection from  the  roadways  by means  of  holes  parallel  to  the coalface 
Having  regard  to  the  advance  in the  coalface  the best site is  selected for  obtain-
ing  an  optimum circulation with  the  lowest  possible pressure,  the water  penetrating 
more  readily and  uniformly under  these conditions. 
But  if the  road  drivage is far  in advance  of  the  coalface,  or if use  can be  made  of 
retreating working,  it is advisable  to drill the holes parallel  to  the  coalface  some 
time  beforehand,  the period being  increased when  the water  pressure  is  low;  the wa-
ter will circulate effectively even when  only  1  or  2  1/min.  are  injected.  This  method, 
which  has  been  tested  in panels  previously  loosened  by  adjacent working,  is  one of 
the most  economic  and  efficient when  permitted  by  the working. 
But  these methods  of  injection into  th~ actual  seam are  subject  to  certain diffi-
culties when  impermeable  intercalations are encountered;  in this case it may  be 
necessary  to drill and  wetten each consecutive  layer  of  the  seam,  or  the actual 
intercalation,  or  to employ  the  following  method. VI,  5 
Advanced  remote  injection,  or  injection from  a  point outside  the  seam  to be 
treated 
One  or more  boreholes  are drilled from  a  roadway  outside an already partly or 
wholly loosened  panel,  these holes being  injected at minimum  pressure  and  a  low 
flow-rate. 
The  advantage  of  this method  is  that  seam  can be  subdivided  and all the  included 
dirt bands  van be  treated.  It is particularly suitable when  excess water is 
troublesome,especially  in deep  workings with ventilation problems;  it has,  in 
fact,  been  found  that  from  the point of view of dust production,  1  % of water 
injected via a  point outside  the working  or injection into  the  seam at a  great 
distance  from  the  face  is as  effective as  2  % injected  into  the microcrack  zone 
at  2  medium  depth  and  3  % - 5  % injected  into  the microcrack  zone at a  slight 
depth~  (1) 
Evaluation of  the various  injection methods 
Analysis  of  the various methods  shows  that  the  aim  shoud  be  to wetten the  layers 
with  the minimum  amount  of water,  at a  minimum  pressure  and  for  a  maximum  1nJec-
tion time;  the best results  have  been obtained by  injecting water at  the greatest 
possible distance  from  the  face. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  is  of  the  opinion that  the  following  graded 
list of  injection methods,  which  has  also been found  te be  the best as  regards 
operating costs,  is  the most  efficient from  the  point of  view  of  dust  suppression: 
- advance  remote  injection; 
- injection via  long  holes  parallel to  the  coalface,  at  a  great distance  from  the 
face  (remote  injection); 
- injection via  long holes  parallel to  the  coalface  in the microcrack  zone  (re-
mote  injection); 
injection via  long holes  at right-angles  to  the  coalface in the microcrack  zone; 
injection via shallow holes  at right-angles  to  the coalface. 
When  coal  is extracted  from very  thick seams the various methods  referred  to  above 
are  inadequate  and  the  operations  should  employ  supplementary methods  adapted  to 
deposit  and  working  in question. 
Spraying 
Sprays  have  now  been  so  perfected  that  spraying may  be  regarded  as  a  useful  sup-
plement  to  injection and  as  the most  effective method  where  the  coalface could 
not been  injected. 
The  Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  recommends  spraying,  especially in non-
injected coalfaces,  provided  the  spraying  techniques  employed  are  the result of 
tested methods  and  are  capable of  laying dust with  the minimum  amount  of water; 
in addition certain technical  conditions  should  be  observed  on  which  the method's 
effectiveness  is  based. 
The  use of  this method  presupposes  the existence of  a  network  capable  of  supplying 
clean water.  This  network  should  be  designed  to  supply  sufficient water  to  the 
sprays  of  the  coal-winning machinery;  when  coal  ploughs  are  used water  sprays 
should  operate along  the  coalface. 
These  machines  and  ploughs  should  also be  studied at  the construction stage  so 
as  to minimise dust production when  the  seam  is fissured;  this point is also dealt 
with in another  recommendation  aimed  at  reducing  the  amount  of dust  created by  the 
use of  coal-winning  and  drivage  machinery~ 
(1)  These  percentages are  quoted for  aomparison  in order to aharaaterise  the various methods 
in a  given deposit. VI,  6 
Water  should be  used  in conjunction with mechanical  picks when  there are no  other 
effective means  of dust  suppression. 
b.  Stowing 
There are obviously no  dust problems  when  hydraulic  stowing is employed. 
When,  however,  dry  soil is being  stowed,  the workmen  are  exposed  to  fine dusts 
released when  the  stowing materials are placed  in position or  fragmented,  and  to 
the  sedimented dusts  re-suspended  by  stowing. 
For  the  suppression of dust  caused  by  stowage of dry  soil,  the Mines  Safety and 
Health Commission  recommends  previous  sprinkling of  this soil  and  of  the site to 
be  stowed  .. 
For  the  suppression of dust due  to pneumatic  stowage,  it recommends,  in addition 
to wettening  the  stowage  area  : 
- the  lowest possible specific consumption of ventilated air; 
- with a  view  to preventing  subsequent  fissuring both during  transport  and  before 
using  forced ventilation,  the use  of  soil of  fine mechanical  composition  and 
sufficiently humid  (as  wash dirt usually is). 
- taking  into  account  the  anti-aerodynamic  force  caused  by  tipping  the  goaf,  and 
preventing stagnation of  air in the  stowage  zone. 
c.  Caving 
For  suppressing dust resulting  from  caving,  the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission 
particularly recommends  the measures  taken previously,  consisting in subjecting 
the actual  seam  to  a  thorough  treatment,  since dust resulting from  caving opera-
tions  is caused by  the fall  of  roof  strata on  coal dust deposited  on  the  floor 
and  by fissuring of  the  actual  rock. 
Sprinkling is advisable  in flat  seams,  and  provided  floor  conditions  are suitable, 
but it only  leads  to  a  considerable  improvement  in the case  of  coarse-grained dust, 
not  toxic dust.  Moreover,  excessive  sprinkling makes  the working  climate difficult 
for  personnel  who  therefore  tend  to  turn it off. 
2.  Roadways 
a.  Drilling mine  chambers 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  recommends  (1)  systematic wet drilling in 
the  stonedrifts,  and  (2)  dry dust extraction where  the first method  is inapplicable. 
b.  Shotfiring 
It is  recommended  to  use wet  tamps  or gelatine pastes for  tamping mine  chambers, 
so  as  to  suppress  the dust  caused  by  the cracking of  the  rock when  the  shot is 
fired;  this method  should  be  supplemented  by previous  sprinkling of  the  floor  and 
the  sides  of roadways,  as well  as  the dirt resulting  from  previous  shots. 
When  such  tamps  cannot be used  it is advisable  to  employ  a  water-screen which  is 
tutned  on  a  few  seconds  before  the  shot  is fired. 
c.  Loading  of  excavated material 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  recommends  abundant  and  systematic  sprink-
ling of  excavated material  .. VI,  7 
d.  Machine  drivage 
In this  case  a  suitable distribution of  the  dust-extTaction and ventilation 
flow rates may  form  the basis  of  dust  suppression  so  as  to keep  the dust 
against  the drivage front  at  the maximum  distance  away  from  the machine-
operatorsw 
Dusty  air  should  be  purified by  seams  of  dry  or  humid  dedusting  equipment 
before being diluted  in the  general ventilation system. 
e.  Various  rock-working  operations 
It is  recommended  to  use  wet mechanical  picks. 
Lastly,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission would  point out  that  the air 
flow  in preparatory operations  and  advancing working  in the  seam  should  also 
be  adapted  both  to  the  firedamp  detection and  dust  conditions,  and  that  the 
air flow rates  should meet  the requirements  specified in the  introductory 
section of  the  recommendation. 
3.  Various material  handling  operations 
The  handling of  products,  whether  coal  or  stone,  inevitably gives rise  to  fine-
dust  suspensions;  it is therefore useful  to  draw  attention to  the  specific 
methods  relating  to  the  suppression of  dust  due  to  these  operations. 
Independently of  the methods  already  recommended  for  coal-getting,  e.g.  seam  in-
jection,  atomisation of  water  on  the  coalface,  the  steps required  for  stowing 
and  c~ving,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  also  recommends  a  series  of 
precautions  relating  to various  operations,  viz: 
- determining  the minimum  height of fall  during  withdrawal  and  transfer opera-
tions; 
- ensuring materials  are completely  tipped  out at  the  loading  and  unloading points; 
- using addition products  ensuring or maintaining  surface wettening of which  the 
effect continues  during  successive  tipping operations. 
As  regards  the  direction of ventilation in workings  to be  recommended  in order 
to  reduce  dust  suspension,  it is advisable  to  conduct  the air in the  same  direc-
tion as  the materials,  either by  using  a  downcast  air current when  the materials 
are withdrawn via the  lower  bottom road,  or  to hoist  the  products  into  the  top 
road  when  there  is  an upcast air  current.  In  gassy workings,  downcast  air currents 
may  only be  used  provided  the  safety regulations  permit. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission believes  however,  that  this method  of  ven-
tilation has  advantages  in certain cases,  both  from  the point  of  view  of  mine 
climate  and  dustiness. RECOMMENDATION  ON  THE  ORGANISATION  OF  SPECIAL  SERVICES 
RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  INSPECTION  OF  DUST  CONDITIONS  IN 
UNDERGROUND  WORKINGS 
(Approved  by  the  Mines  Safety Commission 
at its Plenary  Session  of  26  June  1970) 
ANNEX  VII VII,  3 
Modern  production methods  show  a  clear  trend  towards  the concentration of working 
places  and  pits.  The  increase in the daily rate of  advance  in working  faces,  resulting from 
the mechanisation  and  increased  number  of  production shifts,  automatically leads  to  an  in-
crease in instantaneous dust production. 
Moreover,  when  coal is being produced  in several  shifts a  day  this  involves  a 
number  of  simultaneous  operations  such as  pneumatic  stowing,  caving  and  coal winning. 
This  technological  progress  has  meant  an  increase  in dust  sources and  its pro-
duction. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  notes  that  special  sources  responsible 
for  the  general  organisation of  dust  control  and  the  inspection of dust  conditions  are 
already  in existence  in the Community  countries  and  the United  Kingdom,  and  it believes 
that it might  be useful  for  these services  to  be  streamlined  to  some  extent. 
At  this  early stage it would  not  be  possible  to  impose  a  uniform classification 
of workings,  considering  the  present disparity  in  the  instructions at present  in force  in 
the various  countries,  the measuring methods  used  for  dust  sampling  and  the frequency  of 
measurement. 
The  Commission  accordingly  recommends  the following  methods  of  operating: 
- The  management  of  each pit shall appoint  from  among  its staff a  person who  shall be 
responsible for  dust  control and  is not directly concerned with production and  output. 
The  said person,  and  any  assistants,  shall be  responsible for  dust  control  operations, 
any  improvements  required,  and  dust  sampling. 
- Dust is  to  be  sampled  in all working places.  The  frequency  and  location of  sampling or 
measurement will depend  on  the  hazards  to which  the men  are exposed.  The  results of 
measurements  are  to  be  recorded  in accordance with  the  standards  laid  down  in the various 
countries  and  made  available  to  the  appropriate administrations  and  the mine's medical 
department. 
- A department  belonging  to  the mining organisation or  coalfield shall assemble  the results 
of measurements,  be  responsible for  training persons  in charge of dust  control  operations 
in each mine,  and  work  out  and co-ordinate instructions  for  use  in the latter. 
- The  special  services belonging  to  the  mining  organisation or  coalfield shall keep  in 
touch with  the  relevant  technical  and  medical  departments  so  as  to  take  any  precautions 
needed  for  reducing  inadmissible dust  concentrations or moving  staff following  the re-
sults obtained during  the periodical medical  examinations. 't 
ANNEX  VIII 
STATEMENT  ON  THE  NEED  TO  REDUCE  THE  DUST  CONCENTRATION  RESULTING 
FROM  THE  USE  OF  COAL-CUTTING  AND  GETTING  MACHINERY  AND  ROADWAY  DRIVAGE 
(Approved  by  the  Mines  Safety Commission 
at its Plenary  Session  of  26  June  1970) VIII,  3 
Modern  coal  production methods  necessarily involve  a  concentration of workings, 
collieries and  coal  faces  and  ever-increasing mechanisation. 
When  mechanisation is applied  to  coal  faces  the  coal  cutting and  getting machinery 
employed  produces  a  greater  instantaneous volume  of  coal,  the direct result being  a  simul-
taneous  increase in dust  in the workings;  likewise,  the  development  of  roadway  drivage  tech-
niques  calls for  special measures  for  dust  capture  and  precipitation. 
Although  considerable progress  has  been made  on  the  economic  and  output  side, 
designers  have  so  far failed  to  overcome  the parallel  technical  problem of dust  suppression. 
At  the present date  the machinery  is not  designed  for  reducing  the dust  they  pro-
duce;  improvements  have  had  to be  introduced by  the operators  themselves,  and  in some  cases, 
despite  such  improvements,  machinery which  from  the viewpoint  of  economic  efficiency was 
technically well-designed,  could  only  be  used after many  alterations,  some  of which were 
basic,  in order  to  ensure acceptable  conditions  in the workings. 
In  the  opinion of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  steps  should  be  taken 
as  soon as  possible  to  ensure  that no  machinery  is used  in underground  workings  which  does 
not  ensure  the  dust  conditions  as  approved  by  regulation or  statute. 
In order  to meet  this requirement it recommends,  in the initial stage,  close 
co-operation between designerst  operators  and  research bodies  or centres when  the coal-
getting and  drivage machinery  is being designed or  constructed;  il would  draw  the  designerst 
attention  to  the  need  to  reduce  the dust  concentration resulting  from  the use  of  their ma-
chines,  so  as  to  prevent  further failures  or preliminary difficulties. 
In order  to  assist designers  and  to mark  the  operators desire  for  close co-opera-
tion, it recommends  that  the  Commission  of  the European Communities  should make  available 
to  them  a  bibliography on  research work  carried out  in the Community  countries  and  the 
United  Kingdom  and  which has  already produced  good  results  in  the  suppression of dust. 
Having  regard  to  the  lack of  regulations  governing  the design of  coal-getting 
and  drivage machinery,  the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  proposes  at a  later stage 
to  draw  up  a  set  of  technical  specifications for  the use  of  operators  so  as  to  help  them 
to  explain to designers what  is needed  in the field  of  dust  suppression. ANNEX  IX 
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(1)  Report on  the  characteris~ias and eZectricaZ  p~otection of cabZes  suppLying mobiZe 
machines  (coaZ-cutters.  Zoading  machines~ etc.)  used underground in coaZmines  in the 
various  Community  countries.  AvaiZabZe  ~ithout charge  from  the Secretariat of the 
Mines  Safety and HeaZth  Commission~  Lu:r:erribourg. IX,  5 
I.  Introduction 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  approved  on  28  April  1960  and  27-28 April 
1964  the  two  Recommendations  set out  below: 
a)  "Protection of  underground electrical systems  against  the  risk of electro-
cution"  (1)., 
b)  "Protection of underground electrical systems  against fire  and  firedamp 
explosion risks"  (2). 
In order  to  arrive at  a  more  precise  formulation  of  these  recommendations  and 
to  complete  them,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  empowered  the Working Party 
on  Electrification to investigate  the practical measures  adopted  in the  Community 
to  ensure  the  safety of  systems  and  to prevent  electrocution accidents  and  accidents 
due  to  fire or  firedamp  explosion.  (See  Third  Report  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission,  p.  38,  point  2.) 
In  the  framework  of  this  investigation,  the first  task  imposed  on  the Working 
Party was  defined  as  follows:  "To determine the present state in the various  Conrrnunity 
countries of devices  used  to  ensure  the  safety of underground  systems  carrying low-
or medium-tension  current  (up  to  1,100 volts)  and  of  cables  supplying power  to mobile 
machines,  taking  into  account  the  characteristics of  such  cables".  (3) 
The  Working  Party has  accomplished  that part  of its task relating to  the  areas  of 
greatest risk,  namely  the  supply  cables  to machines  which  are moved  - in the  face  or 
during  roadway  drivage - while  they  are  live.  The  Working Party drafted  a  Report  on 
this  subject which was  adopted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  at its ses-
sion on  20  June  1969.  (4) 
The  Working  Party was  invited at this meeting  to  add  to its Report  some  brief 
comments  and,  if possible,  a  set of  conclusions which  might  serve  as  a  basis  for 
special  recommendations  to be published  concerning  the  supply of  current  to mobile 
machines  underground.  These  comments  and  recommendations  are  the  subject of  the pre-
sent  document. 
II.  Recapitulation of  the  recommendations  of  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission 
concerning networks 
We  review below  the essential provisions  of  the  recommendations  of  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  mentioned  above  an  extract of which  is given in the 
annex. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  recommends: 
A.  Preventive measures 
Prevention of direct  contact. 
B.  Protective measures 
Connecting together of metallic coverings  and  earthing conductors  and  connection 
to  the main  earth electrode. 
(1)  See  Second Report of the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission.,  page  11. 
(2)  See  Third Report of the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission.,  page  3?9. 
(3)  Classification of movable  machines  see Annex I  of the  present document. 
(  4)  See  footnote.,  page  IX.,  3. IX,  6 
C.  Intervention measures 
1.  Permanent  insulation monitoring by: 
a)  cutting off the  power  supply at the first fault  in systems with  the neutral 
point  connected  to earth  through  an  impedance. 
b)  signalling of 1st fault  and  cut-off at  2nd  fault  in networks with insulated 
neutral point. 
2.  Automatic  cutting-off of  power  from  supply  cables  to mobile machines  following 
damage  to sheathing whiczh  causes  leakage  to  earth. 
3.  Protection against  overloading. 
4.  Protection against  short  circuits. 
5.  Electrical protection of  cables  supplying power  to mobile machines  in gassy 
pits. 
III.  Information  to be  drawn  from  the report 
The  Report  (1)  describes  in detail  the various  practices  adopted  and  the protec-
tive devices  used  in Community  countries  in response  to  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission's  Recommendations;  the  characteristics  of  the different processes  are  sum-
marised in the  survey  table  (annex V of  the report). (2) 
It may  be  seen  from  this  table that  the  solutions  adopted  by  the various  Com-
munity  countries  closely resemble  each  other.  The  Safety Commission's  Recommendations 
on  the  supply of power  to mobile  machines  are  for  the most  part satisfied in the  fol-
lowing manner: 
1.  Permanent  insulation monitoring is provided: 
a)  in insulated neutral point systems,  by  a  so-called insulation monitoring 
device  (CI),  operating  generally by  direct  current injection; 
b)  in systems  where  the neutral point  is  connected  to earth  through  an  impedance, 
by means  of  a  core-balance  (CB)  relay. 
2.  Electrical protection for  cables  is  generally  speaking satisfactory,  consisting 
usually of devices  known  as  safety blocks  (SB),  of which  several variations  are 
described  in the  Report  (1),  which  are  specially adapted  to  the different  types 
of  cables with which  they  are  used. 
IV.  Preliminary  remarks 
Faults  likely,  because  of  their characteristics,  to affect  the  cables  supplying 
mobile machines  with  current  have  been  studied  in the  order in which  they  are listed 
in  annex  V to  the Report.(])  The  absolute minimum  requirements with regard  to meas-
ures  which  should  in any  case be  taken  to  guard  against  faults  are  listed under 
annex  V of the  report.(2) 
The  means  at present  used  to  apply  these measures  are set out  under  "Comments". 
The  techniques  described  are  those most  generally used.  They  are only  considered  in 
so  far  as  they  provide  the protection required,  although different  and  more  sophis-
ticated processes  may  give similar if not better results.  Thus  no  details  are  given 
(1)  See  footnote  page  IX~  3. 
(2)  See  annex III of the present document. IX,  7 
"impedance  fault  detectors"  (DDI)  (1)  or double fault detectors  (2),  which  are cer-
tainly highly effective but which  have not  come  into general use. 
V.  Recommendations 
The Mines-Safety and Health Commission  therefore  recommends  that electrical 
equipment  supplying current to mobile machines  should meet  the  following minimum 
requirements: 
Recommendation  A 
Power  should  automatically be  cut off cables  supplying mobile  machines  (3}  in the 
following  cases: 
a}  phase  to  phase faults; 
b)  faults  between phase  and  earth; 
c)  faults between phase  and  polarised screen;  (2} 
d)  faults  between  conductor or polarised screen and  earth; 
e)  breaking of  the monitoring circuit. 
Comments 
a)  Phase  to phase faults 
Faults between  two  phases  should  in principle be dealt with by  current operated 
protection at  the gate-end box. 
It is not be noted that when  the cable has  individual  screens,  a  fault  between  two 
phases  is  always  preceded by  a  fault between phase  and  screen of  lower  energy. 
b)  Faults between phase  and  earth 
Protection against  faults  between phase  and  earth is in principle provided by 
insulation monitoring  (core balance  (CB)  relays  in networks with neutrals  earthed 
through  impedances;  insulation monitoring devices  (CI)  in systems  with  insulated 
neutral points).' 
It should be noted  that when  the  cable has  individual polarised screens,  the  phase 
to earth fault  is preceded by  a  fault between phase  and  polarised screen. 
c)  Fault between phase  and  polarised screen 
When  the fault  arise~ between  a  phase  and  a  polarised element,  conductor or moni-
toring screen,  the fault  current  flows  to earth across  the  supply  to  the monitoring 
circuit. 
The  current is  cut off by both  BS  and  CI  or CB. 
In  a  network with  an  insulated neutral point protection by  BS  is only possible 
if the phase  to earth capacity of  the network is sufficient.  Generally  speaking, 
this  capacity must be in the  region of  1  ~F for  each phase  and,  in short networks, 
it can be obtained by  a  capacitor. 
d)  Fault between  conductor of polarised screen and  earth 
Protection against this  fault  is provided by  safety blocks  (BS). 
(1)  Pages  23  and  39  of the Report referred to in the  footnote of page  IX,3. 
(2}  Pages  21/22 and  33/35 of the Report referred to in the  footnote of page  IX,3. 
(3}  Classification of cables  for mobile machines  see annex IV of the present 
document. 
(4)  Explanatory notes  concerning the notion "screen" see annex  V  of the present 
document. IX,  8 
e)  Break in the monitoring  circuit 
Protection is provided  by  safety blocks. 
Protection in the  event  of  cables  being pulled out  of  connectors  requires  that 
the monitoring  conductors  or polarised screen  should be  connected in such  a  way 
that it breaks  before  the main  conductors  and  the  earth  conductor. 
Recommendation  B 
The  electrical installations defined  above  should be  designed  in such  a  way  that  any 
fault  arising in the  cable  cannot  result in unintentional  starting of machines  con-
nected  to  the  supply. 
Recommendation  C 
Ci  or  CB  insulation monitors  and  BS  safety blocks  not  automatically monitored  should 
incorporate  a  device which monitors  their operation  and  integrity.  They  should  also 
have  a  fault-indicating device. 
Recommendation  D 
The  BS  safety block  should  be  arranged  so  that  the  supply  cable  cannot  become  live 
again after power  has  been  cut off due  to  a  fault. 
Recommendation  E 
The  monitoring circuits should not  give  rise  to  any  risk of  igniting firedamp. 
Recommendation  F 
The  earth conductors  should  be  symmetrically  arranged. 
Finally,  the Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  recommends  that  the  power  to  a  cable 
supplying  a  mobile machine  should  be  cut off when  the first fault  between  phase  and 
screen  (polarised  screen or earth conductor)  appears  and,  in view of  the present state 
state of  the  art it recommends  the  use  of  cables  provided with screens  (polarised 
screens  or earthconductors) of  one  of  the  types  described in annex II  (1)  of  the 
Report  (2)  except  types  A2,  B2,  D2  together with: 
a)  protection by means  of  current intensity appropriate  to  the  length  and  cross-
section of  the  cables; 
b)  a  permanent  insulation monitor  (CI  or CB); 
c)  a  safety block  incorporated  in the  gate-end box. 
(1)  See  annex IV of the present dOcument. 
(2)  See  footnote  page  IX~  3. A.  Machine 
group 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
Classification of  Movable  Machines(!) 
B.  Categ.ory 
portable 
mobile 
machines  which 
can be  advanced 
or flitted 
semi-stationary 
C.  Definition  D.  Examples 
held or guided  by  hand drills 
hand  during oper-
ation 
moved  during oper- (with 
at  ion  (while ca- (inte-
bles are live)  (gral 
(winch 
coal-cutters(with 
(sepa-
(rate 
(winch 
continuous  miners 
shuttle cars 
loading machines 
drilling jumbos 
heading machines 
advanced at  irre- afc driveheads 
gular intervals  monorail-suspend- during operation  ed transformers  (while  cables are and gate-end boxes  still live)  (relays etc.) 
advanced with  roadway  trans-
current  switched  formers,  gate-
off,  but  cable  end  boxes 
connected  (relays etc.) 
Annex  I 
E.  Essential fea-
tures demanded 
of  supply 
cables 
flexibility and 
light weight 
flexibility and 
robustness 
mechanical 
strength is of 
the first  impor-
tance 
mechanical 
strength is of 
the first  impor-
tance 
(1)  Annex  I  of the report  referred to in the  footnote  of  page  IX,  3. IX,ll 
Recommendations  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
on  electrical systems  underground  (extract) 
1.  Electric  shock  hazard 
A.  g~g~!£!gg_g~!~2!~£  (1): 
Annex  II 
1.  With  all  types  of  network direct  contact with  a  live  conductor must  be  rendered 
impossible 
2.  All  low-tension networks  must  have  the best possible equipotential  connection 
between metallic enclosures,  earth conductors  and  the  general  body  of earth.  This 
is  a  most  important  precautionary measure.  · 
3.  To  attain the  same  degree  of  safety with  allmedium-tension  systems it is neces-
sary: 
a)  automatically  to  cut off the  power  from  the  system  (or parts of  the  system) 
whetherthe neutral point  is earthed  through  an  impedance  or without  any 
impedance  (in which  case  the  fault  current is not  restricted),  as  soon  as  pos-
sible after the  fault  current  reaches  a  value  of  a  few  amperes; 
b)  to  check  continuously  the  insulation of  systems  with  insulated neutral points 
or  to  cut  them  off  automatically  (either partially or completely)  as  soon  as 
a  double  fault  occurs. 
It is  obvious  that  automatic  cutting-off  on  the  occurrence of  a  single  fault 
would  make  the networks  even  safer but  a  regulation  to  this effect is not  es-
sential. 
It is  obvious  that  the  protection must  come  into  action automatically  and  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  as  soon  as  a  double  fault  occurs  in networks with  insulated 
neutral  point  and  a  single fault  in networks with earthed neutral point. 
If a  single fault  occurs  in a  medium-tension  system with insulated neutral point 
the  tripping of  the protective device  is desirable,  but  not  essential  except per-
haps  in very  extensive networks;  an  absolute prerequisite for  this is however 
that  there  should be  an  effective  automatic protection against  double  faults, 
acting  as  quickly  as  possible.  If this  is  so,  it is  sufficient if the  interrup-
tion  takes  place before  the  total  insulation resistance of  the  system drops  to 
too  low  a  value.  It can  on  occasion also be  accepted,  purely  and  simply with 
regard  to the danger  of  electric shocks,  that working  of  the  shift should  be  com-
pleted with  an  earthed phase. 
If not  automatic  cut-off device  is installed  (3),  the  switchgear controlling 
cables  supplying mobile  machines  must  be  fitted with  an  automatic  device  to  cut 
off power  as  soon  as  a  fault  occurs  following  damage  to  the  external  insulation 
or by  damage  of  the  insulation to  an  individual  phase. 
(1)  See  2nd  Report of the Mines  Safety  Commission~  p.  20  etc. 
(2}  See  2nd  Report of the Mines  Safety  Commission~  p.  14. 
(3)  i.e. if there is no  insulation monitor with automatic cut-off in accordance with 
point A  3b)  above  for  the  system or part of a  system concerned. IX,  12 
1.  The  systems  should be  automatically protected against  overloads  by  suitably select-
ed,  adjusted,  inspected  and  maintained relays,  switches  or other equivalent 
devices. 
2.  The  systems  should be  automatically protected against  short-circuits by  means  of 
protective devices  - e.g.  fuse  units,  circuit-breakers,  etc.  - or by  the  combined 
use  of  these devices.  All  these devices  to be  capable  of breaking safely  the 
maximum  possible short-circuit  current which  can occur at  the  point where  they 
are  installed. 
These  devices  should be  chosen  and  ajusted  according  to  the  lowest  short-circuit 
current which  can  occur  at  the  end  of  the  section of  the  system which  they pro-
tect. 
Switches,  relays,  protective devices  against  short-circuits,  etc.  should,  on 
switching on,  be  able  to  cope with  the maximum  short-circuit  current which  can 
occur at  a  point where  they  are  installed. 
Should  the  power  involved  in the short-circuit on  switching off require it, the 
speed of movement  of the  switch  contacts  should not  depend  on  the  amount  of 
physical  energy  exerted by  the  operator in the  case  of hand-operated  switch-gear. 
3.  Measures  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  as  far  as  possible  there is effective pro-
tection against  faults with  low  current  intensity which would  f~il to  trip the 
protective devices  named  above  and  eDuld  cause  dangerous  heating. 
1.  The  systems  should be  laid out  in such  a  way  that  any  possible  fault  current be-
tween phase and  earth is reduced  to  a  low  value  or  rapidly  cut  off. 
2.  Preference  should  be  given to  the  use  of  automatic  protective devices  - either 
collective  or  selective - against  faults  between  phases  and  against  earth faults. 
3.  Precautions  should be  taken  to exclude  the  risk of  accidents  to men  when  detecting 
faults  or when  locating  them  and  when  the  sections  of  the  systems  in question  are 
switched  on  again. 
4.  Cables without  metal  armouring,  and  especially cables  supplying power  to mobile 
machines  in the workings,  must  be  electrically protected against  internal  or 
external  earth faults  by  individual  or  collective screens  which  are  capable  of 
carrying sufficient  current  to  operate protection devices  in the  event  of  a  fault, 
or alternatively by  the  use  of  equivalent methods  of protection. 
(1)  See  3rd Report of the  Mines  Safety  Commission~  pp.  3?5-376. 
(2)  See  3rd Report of the Mines  Safety  Commission~  p.  3?9. .  I 
IX,  13 
Table  showing  the  main  electrical protection  equipment  for 
cables  supplying mobile  machines  (1) 
(1)  Annex  V of the  report referred to in  the  footnote  of page  IX~  3. 
Annex  III IX,  14 
Legend  to  the  table  showing  the main  devices  for electrical 
protection of  cables  supplying mobile machines 
The  classification and  the  terms  described  in the  cables  and  given  in the  first 
line of  the  table  correspond  to  the  concepts  defined  in Annex  IV. 
The  protective devices  indicated by  symbols  in the  third  line of  the  table  are 
described  in Annex  IV  of  the  report  (1). 
a)  CI 
b)  BS 
c)  amp. 
d)  Rl 
e)  R2 
f)  R3 
g)  R2+3 
h)  R4 
i)  CB 
j)  BU 
k)  DBT 
1)  DDI 
The  symbols  used  in the  table have  the  following  meanings: 
insulation-monitoring device  (see Annex  IV,  page  V,  20){1) 
safety-blocks  (see Annex  IV,  page  V,  21)(1} 
amperometric  relay 
relay  for  insulation-monitoring device 
relay  for  control  current 
relay  for  fault  current 
combination  of  the  two  relays  R2  +  R3 
double-fault  relay  (2) 
core-balance  relay  (see Annex  IV,  page  V,  19)(1) 
Back-up  relay:  amperometric  relay with  time-lag,  which  cuts  off  the  supply 
transformer  on  the  primary  side when  the  core-balance relay  on  the  secondary 
side does  not  operate  (see  Annex  IV,  page  V,  20){1) 
deviced  based  on  amperometric  and  directional detection of  homopolar  current 
(see Annex  IV,  page  V,  20)(1) 
impedance-fault  detectors  (see Annex  IV,  page  V,  23)(1) 
If the detection of  a  fault  is  simultaneously provided by  two  relays,  the  symbols 
are  connected  by  a  +  sign.  The  dash  indicates if this  point  is not  applicable,  the  symbol 
0  indicates  that  the device  does  not  operate. 
(1)  This  reference relates to  the report referred to in the  footnote  of page  IX~  3. 
(2)  In  Germany  this double-fault relay is used because  up  to  1  October  1971  work  can  go 
on  for  8 hours  when  there is a  fault.  This  relay  R4  then eliminates  the  danger of oc-
currence  of a  double  fault  (fault between phase  and earth accompanied by  a  fault 
between  phase  and monitoring conductor). Annex  III 
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11)  Phase  to  phase  I  amp.  amp.  amp.  '  R1  +  amp.  R1  +  R3  +  amp.  R1  +  R3  +  amp.  CB  +  amp. 
2)  Phase  to  mass  (2) 
3)  Phase  to  polarised  screen(s)  or to  concentric 
mass  conductor 
4)  Phase  to polarised conductor  (3) 
5)  Double  fault  (4) 
a)  Phase  to  mass  conductor or  earthed  screen 
b)  Another phase  to polarised  screen  (3) 
Rl 
Rl 
Rl  +  R3 
-
Rl  Rl 
Rl  Rl  +  R3 
Rl  +  R3  -
- -
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6)  Polarised  screen  (3)  to  mass  conductor 
~~-------------------------------------------------+----------------~----------------+---------------~----------------~----------------+----------------4----------------~----------------+---------------~----------------~ 
7)  Polarised  conductor  (3)  to  mass  conductor 
8)  Breakage  of polarised  conductor  (3)  or of 
polarised  screen  (3)  or of  mass  conductor 
(breakage  of  interlocking circuit) 
9)  Penetration into  the  cable  of  a  metallic object 
connected  to  mass  and  touching only  the screens 
10)  Penetration into  the cable of  a  metallic object 
insulated  from  mass  and  touching only  the  screens, 
or possibly  2,lso  the  concentric  conductor 
Symmetry  of  mass  conductor 
Application  in  (name  of country) 
0 
0 
Yes 
Belgium 
(1)  See  Annex  IV  of  the report  refer1·ed  to  in  the  footnote  of  page  IX~  3. 
0 
0  0 
No  Yes 
Belgium  France 
0 
0 
Yes 
Germany 
Belgium 
0 
No 
Belgium 
France 
R3 
0  R3 
Yes  Yes 
France  Netherlands 
(2)  ln  France,  certain installations are  also  equipped  with  CBT  and  DDI  devices  (see  Annex  IV,  pages  V,  20  and  V,  23  respectively  of  the  report  referred to  in  the  footnote  of  page  IX,  3). 
ln  Germany  and  Belgium,  efforts are  made  to  fit  the installations with  CBT  type  devices. 
(3)  Polarised screen or polarised  conductor  =screen or conductor under  monitoring  voltage. 
(4)  Only  for  delayed  switching-off  by  CI  (see  Annex  IV,  page  V,  20 of  the  report  referred  to  in the  footnote  of  page  IX,  3)  with  respect  to  BS  or  if the  CI  device  is switched off). 
R2+3  R2+3  R2+3 
R2+3  R2+3  R2+3 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Germany  Germany  Italy IX,  17 
Annex  IV 
Classification of  the Cables  for Mobile Machines  (1) 
(1)  Annex II of the  report referred to in the  footnote  of page  IX~  3. IX,  18 
Explanation of  the  symbols  used  (1) 
Capital  letters: 
A  cables with  a  single collective  screen  (A.2  and  A.3)  or  a  mass  conductor which 
serves  at  the  same  time  as  a  single  collective screen  (A.l). 
B  cables with  individual metallic screens  for  each  core  (B.2  and  B.3)  or  a  divided 
mass  conductor  serving at  the  same  time  as  individual  screens  (B.l). 
C  cables  with  the  combined  characteristics of  groups  A  and  B. 
D  cables  with  individual  semi-conducting  screens  in which  good  lontigudinal 
conductivity is  guaranteed  (D.l,  D.2  and  D.3). 
Indices: 
1  cables  with  a  mass  conductor  serving  at  the  same  time  as  a  collective screen or 
as  individual  core  screens  (A.l,  B.l,  C.l  and  D.l). 
2  cables with  a  single mass  conductor set  asymmetrically with respect  to  the  phase 
cores  (A.2,  B.2  and  D.2). 
3  cables with  a  mass  conductor  divided  into  three  cores  set  symmetrically with 
respect  to  the  phase  cores  (A.3,  B.3  and  D.3). 
Description of  the  cables: 
A.l  cable with  3  phase  cores  and  1  concentric mass  conductor which  serves  at  the 
same  time  as  collective screen. 
A.2  cable with  4  cores,  one  serving  as  a  mass  conductor,  with  a  collective screen. 
A.3  cable with  3  phase  cores,  a  mass  conductor  divided  into  3  cores  set  symmetrically, 
and  a  collective screen. 
B.l  cable with  3  phase  cores, with  a  mass  conductor  divided  into  3  parts  serving at 
the  same  time  as  individual  core  screens. 
B.2  cable with  4  cores,  one  serving  as  a  mass  conductor,  and  with  individual  core 
screens. 
B.3 
C.la 
C.lb 
D.l 
cable with  3  phase  cores,  a  mass  conductor  divided  into  3  cores  set  symmetrically, 
individual  core  screens. 
cable with  3  phase  cores,  a  concentric mass  conductor  serving at  the  same  time 
as  a  collective screen  and  individual  screens. 
cable with  3  phase  cores,  a  mass  conductor divided  into  3  parts  serving  at  the 
same  time  as  individual  core  screens,  and  a  collective screen.  (2) 
cable with  3  phase  cores,  a  concentric mass  conductor  serving at  the  same  time 
as  a  collective screen,  and  individual  core  screens  of  semi-conducting material. 
(1)  See  note at the  end of page  IX,19  and  the illustrations of cable  types  on  page  IX,21 
of this annex. 
(2)  In  the  Netherlands,  to ensure better continuity of the  masses,  use is made  of the 
4th core  which is electrically connected over its whole  length with  the  3  individual 
mass  screens.  In  cable  C.lb 7  it is central. IX,  19 
D.2  cable with  4  cores  one  of which  serves  as  a  mass  conductor,  with  individual 
screens  of  semi-conducting material. 
D.3  cable with  3  cores,  a  mass  conductor  divided  into  3  parts set  symmetrically, 
with  individual  core  screens  of  semi-conducting material. 
NOTE: 
All  the  cables  may  have  a  certain number  of  cores  or pairs  of  auxiliary  cores 
which  are  insulated  and  can be  used  as  pilot  cores  or monitoring  cores. 
The  collective screen or  the  mass  conductor which  also serves  as  a  collective 
screen may  in  some  cases  also  act  as  armouring. 
The  various  possible ways  of  using  these  screens  are  set out  clearly in Annex  V 
of  the present  document. 
In Great Britain the mass  conductor  is  usually referred  to  as  the  earthing 
conductor. A1 
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IX,  21 
Cables for mobile machines 
Types In service or to be introduced (1) 
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Annex IV 
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Mass conductor serving as collective or individual screen (2) 
----- Concentric or individual metallic screen (2) 
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(1) This diagram does not take into account the possible use of auxiliary conductors (polarised conductors 
and pilote conductors) 
(2) See Annex V of the present document IX,  23 
Annex  V 
Explanatory notes  on  the  concept  of  "screening of electrical cables"(1) 
The  "screen"  on  a  cable is understood  to  mean  a  conducting  envelope  surrounding 
one  or several  insulated main  conductors. 
The  screens  are made  either of metal  or of  semi-conducting elastomer or plasto-
mer  material,  in which  one  or several  copper  conductors  are  embedded  to  ensure  good 
longitudinal  conductivity. 
The  screen is  collective when  it is set  concentrically  around  all the  conducting 
cores. 
The  screen is  individual when  it is set separately round  an  individual  con-
ducting  core. 
The  main  function  of  a  screen is to  allow  for  the detection of  an  insulation 
fault  on  main  conductors,  this  detection being based  on  the production on  the  screen of 
a  fault  current  to earth.  For  this  reason  the  screen is  generally electrically connected 
to  the mass,  which  is in turn earthed. 
In certain cases,  the  screen is not  directly connected  to  the mass  but  is pola-
rised.  In this instance,  it still serves  the  same  main  purpose but  also makes  it possible 
to have  constant electrical monitoring  of  the  cable in respect  of  damage  caused  by  the 
penetration of  any  conducting object which  may  be  connected  to  the mass  or to earth. 
When  a  collective screen has  a  sufficient degree  of  conductivity, it can  also 
serve  as  a  mass  conductor.  The  same  is  true of  the  individual  screens,  when  the  totality 
of  these  screens  has  sufficient conductivity.  In Germany  the  terms  screen  ("Schirm")  is 
then  replaced by  two  different  terms,  respectively "concentric protective  lead"  ("konzen-
trischer Schutzleiter")  or "protective  lead  in the  form  of  an  individual  core  sheath" 
("Schutzleiter als Einzeladerhulle"). 
When  a  collective screen has  a  high degree  of mechanical  strength, it can  also 
serve  as  an  armouring which  protects  the  cable against mechanical  damage. 
In  the Netherlands,  use  is made  of  cables  fitted with  individual  screens  of 
high  conductivity which  also play a  part  in  the  structure,  serving  as  "safety armouring" 
("veiligheidsscherm"). 
(1)  Annex III of the  report referred to in the  footnote of page  IX,  3. DECISION  (1) 
OF  9 JULY,  1957 
CONCERNING  THE  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  AND  RULES 
OF  PROCEDURE  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
ANNEX  X 
(1)  See  '~ournal offiaiel de  la Communaute  europeenne  du  aharbon  et de  l'aaier" no.  28  of 
the  31st August  1957. X,  3 
COUNCIL  OF  t1INISTERS 
DECISION 
of  9  July  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
Having  taken note of  the Recommendations  adopted  by  the Conference 
on  Safety  in Coalmines  and  of  the  proposals  submitted by  the  High Author-
ity in connection with  the Conferencets  final Report, which  afford  a  working 
basis for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines,  and 
having regard  to  their Decisions at  the Council's  36th and  42th  sessions 
on  September  6,  1956  and  on May  9  and  10,  1957,  setting up  the Mines  Safety 
Commission, 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  MEETING 
AT  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS, 
- hereby  lay  down  that  the  terms  of  reference of  the  aforesaid Commission 
shall  be  as  follows: 
1.  The  Commission  shall follow  developments  regarding  safety in coalmines,  including 
those  regarding  the  safety regulations  instituted by  the  public authorities,  and 
assemble  the  necessary  information concerning progress  and  practical results  ob-
tained,  more  especially in the  ~atter of  accident  prevention. 
To  secure  the  necessary  information,  the Commission  shall  apply  to  the  Governments 
concerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information in its possession and  submit  to  the 
Governments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help  the  High Authority  to work  out  a  method  of  compiling 
intercomparable accident statistics. 
3.  The  Commission  shall ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the quarters directly concerned 
(including in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associa-
tions)  of  relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by regular  contact with  the  Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken  to  implement  the  proposals  of  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines, 
and  such proposals  as it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research as  it deemsmostindicated  for 
the  improvement  of  safety,  with notes  as  to  the way  in which  these  can best be ef-
fected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among 
persons  responsible for  safety matters,  and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this 
purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study sessions,  establishment  of  documentation ser-
vices). 
7.  The  Commission  shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the necessary liaison 
among  the  rescue  services  of  the Community  countries. X,  4 
8.  The  Commission  shall  submit annually  to  the Council  of Ministers  and  the  High Author-
ity a  Report  on its activities  and  on  developments  regarding  safety in coalmines  in 
the different member  States.  In this  connection,  il shall  in particular examine  the 
statistics compiled  on  accidents  and  incidents  in coalmines. 
- The  Representatives  of  the  Governments  further  lay down  that  the rules 
of  procedure  of  the  Commission  shall be  those  set forth  in  the Annex  to 
the  present Decision. 
- The  Representatives  of  the  Governments  trust  that  the  High  Authority will 
arrange  for  the  Commission  to  start work  at  the earliest possible moment. 
This  Decision was  adopted  by  the Council  at its forty-fourth  session, 
on  July  9,  1957. 
For  the  Council, 
(sgd.)  J.  REY 
President. X,  5 
RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 
of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
CHAIRMAN 
Article 1 
The  Chairman  of  the Mines  Safety Commission  shall be  a  Member  of  the  High 
Authority  of  the  European Coal  and  Steel Community. 
Article  2 
ANNEX 
The  Chairman  shall conduct  the  work  of  the Commission  in accordance with  these 
Rules  of  Procedure. 
MEMBERS 
Article  3 
The  Commission  shall consist  of  24  members  appointed  by  the  Governments;  each 
country  shall  have  four  members,  of  whom  two  shall be  representatives  of  that country's 
Governments.  one  of  the  employers  and  one  of  the workers. 
Each  Government  shall  send  in writing  to  the  Chairman a  nominal  roll of  the 
members  appointed  by  it.  It shall notify  the Chairman  of  all changes  in this. 
Each  Government  may  appoint  for  any particular meeting  of  the Commission  one  or 
two  advisers,  whose  names  it shall  send  to  the Chairman. 
I.L.O.  PARTICIPATION 
Article 4 
Representatives  of  the  International  Labour  Organization shall be  invited  to 
·attend  the  proceedings  of  the Commission  in a  consultative capacity. 
U.K.  PARTICIPATION 
Article 5 
Delegates  appointed  by  the  Government  of  the United  Kingdom  may  attend  the  pro-
ceedings  of  the  Commission  as  observers. 
ORGANIZATION 
(a)  Restricted Committee 
Article  6 
A Restricted Committee  shall be  set up,  to  consist of  Governments  represent-
atives  on  the  Commission. X,  6 
A.rtiole. ? 
The  Chairman of  the Commission  shall act  as  Chairman of  the Restricted  Committee. 
A.rtiale  8 
The  function of  the Restricted  Committee  shall be  to  ensure  permanent  liaison 
among  the  Governments  of  the member  States  and  between  them  and  the Commission,  more  espe-
cially for  the  purpose of  exchanging  relevant  information.  The  Restricted Committee  shall  see 
to  the preparation of  the  Commission's  activities. 
A.rtiale  9 
The  Restricted Committee  shall be  convened  by  the Chairman. 
The  Chairman  shall be  required  to  convene it when  asked  to  do  so  by  the  represent-
atives of  three or more  Governments. 
(b)  Working  Parties 
Artiale 10 
The  Commission  of  the Restricted Committee  may  set up  Working  Parties  of  experts 
to  consider  specific  technical matters. 
A.rtiole  11 
The  Working  Parties  shall decide  their own  modus  operandi. 
A.rtiale  12 
The  Restricted  Committee  shall  be  given reports  by  the Working  Parties on  the 
results of  their proceedings,  which it shall  submit  to  the Commission with  the  comments 
of  its members. 
In  the  event  of differences  of  op~n~on within  the  Working  Parties,  the  views 
expressed  shall be  given,  together with  the  names  of  those  expressing  them. 
SECRETARIAT 
A.rtiale  13 
The  High  Authority shall be  responsible  for  the  secretarial arrangements  in 
connection with  the work  of  the Commission,  the Restricted  Committee  and  the  Working 
Parties. 
These  arrangements  shall be  underthe  charge  of  a  High Authority staff member 
appointed  to act as  Secretary. 
All documents  shall be  in the  four  official  languages  of  the  Community. X,  7 
WORKING  PROCEDURE 
Article  14 
The  Chairman  shall fix the  agenda  and  the dates  of  meetings  after consultation 
with  the members  of  the Restricted Committee. 
Article 15 
The  Chairman shall allow to  speak any member  of  the  Commission,  representative 
of  the International Labour  Organization or United  Kingdom  observer  asking  to  do  so. 
The  Chairman may  allow advisers  to  speak. 
Article  16 
The  members  of  the High Authority shall have  the right  to  attend meetings  of  the 
Commission  and  of  the Restricted  Committee,  and  to  speak  there. 
The  Chairman may  bring with him  advisers,  whom  he  may  allow  to  speak. 
Article 1? 
Where  the Commission  or  the Restricted  Committee  deems  it desirable  to  obtain 
infor~~tion concerning  the various  aspects  of  safety  in coalmines,  it shall request  this 
from  the  Governments  of  the member  States. 
Article  18 
Sixteen members  shall constitute a  quorum.  Conclusions  shall be  adopted  by  major-
ity of  the members  present. 
Proposals  by  the  Commission  under  1,3 of  its terms  of  reference shall,  however, 
require  a  vote  in favour  by  two-thirds  of  the members  present,  and  by  not  less  than thirteen 
members  in alL 
Any  dissenting  op~n~ons shall be  brought  to  the  attention of  the  Governments 
should  the members  expressing  them  so  request. X;  8 
THE  COUNCIL 
DECISION  (1) 
of March  11,  1965 
of  the Representatives  of  the  Governments 
of  the Member  States  assembled  in  the  Special 
Council  of Ministers  to  modify  the decision 
of  July  9,  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  ASSEMBLED 
IN  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  -
having  regard  to  the decision of  July  9,  1957  regarding  the  terms  of 
reference  and  rules  of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  and 
having  regard  to  the  High Authority's  proposal  of  January  7,  1964, 
and 
seeing  that  this decision in no  way  affects Article  118  of  the  Treaty 
setting up  the European  Economic  Commununity, 
DECIDE: 
Article 1 
The  terms  of  reference of  the Mines  Safety Commission  laid  down  by  the  deci~ion 
of  July  9,  1957  are  repl~ced by  the  provisions  in the  annex. 
Article  2 
The  provisions  of Article  17  of  the  rules  of  procedure  annexed  to  the Decision 
of  July  9,  1957  are replaced  by  the  following  provisions: 
"Should  the  Mines  Safety Commission or  the Restricted  Committee  consider it 
desirable  to  receive  information regarding  the various  fields  for  which it is 
responsible,  it shall  apply  to  the  Governments  of  the  member  States." 
This  decision was  adopted  by  the  Council  at its one-hundredth  session,  on 
March  11,  1965. 
For  the  Council 
(sgd.)  M.  MAURICE-BOKANOWSKI 
President 
(1)  See  "Journal officiel de  la  Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon  et de  l'acier" no.  46 
of 22nd  March  1965. X,  9 
ANNEX 
TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  FOR  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
1.  The  Commission  shall follow  developments  regarding  safety and  measures  to  avoid  at work-
ing-points  conditions which represent  a  danger  to health in coalmines,  including  to  this 
end  the  safety regulations instituted by  the public authorities  and  assemble  the  necessary 
information concerning progress  and  practical results obtained. 
To  secure  the necessary  information,  the  Commission  shall apply  to  the  Governments  con-
cerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information  in its possession and  submit  to  the  Govern-
ments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety  and  healthy conditions  in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help  the  High  Authority  to work  out  a  method  of  compiling  inter-
comparable  statistics on  accidents  and  damage  to  health attributable  to  vocational 
activities  in coalmines. 
3.  The  Commission  shall ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associations) 
of relevant information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular contact with  the  Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken to  implement  the  proposals  of  the Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines, 
and  such proposals  as  it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research as  it deems  most  indicated for 
the  improvement  of  safety,  and  of  healthy working  conditions  in coalmines,  with notes 
as  to  the way  in which  these  can be  effected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among  per-
sons  responsible for  safety matters  and  the maintenance  of  healthy working  conditions, 
and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study  sessions, 
establishment  of  documentation  services). 
7.  The  Commission  shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the  necessary  liaison 
among  the  rescue  services of  the  Community  countries. 
8.  The  Commission  spall  submic  annually  to  the  Council  of Ministers  and  the  High Autority 
a  Report  on its activities and  on  developments  regarding  safety and  protection of  health 
in coalmines  in the different member  States.  In this connection,  it shall  in particular 
examine  the statistics compiled  in  these fields. COMPOSITIO~ OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION  AND  ITS  WORKING  PARTIES 
(AS  AT  31.12.1970) 
ANNEX  XI XI,3 
A.- MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  Representatives 
Ministerialrat W.  SCHNASE,  Referat  III A 1,  Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft, 
53  Bonn 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER,  Ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und 
Verkehr  des  Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Employers'  Representative 
Bergrat  a.D.  H.  ERNST,  Geschaftsfuhrer des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen, 
Frillendorfer Strasse 351 
Workers'  Representative 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter des  Sachgebietes Arbeitsschutz,  IG-Bergbau und  Energie, 
4630  Bochum,  Alte Hattingerstr.  19 
Technical Advisers 
H.  BERG,  Bergdirektor,  Ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und  Verkehr  des 
Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Ministerialrat K.  HUBNER,  Leiter der Unterabteilung Montanwirtschaft,  Ministerium 
fur Wirtschaft,  Verkehr  und  Landwirtschaft,  66  Saarbrucken,  Hardenbergstr.  8 
BELGIUM 
Government  Representatives 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur-generaal van  het Mijnwezen,  Ministerie van  Economische  Zaken 
en  Energie,  24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur general  des  mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du  Centre  de  coordination de  sauvetage  du  bassin de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Kiewit-Hasselt 
Workers'  Representative 
J.  OLYSIAEGERS,  Secretaire national  de  la Centrale  syndicale des  travailleurs des 
mines  de  Belgique,  F.G.T.B.,  Koolmijnlaan  1,  Houthalen 
Technical Advisers 
L.  BOULET,  Directeur general  du  Fonds  national de  retraite des  ouvriers mineurs, 
Ministere du  travail et de  la prevoyance  sociale,  6,  place Stephanie,  Bruxelles 
E.  VANDENDRIESSCHE,  Secretaire general de  la Centrale des  francs~ineurs, 26-32, 
avenue  d'Auderghem,  Bruxelles  4 XI,4 
FRANCE 
Government  Representatives 
L.  KOCH,  Ingenieur  en  chef  des mines,  Direction des  mines,  Ministere  de  l'industrie, 
99,  rue  de  Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
D.  PETIT,  Ingenieur  des  mines,  Direction des  mines,  Arrondissement  de  Metz, 
1,  rue  Eugene  Schneider,  57-Metz 
Employers'  ~epresentative 
A.  PROUST,  Directeur general  des  services  techniques  des  charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  Be 
Workers'  Representative 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale des  syndicats  chretiens  des mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  75-Paris  5e 
Technical Adviser 
St.  NOWAK,  4,  rue  Charcot,  62-Lens,  Pas-de-Calais,  France 
ITALY 
Government  Representatives 
Dott.  Consigliere  B.  COLUCCI,  Direzione  generale dell'emigrazione,  Ministero degli 
affari esteri,  Roma 
Dott.  Ing.  M.  MARRA,  Ispettore generale delle miniere, Ministero dell'industria e 
commercio,  via Veneto  33,  Roma 
Employers'  Representative 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto Arte Mineraria della facolta d'Ingegneria,  Piazza d'Armi, 
Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
Workers'  Representative 
Dott.  G.  CRAVIOTTO,  Segretario generale della Federestrattive, via Isonzo  42,  Roma 
Technical Advisers 
Dott.  C.  MICHELAZZI,  Ispettore generale del Ministero del  lavoro  e  della previdenza 
sociale, via Flavia 6,  Roma 
Dott.  R.  PURPURA,  Direttore generale al Ministero  del  lavoro,  via Flavia 6,  Roma 
LUXEMBOURG 
Government  Representative 
A.  SCHUSTER,  Ingenieur-directeur  du  travail et des  mines,  inspection du  travail et 
des mines,  19,  av.  Gaston Diderich,  Luxembourg 
Employers'  Representative 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur de  securite  a  l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch/Alzette 
Workers'  Representative 
N.  PASCOLINI,  President  de  la delegation ouvriere d'Arbed-Mines,  90,  rue  des  Fleurs, 
Schiff  lange XI,5 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  Representatives 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS,  Inspecteur-generaal  der  mijnen,  Staatstoezicht op  de  mijnen, 
Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL,  Plaatsvervangend  Inspecteur-generaal der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht 
op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Employers'  Representative 
Ir. G.B.  DEBETS,  Directeur,  Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Workers'  Representative 
J.M.  WEIJERS,  Vice-Voorzitter van  de  Nederlandse  Katholieke Mijnwerkersbond, 
Seringenstraat  9,  Passart-Zuid 
Technical Adviser 
H.L.  GROND,  Chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdienst,  p/a Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Government  Representatives 
J.W.  CALDER  O.B.E.,  H.M.,  Chief  Inspector  of Mines  and  Quarries,  Department  of  Trade 
and  Industry,  Thames  House  South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.  1 
J.R.  WILSON,  Assistant  Secretary,  Separtment  of Trade  and  Industry,  Thames  House 
South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.  1 
Employers'  Representative 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLET,  Deputy  Director-Generaal  of  Production,  National Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor Place,  London  S.W.  1 
Workers'  Representative 
S.  SCHOFIEDD,  Vice-President  of  the National  Union  of Mineworkers,  c/o Miner's  Offices 
Barnsley  I  Yorkshire 
INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  ORGANISATION,  GENEVA 
A representative of  the  International  Labour  Office sitting as  an  observer. 
B.- RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE 
The  Restricted Committee  consists  of  the  Government  members  of  the Mines  Safety and 
Health  Commission. XI,6 
C.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  TECHNICAL  QUESTIONS 
I.  Working  Party on  Electrification 
- Members  of  the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Bergdirektor  W.  SCHOTTELNDREIER,  Landesoberbergamt  Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
46  Dortmund,  Goebenstr.  25 
Dipl. -Ing.  L.  GEBHARDT,  Steinkohlenbergbauverein,  4J  Essen,  Fri  llendorfer  Strasse  351 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN  (1),  Inspecteur general  des mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire  a  !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue  J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.J.A.  COOLS,  Inspecteur general  des  mines  honoraire,  Eug.  Plasky Laan  75, 
B-1040  Brussel 
FRANCE 
N.  TRETIAKOW,  Ingenieur  en  chef  au  service exploitation des  charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  Be 
F.  VIN,  Ministere de  l'industrie,  service de  !'hygiene et de  la secnrite miniere, 
97,  rue  de  Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
P.  FLINOIS,  Houillere du  bassin du  Nord  et du  Pas-de-Calais,  service  technique  du  fond, 
· 20,  rue  des  Minimes,  Douai  (Nord) 
'ITALY 
Dott.  Ing.  C.  MACCIONI,  ENEL,  Compartimento Cagliari,  Sett.  tecnico,  Piazza Deffenu  2, 
Cagliari 
LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur civil des  mines  a  l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  E.A.R.  HOEFNAGELS,  Inspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht op  de  mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir. P.H.  GIESBERTZ,  p/a Staatsmijn Emma/Hendrik  te Hoensbroek,  Hoensbroek/Heerlen(L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
B.J.  BURKLE,  H.M.  Principal Electrical Inspector of Mines  and  Quarries,  Thames 
House  South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.  1 
R.  HARTILL,  Chief  Electrical Engineer,  National  Coal  Board,  The  Lodge, 
South Parade,  Doucaster  (Yorkshire) 
- Experts  on  cables  and  leads 
Dr.  J.  UELPENICH,  Land- und  Seekabelwerke,  Niehler Strasse 100,  50  Koln-Nippes 
H.  GOBBE,  Directeur ala division cablerie des  A.C.E.C.,  Charleroi 
(1)  Chairman  of the  Working  Party as representative of the Restriated Committee XI,7 
M.  OSTY,  Directeur  technique a la societe industrielle de  liaisons electriques, 
64bis,  rue  de  Monceau,  Paris  Be 
M.  PAINDAVOINE,  Ingenieur au  CERCHAR,  Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise) 
Y.  EYRAUD,  Chef  du  laboratoire d'etudes  generales  des  cables  de  Lyon,  170,  avenue 
Jean-Jaures,  Lyon  (Rhone) 
Ir. F.  GOEDBLOED,  Nederlandse Kabelfabriek,  Delft 
Ir. W.L.  BAER,  N.V.  Hollandse  Draad- en  Kabelfabriek,  Amsterdam 
II.  Working  Party on  Rescue Arrangements  and  on  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion 
- Members  of  the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER  (1),  Ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Mittelstand 
und  Verkehr,  Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Dipl.-Berging.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fur das  Grubenrettungswesen  des 
Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  2B 
Dipl.-Ing~ A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle  fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
A.  VAN  GEMBER,  Erster Bergrat a.D., Direktor der  Grubensicherheitsabteilung der 
Saarbergwerke  AG,  66,  Saarbrucken,  Trierer Strasse 1 
H.  BERG,  Bergdirektor,  Ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und  Verkehr,  Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general  des mines,  Ministere  des  affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur genP.ral  des mines,  Ministere  des  affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  Directeur du  centre national belge  de  coordination des  centrales de 
sauvetage,  17,  rue Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur  du  centre de  coordination de  sauvetage  du  bassin de  Campine, 
Kempische  Steenweg  555,  Kiewitt-Hasselt 
FRANCE 
R.  GRISARD,  Ingenieur  des mines,  charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier, 
75-Paris  Be 
G.  ROGEZ,  Directeur du  poste central de  secours  des  mines  du  Nord  et du  Pas-de-Calais, 
rue  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette,  62-Lens  (Pas-de-Calais) 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours,  Belle-Roche, 
57-Merlebach 
H.  BONARDOT,  Ingenieur  en chef,  houilleres  du  bassin de  la Loire,  9,  rue  Benoit 
Charvet,  42-Saint-Etienne 
(1)  Chairman  of the  Workinp  Party as representative of the Restricted Committee. XI,8 
LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  ingenieur de  securite  a  l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
ITALY 
Prof.  Ing.  P.  PIGA,  Titolare della cattedra di Arte Mineraria della facolta di 
Ingegneria di Roma,  via Eusossiana,  Roma 
Ing.  A.  BIGNONE,  ENEL,  Miniera di  Seruci,  09013-Carbonia  (Sardegna) 
Dott.  Ing.  G.  FORTE,  Distretto minerario,  via C.  Battisti  10,  Trieste 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  D.J.  KNUTTEL,  Plaatsvervangend  Inspecteur-generaal der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht 
op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  Chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus  65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
H.L.  GROND,  Chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdienst,  p/a  Oranje-Nassau  Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLETT,  Deputy Director-General  of  Production,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor Place,  London  S.W.  1 
G.  MILLER,  Deputy  Chief  Inspector  of  Mines  and  Quarries,  Department  of  Trade  and 
Industry,  Thames  House  South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.  1 
1.  Experts  on  Aspects  of Fires  in Deep  Shafts 
GERMANY 
Dipl.-Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft mbH, 
46  Dortmund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Dipl.-Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer Leiter der  Hauptstelle fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.-Ing.  K.  RENNER,  Forschungsstelle der  Grubenbewetterung  des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins, 
43  Essen-Kray,  Frillendorfer Strasse  351 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  W.  SCHMIDT,  Westfalische  Berggewerkschaftskasse,  Prufstelle fur  Gruben-
bewetterung,  4630  Bochum,  Herner  Strasse  43 
BELGIUM 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  Directeur  du  centre national  belge  de  coordination  des  centrales  de 
sauvetage,  17,  rue Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du  centre  de  coordination de  sauvetage  du  bassin de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Hasselt 
R,  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire  a  l'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue  J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
J.  PATIGNY,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  Institut d'hygiene  des  mines,  Havermarkt,  Hasselt 
FRANCE 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste  central  de  secours  Belle-Roche, 
Merlebach  (Moselle) 
R.  LOISON,  Directeur des  groupes  de  recherches,  Cerchar,  35,  rue  Saint-Dominique, 
75-Paris  7e XI,9 
M.  FROGER,  Ingenieur  au Cerchar,  35,  rue  Saint-Dominique,  75-Paris  7e 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  D.J.  KNUTTEL,  Plaatsvervangend Inspecteur-generaal  der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de 
mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  Chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus  65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.S.  EISNER,  Ministry of  Power,  Safety in Mines  Research Establishment,  Harpur 
Hill,  Buxton  (Derbyshire) 
2.  Experts  on Fire-Resistant Fluids 
GERMANY 
Dipl.-Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen  des 
Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  H.W.  THOENES,  Direktor,  Technischer  Dberwachungsverein e.V., 
43  Essen,  Steubenstr.  53 
Dipl.-Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungs1eiter,  Versuchsgrubengese11schaft mbH, 
46  Dortmund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  MALORNY,  Direktor  des  Pharmakologischen Instituts der Universitat 
Hamburg,  2  Hamburg,  Martinistr.  52 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  C.A.  PRIMAVESI,  Hygiene-Institut  des  Ruhrgebietes,  4650  Ge1senkirchen, 
Rotthauserstr.  19 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  BENTHE,  Pharrnakologisches  Institut der Universitat Hamburg, 
2  Hamburg,  Martinistr.  52 
BELGIUM 
H.  CALLUT,  Ingenieur  en  Chef  - Directeur des  mines,  Institut national  des  industries 
extractives  (INIEX),  60,  rue  Grande,  7260-Paturages 
J.  BRACKE,  Ingenieur principal divisionnaire,  Institut national  des  industries extrac-
tives  (INIEX),  60,  rue  Grande,  7260-Paturages 
Dr.  J.  CRISPOUX,  2,  rue Potresse,  7200-Wasmes 
FRANCE 
G.  BLANPAIN,  Ingenieur,  Centre d'etudes  et de  recherches  des  Charbonnages  de  France, 
Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise),  BP  27,  F-60  Crei1 
R.  PLOUCHARD,  Ingenieur  des  mines,  chef  du  laboratoire lubrifiant,  59-Sin-le-Noble/Nord 
Dr.  AMOUDRU,  Medecin-chef  des  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  Paris  8e 
E.  QUINOT,  Chef  de  1a section physique et recherches  mathematiques,  Centre  d'etudes 
medicales minieres  du  Nord/Pas-de-Calais,  129-133,  avenue  Salengro,  59-Sin-le-Noble/Nord 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  VAN  BLARICUM,  Staatstoezicht op  de  mijnen,  Apollo1aan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) XI,lO 
3.  Experts  on Ventilation 
GERMANY 
Dipl.-Ing.  W.  BOTH,  Hauptstelle fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen  des  Steinkohlenbergbau-
vereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  w-.  SCHMIDT,  Prufstelle fur  Grubenbewetterung,  4630  Bochum,  Herner 
Strasse  45 
BELGIUM 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
J.  PATIGNY,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  Institut d'hygiene  des mines,  Havermarkt  22, 
Hasselt 
FRANCE 
M.  GANIER,  Ingenieur Principal,  Cerchar,  35,  rue  St Dominique,  75-Paris  7e 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours,  Belle-Roche, 
57-Merlebach  (Moselle) 
E.  SIMODE,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  houilleres  du bassin de  Lorraine,  direction des 
etudes et des  travaux neufs,  Petite-Rosselle  (Moselle) 
NETHERLANDS 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  Chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus  65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
III.  Working  Party on Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft Guides 
- Members  of  the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Dr.-Ing.  H.  ARNOLD,  Leiter der Seilprufstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschafts-
kasse,  4630  Bochum,  Dinnendahlstr.  9 
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Requirements  which  must  be  met  by electrical shotfiring leads  (2nd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  page  8,  June  1961); 
Protection of  the  underground electrical network  against  the  danger of electric 
shocks  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  11,  June  1961); 
Report  on  investigations  into  the  protection of underground electrical network 
against  dangers  arising  from  fires  or from  firedamp  explosions  (3rd Report  MSHC, 
Annex  VII,  November  1966); 
Report  on  firedamp-proof electrical switchgear for  nominal  voltages  above  1100 
volts  (3rd Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII,  November  1966); 
Notes  on  the  problem of heat  transmission in an  insulated  conductor  (3rd Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IX,  November  1966); 
Report  on  characteristics  and  the electrical protection of power  feed  cables  for 
mobile machines  (cutters,  loaders, etc.)  used  underground in the  coalmines  of  the 
countries of  the  Community  (7th Report  of  the MSHC,  Annex  V,  September 1970); 
Comments  and  recommendations  arising  out  of the  report  adopted by  the Mines  Health 
and  Safety  Commission  on  20  June  1969  on  the  characteristics  and  electrical protec-
tion  of cables  supplying mobile machines  (coal cutters,  loading machines  etc.)  used 
underground  in coalmines  in  the  Community  countries  (8th Report  of  the MSHC, 
Annex  IX,  June  1971). XII,  6 
D - Winding  ropes  and  shaft guides 
Report  on  the electro-magnetic examination of winding  ropes  (3rd Report  of 
the MSHC,  Annex  VI,  November  1966); 
Final  report  on  electro-magnetic tests  carried out with  the  financial  aid of 
the High  Authority in the Bochum  Rope-testing  Station  (3rd Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  XI  a,  November  1966); 
Report  on  the  use  of  accelerometers  for  testing winding  installations  (3rd 
Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  November  1966); 
Report  on  measurement  and  testing procedures  for shaft- and  roadway  winding  ropes 
and  for guides  for shaft- and  roadway  haulage  installations  (7th  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  Annex  VII,  September  1970). 
E  - Combustible  dusts 
Report  on  work  done  on  the neutralization of  combustible  dusts  and  dust barriers 
(7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII,  September  1970). 
F  - Mechanization 
Recommendations  concerning  the  equipment  of  locomotives  (1st  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
April  1959); 
Recommendations  concerning  the neutralization of  exhaust  gases  from  diesel  engines 
(1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959). 
II.  HEALTH  PROTECTION  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS 
Explanatory notes  to  the  recommendation  on  "Fixing of  climatic  limits" 
(3rd Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X,  November  1966); 
Recorrnnendation  on  "Fixing  of  climatic  limits"  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI, 
November  1966); 
Recommendation  embodying  directives  on  means  of  suppressing  dust  concentrations 
in  underground workings  (8th  Report  of the  MSHC,  Annex  VI,  June  1971); 
Recommendation  on  the  organisation of  special services  responsible  for  the 
inspection of  dust  conditions  in  underground working  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VII,  June  1971); 
Statement  on  the need  to  reduce  the  dust  concentration  resulting  from  the  use 
of coal-cutting  and  getting machinery  and  roadway  drivage  (8th  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  Annex  VIII,  June  1971); 
III.  HUMAN  FACTORS 
A - Medical  problems 
Report  on  pre-entry ~nd routine medical  examinations  and  recommendations 
(2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  74,  June  1961); 
Colliery medical  services  in the  countries  of  the  Community  and  the  United 
Kingdom  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  C,  June  1961). XII,  7 
B - Psychological  and  sociological  factors  in mine  safety 
Report  on  the  psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety  (3rd Report 
of  the MSHC,  Annex  XII,  November  1966); 
Recommendation  on  the  psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety 
(3rd Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XIII,  November  1966). 
C - Effects  of remuneration methods  on  safety 
Report  on  the  implications  of  payment  at  piece  rates  for mine  safety 
(4th Report  of  the MSHC,  Annex  III, December  1967); 
Recommendations  as  to principles  to be  observed  in view  of  the possible influence 
of  payment  at  piece  rates  on  safety in coal mines  (4th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
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